Public enforcement of law

Criminal Law and Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-59

  Polinsky, A Mitchell ^a   Shavell, Shavell ^b  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875268898     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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