Government regulation, corruption, and FDI

Asia Pacific Journal of Management

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 487-511

  Mudambi, Ram ^a   Navarra, Pietro ^b,c   Delios, Andrew ^d  

^a TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MESSINA   (Italy)

^c LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^d NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Corruption; Endogenous; Favors; Foreign direct investment (FDI); Systems approach

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877619166     PISSN: 02174561     EISSN: 15729958     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10490-012-9311-y     Document Type: Article

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