Political exchange and the voting franchise: Universal democracy as an emergent process

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 203-220

  Horpedahl, Jeremy ^a  

^a BUENA VISTA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Constrained government; Democracy; Political exchange; Voting franchise

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960958038     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-010-9103-7     Document Type: Article

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