The transaction cost economics (TCE) theory of trading favors

Asia Pacific Journal of Management

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 409-431

  Verbeke, Alain ^a,b   Kano, Liena ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

^b FREE UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSELS   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Bounded reliability; Emerging economies; Informal organization; Trading favors; Transaction cost economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877608464     PISSN: 02174561     EISSN: 15729958     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10490-012-9324-6     Document Type: Article

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