How to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise: Voting on the Great Reform Act of 1832

Public Choice

Volumn 155, Issue 3-4, 2013, Pages 229-250

  Aidt, Toke S ^a,b   Franck, Raphaël ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

^c BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Democratization; Franchise extension; The Great Reform Act

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876984012     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9911-y     Document Type: Article

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