Beyond Outcomes: The Influence of Intentions and Deception

Expanding the Space of Cognitive Science - Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2011

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1860-1865

  Schächtele, Simeon ^a   Gerstenberg, Tobias ^a   Lagnado, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

deception; experimental game; Intentions; outcomes; preferences; punishment; reward

Indexed keywords

DECEPTION; EXPERIMENTAL GAME; INTENTION; OUTCOME; PREFERENCE; PUNISHMENT; REWARD;

EID: 84875810455     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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