Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 323-335

  Polinsky, A Mitchell ^a,b  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Auditing; Fines; Misrepresentation of wealth; Penalties; Public enforcement

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847074524     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2006.11.004     Document Type: Article

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