The structural exceptionalism of Bankruptcy administration

UCLA Law Review

Volumn 60, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 384-460

  Pardo, Rafael I ^a   Watts, Kathryn A ^b  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

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EID: 84874752149     PISSN: 00415650     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (406)

1. This Article uses the terms "Bankruptcy Code" and "Code" to refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
2. (codified as amended primarily at 11 U. S. C. §§ 101-1532 (2006)).
3. See Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L. J. 1, 84 (2006);
4. Matthew Stephenson & Kristin Hickman, The Administrative Law of Borrowed Regulations: Legal Questions Regarding the Bankruptcy Law's Incorporation of IRS Standards, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Jan. 2008, at 1, 1.
5. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 654 (2008)
6. cf Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 919, 963 (1991) ("It is the judiciary, far more than Congress, which controls the evolution of bankruptcy policy.")
7. cf. Thomas M. Mackey, Post-Footstar Balancing: Toward Better Constructions of § 365 (c) (1) and Beyond, 84 AM. BANKR. LJ. 405, 478 (2010) ("[T]he fact that Congress chose not to make an administrative agency such as the PTO, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but did choose to create specialized bankruptcy courts as the only means for formal, legally binding restructuring or liquidation bankruptcy procedures, implies that Congress saw bankruptcy courts as having quasiadministrative, as well as adjudicative, functions."). These scholars, however, either have touched on the issue only in passing or have discussed the judicial role in bankruptcy without evincing an awareness of the choice-of-delegate issues raised by Congress's empowerment of the courts rather than an agency.
8. Chevron, U. S A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 865 (1984).
9. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L. J. 2225, 2228 (1997) ("[A]ny time Congress enacts a statute that does not resolve an interpretive question that arises in the process of administering the statute, Congress has created the need for some other institution to resolve a policy dispute."); (Pubitemid 127423584)
10. Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 997, 1024 (2007) ("[S]electing one reading of an ambiguous statute over another can be viewed as a 'political act' that turns on policy questions.").
11. Lisa Bressman, The Judicial Playing Field: Courts as Lawmakers, JOTWELL (July 11, 2011), http://adlaw.jorvvell.com/me-judiccial-playing-field-courts-as- lawmakers.
12. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 287 (Jarnes Madison) (fohn C. Hamilton ed., 1885) ("All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular... adjudications.");
13. see also Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 428 (2008).
14. Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 365 (2010) (emphasis added).
15. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U. S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring);
16. see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 49, 54 n. 18 (2005)
17. Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modem Doctrines of Deference With the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 77 (2000). (Pubitemid 33651494)
18. Cf Amnon Lehavi, Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking, 96 MINN. L. REV. 520, 576 (2011)
19. Compare H. LAHART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 131 (2d ed. 1997)
20. See Thomas C. Arthur, Work a ileanti trust law: the statutory approach to anti trust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (1988);
21. See, e.g, Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1751 (2011);
22. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1041 (2003).
23. See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984) (calling for deference to agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions);
24. See NAT'L ASS'N CONSUMER BANKR. ATTORNEYS, STUDENT LOAN DEBT CRISIS SURVEY (2012), available at http://nacba.org/Portals/0/Documents/Student Loan Debt/020712 NACBA student loan survey.pdf
25. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
26. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
27. See David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 227 (2007);
28. Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of MPCPA: Not What Was Advertised, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2005, at 1, 70.
29. See Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Beiman, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L. J. 195, 228 (2007).
30. 11 U. S. C. § 301 (a) (2006).
31. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 244 (1934).
32. See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. §§ 1322 (a) (1), 1328 (a).
33. See 28 U. S. C. § 157 (a) (2006).
34. The federal district courts have entered standing orders that, in the first instance, refer bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy courts. Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation Into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1756 (2008).
35. See 28 U. S. C. § 1334 (a).
36. Menk v. Lapaglia (In reMenk), 241 B. R. 896, 909 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1999).
37. In re Attorneys at Law & Debt Relief Agencies, 353 B. R. 318, 322-23 (S. D. Ga. 2006) ("A 'case' refers to a matter initiated by the filing of a petition seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code. A 'proceeding' refers to everything which happens within the context of a bankruptcy case.");
38. H. R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 379 (1977)
39. refrintedin 1978 U. S. C. CA. N. 5963, 6335.
40. See 11 U. S. C. § 522 (1) (2006).
41. See 28 U. S. C. § 581 (a) (2006).
42. See 28 U. S. C. § 581 (a).
43. See 28 C. F. R. § 0.37 (2012) ("The Executive Office for United States Trustees shall be headed by a Director appointed by the Attorney General.");
44. GEN. GOVT DIV., U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-133, BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION: JUSTIFICATION LACKING FOR CONTINUING TWO PARALLEL PROGRAMS 4(1992), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d35tl l/147775.pdf (The Attorney General established the Executive Office for United States Trustees (EOUST) to provide legal, administrative, and management support to the individual UST districts."). Although no statute contains an express provision establishing the EOUST, the Judicial Code does make two references to the EOUST.
45. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 156 (f), 586 (a) (3) (A) (i).
46. 28 C. F. R. § 0.38 (The [EOUST] Director shall perform such duties relating to such functions and others under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as may be assigned by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General.").
47. See Executive Office for United States Trustees, U. S. DEPT JUST., http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/eoust.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (depicting an EOUST organizational chart).
48. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302 (d) (3) (A), (E), 100 Stat. 3088, 3121-22 (amended 1990 and 2000).
49. See 28 U. S. C. § 331 (establishing the JCUS).
50. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act § 302 (d) (3) (I), 100 Stat, at 3123.
51. See Dan J. Schulman, The Constitution, Interest Groups, and the Requirements cf Uniformity: The United States Trustee and the Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 74 NEB. L. REV. 91, 121 & n. 161 (1995).
52. See 132 CONG. REC. 10, 008-10 (1986) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
53. See 132 CONG. REC. 10, 013
54. This leaves the decision where it should be-within the judicial districts which will be most affected by the decision" Id at 10, 009
55. See 132 CONG. REC. 10, 009 (statement of Sen. Heflin).
56. 9 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 210 (a) (2010) [hereinafter JCUS REG.].
57. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OFTHE U. S., REPORT OFTHE PROCEEDINGS OFTHE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 49, 53-54, 81-82(1987), available at http://www.us courts.gov/FederalCouits/JudicialConference/Proceedings/ Proceedings.aspoc?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1987-09.pdf
58. 9 JCUS REG., supra note 76, § 220. 40 (a).
59. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302 (d) (3) (A) (ii), 100 Stat. 3088, 3121
60. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 317 (a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5115 (extending date for judicial districts in Alabama and North Carolina to join the UST Program to October 1, 2002).
61. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 501, 114 Stat. 2410, 2421
62. (codified at 28 U. S. C. § 581 note (2006)) (eliminating requirement that judicial districts in Alabama and North Carolina join the UST Program by a date certain).
63. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act § 302 (d) (3) (A) (ii), 100 Stat, at 3121 (providing that any judicial district in Alabama or North Carolina will not join the UST Program unless "such district elects to be included in a bankruptcy region established in
64. [28 U. S. C. § 581 (a)]");
65. See GEN. GOVT DIV., supra note 66, at 1
66. See 28 U. S. C. § 601
67. 9 JCUS REG., supra note 76, § 230. 30 (b).
68. 28 U. S. C. § 586 (a);
69. see also 11 U. S. C. § 701 (a) (2) (2006)
70. See 9 JCUS REG., supra note 76, § 240. 10 (e) (7), (e) (10), (f).
71. See 11 U. S. C. § 307 (UST standing);
72. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 317 (b), 104 Stat. 5089, 5115
73. (codified at 11 U. S. C. § 307 note) (BA standing);
74. see also 9 JCUS REG., supra note 76, § 240. 20 (b) ("Bankruptcy administrators may file objections, applications, responses, motions, appeals, and other pleadings concerning any matter affecting estate administration in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and local rules.");
75. See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. § 707 (a) (3), (b) (6).
76. See Thomas D. Buckley, The Untapped Power of Bankruptcy's Wild Card: The United States Trustee, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 249, 250 (1997).
77. See H. R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 4 (1977) (describing USTs as "bankruptcy watchdogs")
78. reprinted in 1978 U. S. C. C AN. 5963, 5966;
79. U. S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES TRUSTEES 38-39(1988), available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust-org/ustp-manuai/ docs/voll-1988AUG-generaLpdf.
80. See 11 U. S. C. § 707 (a) (3), (b) (1).
81. See 28 U. S. C. § 586 (a) (3) (A) (i) (2006)
82. See Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Filed Under 11 U. S. C. 330
83. 61 Fed. Reg. 24, 889 (May 17, 1996)
84. (codified at 28 C. F. R. pt. 58 app. A).
85. See New Proposed Fee Guidelines, U. S. DEPT'JUST. (Nov. 8, 2012, 10:01 AM), http:///www.justice.gov/ust/eo/rules-regulations/guidelines/proposed.htm.
86. See 28 U. S. C. § 586 (a), (c)
87. See 28 U. S. C. § 586 (d);
88. see also 28 C. F. R. §§ 58.3, 58.4 (2012)
89. see 28 U. S. C. § 586 (e).
90. See 11 U. S. C. §§ 109 (h), 727 (a) (11), 1328 (g).
91. See In re Gideon, Inc., 158 B. R. 528, 530-31 (Bankr. S. D. Fla. 1993) (discussing limited role of UST);
92. In re Johnson, 106 B. R 623, 624 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (denying the USTs request to require debtor in possession to imprint checks with "debtor-in-possession", and holding that the UST Guidelines did not carry the force or effect of law);
93. In re Crosby, 93 B. R. 798, 802 (Bankr. S. D. Ga. 1988) (The 'requirements' of the United States Trustee are merely administrative in nature.");
94. cf. In re Vance, 120 B. R. 181, 185 (Bankr. N. D. Okla. 1990) ("[T]he UST has literally nothing to work on until a bankruptcy case is filed in a Bankruptcy Court; all UST action is incident to bankruptcy proceedings in Bankruptcy Court. Even when acting as an agency instead of as a litigant, the UST is an auxiliary to the Bankruptcy Court.").
95. See Leif M. Clark, Artick III Issues in Bankruptcy-Preparing/or the 21st Century, 1997 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 143, 155 n. 7 (The executive branch is charged with the responsibility for selecting and monitoring private trustees, but the United States Trustee has no direct responsibility for the restructuring of the debtor/creditor relationship in bankruptcy.").
96. 28 U. S. C. § 151 (2006);
97. See Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd.), 40 F.3d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 1994);
98. Perroton v. Gray (In re Perroton), 958 F.2d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 1992).
99. But cf. In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 105 (3d Cir. 2008) ("We find that although a bankruptcy court is not a 'court of the United States' within the meaning of § 451, it is a unit of the district court, which is a 'court of the United States', and thus the bankruptcy court comes within the scope of § 451.").
100. see 28 U. S. C. § 152 (a) (2).
101. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 40(2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Stetistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/ fudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
102. 28 U. S. C. § 157 (b) (1).
103. See 28 U. S. C. § 157 (d).
104. Cf. Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 681-82 (1985)
105. E.g., Peklar v. Ikerd (In re Peklar), 260 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2001);
106. Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001).
107. Cf Daniel J. Bussel, Essay, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1085 (1994) ("Bankruptcy courts are Article I tribunals, arguably constitutionally analogous to administrative agencies, although they function within the judicial rather than the executive branch.").
108. N. Pipeline Constr. Co v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 71 (1982) (plurality opinion).
109. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 7 (1978)
110. reprinted in 1978 U. S. C. CA. N. 5787, 5793;
111. H. R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977)
112. reprinted in 1978 U. S. C. CA. N. 5963, 6138;
113. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H. R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 75, 76-81 (1973);
114. William O. Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs. Federal Control, 42 YALE L. J. 591, 592-93 (1933);
115. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 413-14 (2005).
116. John T. Cross, Congressional Power to Extend Federal Jurisdiction to Disputes Outside Article IRA Critical Analysis From the Perspective of Bankruptcy, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1188, 1226 n. 140 (1993) ("As with all federal statutes, the federal courts may create 'interstitial' federal common law when interpreting and applying the Bankruptcy Code.");
117. Richard M. Hynes, Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-optimal World, 44 B. C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) ("In many instances, the Code gives litde guidance to courts that must adjust the Utopian goal to the realities of the actual world.");
118. cf. Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons From the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L. J. 173, 210 (2000) ("My point is that the art of judging ought to be focused on putting into action the principles enunciated by the legislature [regarding bankruptcy]; to develop and extend them by prudent and reasoned application consistent with the spirit in which those principles were promulgated.").
119. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225-52 (1986) (discussing the fresh-start policy). Jackson takes the view that the fresh-start policy applies only to individual debtors rather than to non-individual legal entities, such as corporations or partnerships. Id at 225. Others, however, take the view that the fresh-start policy plays a role in both consumer and business bankruptcies, albeit with greater salience in the consumer context.
120. See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for Application of Agency Rules in Bankruptcy Dischargeability Litigation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2515, 2521-22, 2554 & n. 155 (1996).
121. See 11 U. S. C. §§ 524 (a) (2), 727 (b), 944 (b), 1141 (d), 1228, 1328 (2006).
122. See, e.g., Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 71 (1982) ("[T]he discharge process in the United States can be... rather inflexible.").
123. 11 U. S. C. § 1328 (b) (1).
124. Referred to as the "hardship discharge", H. R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 430 (1977)
125. reprinted in 1978 U. S. C. CAN. 5963, 6386
126. See 11 U. S. C. § 523 (a) (8).
127. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1379 (2010)
128. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy'Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L. J. 625, 658 (2002)
129. See West Virginia v. Thompson, 475 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2007).
130. See Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Examination of Access to Chapter 7 Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 19 (2009) ("[D]ismissal of a debtor's case will dispositively result in the failure of the debtor to obtain a discharge and thus bankruptcy's fresh start.").
131. 11 U. S. C. §§ 707 (a), 1307 (c).
132. Kg., Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1127 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding "that lack of good faith is a basis for dismissal under § 707 (a) ");
133. Leavirt v. Sotor (In re Leavitt), 171 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Although not specifically listed, bad faith is a 'cause' for dismissal under § 1307 (c).").
134. Contra, e.g., Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F3d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) (The Bankruptcy Code's language and the protracted relationship between reorganization debtors and their creditors lead us to conclude that bad faith per se can properly constitute 'cause' for dismissal of a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 petition but not of a Chapter 7 petition under § 707 (a)."). Similarly, a legal entity's Chapter 11 case may be dismissed if it was not filed in good faith.
135. Kg., In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1999).
136. 11 U. S. C. § 707 (b).
137. The "abuse dismissal" in Chapter 7 has aptly been described as a "statutory gateway." McDow v. Dudley, 662 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Or. 2011).
138. See 11 U. S. C. § 101.
139. The Supreme Court's opinion in Ransom v. FIA Card Services, 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011)
140. See 11 U. S. C. § 707 (b) (2) (A) (i).
141. see Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating tie Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L. J. 471, 495-96 (2007).
142. See 11 U. S. C. § 707 (b) (3).
143. see 11 U. S. C. § 522 (b)
144. Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N. Y. U. L. REV. 235, 246 (1995);
145. see also Hanson v. First Natl Bank in Brookings, 848 R2d 866, 870-71 (8th Cir. 1988) (Arnold, J., concurring)
146. see 11 U. S. C. § 525 (a)
147. see FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U. S. 293 (2003).
148. See 11 U. S. C. § 362 (a) (6).
149. See H. R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340-41 (1977)
150. reprinted in 1978 U. S. C. C AN. 5963, 6296-97.
151. See Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he automatic stay... is actually a legislative creation with unique properties different from court-ordered injunctions.");
152. see also Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 113 (1st Cir. 1994)
153. See 11 U. S. C. § 362 (d).
154. See, e.g., Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 R2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that, for purposes of relief from the automatic stay, "[clause' has no clear definition and is determined on a case-by-case basis"); Sonnax Indus., Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp. (In re Sonnax Indus., Inc.)
155. 907 F.2d 1280, 1288 (2d Cir. 1990)
156. See, e.g., Spencer v. Bogdanovich (In re Bogdanovich), 292 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Although the term 'for cause' is not defined in the bankruptcy code, we have adopted 12 factors to consider when deciding whetlier or not to lift a stay in order that litigation may continue to completion in another tribunaL").
157. See 11 U. S. C. § 101.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U. S. 241, 246 n. 4 (1985)
159. Long v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 526, 534 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
160. See Vineland Fireworks Co. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 544 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2008);
161. see also 38 C. F. R. § 3. 301 (c) (2012) (setting forth the Department of Veterans Affaire's interpretation of the term "willful misconduct").
162. Vineland Firework Co., 544 F.3d at 517 & n. 12.
163. See Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination As Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 BUS. LAW. 417, 418 (1985).
164. 11 U. S. C. § 301 (a) (2006).
165. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 157 (a), 1334 (a), (e) (1) (2006).
166. See Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1994).
167. See 11 U. S. C. §§ 725, 726 (a);
168. See, e.g., In re Saltan, 234 B. R. 260, 279 n. 17 (Bankr. E. D. N. Y. 1999);
169. In re Harris, 143 B. R. 957, 958 (Bankr. M. D. Fla. 1992);
170. cf. H. R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 383 (1977) ("[Code § 726 (b) specifies that claims within a particular class are to be paid/ro rata. This provision will apply, of course, only when there are inadequate funds to pay the holders of claims of a particular class in full.")
171. reprinted in 1978 U. S. C. CA. N. 5963, 6339.
172. See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. §§ 1129 (a) (7), 1325 (a) (4).
173. see Rafael I. Pardo, Reconceptualizing Present-Value Analysis in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 113, 118, 133-64 (2011).
174. See, e.g., David G. Epstein, Don't Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down Interest Rates, 49 ALA. L. REV. 435, 443-59 (1998)
175. (summarizing the various approaches to present-value analysis adopted by courts of appeals prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U. S. 953 (1997)).
176. 541 U. S. 465.
177. Cf. KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 242 (2008) (noting that "the [Supreme] Court does its best to interpret the Bankruptcy Code in a manner consistent with fundamental bankruptcy policies").
178. See 11 U. S. C. § 704 (a) (1) (2006) (requiring a trustee to "collect and reduce to money the property of the estate");
179. David Gray Carlson, Modified Plans of Reorganization and the Basic Chapter 13 Bargain, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 585, 585-86 (2009).
180. 11 U. S. C. § 1325 (b) (1) (B).
181. See, e.g., Schultz v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 2008).
182. See 11 U. S. C. § 1325 (b) (3).
183. See, e.g., Ransom v. FLA Card Servs., NA, 131 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2011) ("We must determine whether [an abovemedian Chapter 13] debtor... who owns his car outright, and so does not make loan or lease
184. See 11 U. S. C. § 1325 (b) (2) (A) (i).
185. See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2469 (2010) ("We granted certiorari to decide how a bankruptcy court should calculate a debtor's 'projected disposable income.' Some lower courts have taken what the parties term the 'mechanical approach', while most have adopted what has been called the 'forward-looking approach.").
186. See FED. R. BANKR. P. pt. VII.
187. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
188. Examples include (subject to certain exceptions) any proceeding to recover money or property, FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 (1)
189. to object to or revoke a discharge, FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 (4)
190. and to determine the dischargeability of a debt and to determine the dischargeability of a debt, FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 (6).
191. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 (a).
192. See Khachikyan v. Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B. R. 121, 125 (BAP. 9th Cir. 2005) ("In a contested matter, there is no summons and complaint, pleading rules are relaxed, counterclaims and third-party practice do not apply, and much pre-trial procedure is either foreshortened or dispensed with in the interest of time-"). Some of the procedural rules governing adversary proceedings, however, equally apply in contested matters.
193. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 (b).
194. See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of American Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 915, 930 (2005) (finding that, while 16 percent of all adversary proceedings went to trial in 1985, the trial rate had dropped to 5 percent by 2002).
195. See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A Sideshow, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 951, 957 (2005);
196. cf. Robert M. Lawless, Are Bankruptcy's Trials Vanishing? If So, Who Cares?, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 995, 1002 (2005) (noting that bankruptcy trials may become "centralized in a few places with the rest of the court system dealing principally with unlitigated, more routine matters"). If adversaiy proceedings are concentrated in a few cases, then the possibility exists that such proceedings will not be evenly distributed across judges.
197. See, e.g., W. D. WASH. LOCAL BANKR. R. 1073-1, available at http://www.wawb.uscourts.gov/read-file.php?file=3269 (providing that adversary proceedings are generally assigned to the judge to whom the underlying bankruptcy case has already been randomly assigned).
198. See Stacy Kleiner Humphries & Robert L. R. Munden, Painting a Self-Portrait: A Look at the Composition and Style of the Bankruptcy Bench, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 76, 82, 105 (1997) (reporting findings from an empirical study based on survey data from approximately 71 percent of active bankruptcy judges that, in business bankruptcy cases, "the bankruptcy judges' self-reported general style... indicated clear and significant support for managerial judging");
199. See E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CM. L. REV. 306, 323-26 (1986).
200. Such privatized setdement may, however, be publicly available through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system, http://www.pacer.gov.
201. See, e.g, Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal-Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 179, 212-13 (2009).
202. See Randall J. Newsome, Vanishing Trials-mat's the Fuss All About?, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 973, 975 (2005) (stating that contested matters "encompass (J a great portion of the activity in both business and non-business [bankruptcy] cases", and noting that, "[a]cording to the [Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts], there were 509, 458 relief from stay motions filed in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2004").
203. U. S. CONST, art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (providing that Congress has the power to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies").
204. See generally Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 AM. BANKR. L. J. 129, 196 (2003) (discussing the Uniformity Clause and arguing that "the uniformity described by the Framers in the Bankruptcy Clause was a substantive power granted to Congress, not a limitation").
205. One specific Uniformity Clause issue that has arisen is whether the existence ofboth the BA Program and the UST Program, which split their powers along geographic lines, violates the Uniformity Clause. See St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc., 38 F.3d 1525, 1535 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that parallel BA and UST Programs violated the Uniformity Clause and remedying the violation by striking down the BA Program).
206. But see Dan J. Schulman, Constitutionality of the United States Trustee/Bankruptcy Administrator Programs, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 319, 329 (1995) (noting the unenforceability of the Ninth Circuit's decision given that the BA Program "functions solely in six districts located within the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits" and is "not present in the Ninth Circuit"). If, as some have argued, the Uniformity Clause is best understood as a power granted to Congress rather than a limitation, see, e.g., Haines, supra, at 196, then arguments that the coexistence of the BA and UST Programs is unconstitutional would seem to fail.
207. See, e.g., Robert E. DeMascio, For Fourteen Years..., in FOURTEEN YEARS OR LIFE: THE BANKRUPTCY COURT DILEMMA 1, 6 (Nat'l Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest ed., 1983) ("[L]imited as it would be to actual 'cases or controversies', an Article III bankruptcy court could not handle the myriad administrative work generated by the great bulk of bankruptcy filings.");
208. Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 587 n. 157 (2006) (discussing "case or controversy" issues that potentially inhere in bankruptcy proceedings).
209. But see, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Ripeness of Government Action for Judicial Review, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1123-24 (1955) (pointing to various examples of situations in which the federal courts act despite the lack of a dispute between two opposing parties, such as criminal cases in which the defendant pleads guilty or bankruptcy cases in which "all parties affected are in agreement");
210. Frank R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION LAW IN THE COURTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 5 (1995) ("No serious challenge based on the 'caseor-controversy' limitation on Article HI has ever developed in reported cases or commentary regarding the constitutionality of the exercise of administrative functions in bankruptcy cases by bankruptcy courts, district courts, or the federal appellate courts.").
211. See Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 233, 234, 295 (2008) (arguing that bankruptcy judges, "who are powerful officers", might be deemed principal officers who can constitutionally be appointed only by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and not by courts).
212. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011);
213. see also Troy A. McKenzie, Getting to the Core of Stern v. Marshall. History, Expertise, and the Separation of Powers, 86 AM. BANKR. L. J. 23, 44-45 (2012) ("The teaching of Stern, apparently, is that the federal judiciary faces more danger of encroachment by the political branches when the non-Article III adjudicator is a bankruptcy court than when it is an administrative agency.").
214. See generally, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L. J. 3, 4-5 (2012) (discussing the impact of Stern v. Marshall on bankruptcy jurisdiction);
215. Ralph Brubaker, A "Summary" Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy Judges' Core Jurisdiction After Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L. J. 121 (2012) (same);
216. 458 U. S. 50 (1982).
217. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609-10
218. (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U. S. at 87 n. 40 (plurality opinion)).
219. N. Pipeline, 458 U. S. at 87 (plurality opinion).
220. (quoting Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 451 (1929)).
221. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U. S. C.).
222. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011).
223. 473 U. S. 568 (1985).
224. 478 U. S. 833 (1986).
225. Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610-11 (2011).
226. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302 (d) (3) (I), 100 Stat. 3088, 3123 (amended 1990 and 2000).
227. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act § 302 (d) (3) (I), 100 Stat, at 3123.
228. See U. S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl 2 (providing that inferior officers may be appointed by the courts of law).
229. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 671-72 (1988) (holding that the independent counsel was an inferior officer because, inter alia, the independent counsel was removable for cause by the Attorney General and enjoyed limited jurisdiction and tenure).
230. The test for determining whether one is an officer subject to the Appointments Clause rather than a mere employee asks whether the appointee exercises "significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 126 (1976);
231. see also Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926) (finding a postmaster first class to be an inferior officer subject to the Appointments Clause);
232. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 225 (1839) (finding the clerk of a district court to be an inferior officer within the meaning of the Appointments Clause). Applying Buckley's significance test, BAs seem to qualify as officers given that they exercise significant executive powers. See infra text accompanying notes 238-239.
233. Cf. Stanley v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 653, 659-60 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a UST-if an officer at all-is clearly an inferior officer, not a principal officer, because the "position was limited geographically, temporally, and topically").
234. See U. S. CONST, art. III, §1.
235. 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
236. FreeEnter., 130 S. Ct. at 3158.
237. U. S. CONST, art. I, §1.
238. RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2008).
239. Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2011).
240. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U. S. 457, 472 (2001);
241. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [regulate] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
242. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 541-42 (1935);
243. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 414-20 (1935).
244. See, e.g., Natl Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225-26 (1943);
245. United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 576-77 (1939).
246. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 420 (1944).
247. seealso Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008) ("[O]ne of the central rationales for creating administrative agencies was that they would have greater expertise and focus than generalist legislatures or courts.");
248. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 440-41 (1987) (suggesting that the increase in grants of authority to regulatory agencies during the New Deal was motivated in part by a conception of administrative agencies as "technically sophisticated").
249. See, e.g., Chevron, U. S A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 865 (1984) (noting that "[j]udges are not experts" when compared to specialized administrative agencies);
250. Richard W. Murphy, A "New" Counter-Masbwy: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 40 (2004) ("[C]ourts are relatively ill-suited to the task of policymaking-judges are generalists who gather information through the incomplete, skewed process of litigation. ");
251. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (1990) (The federal judiciary at the Article III level is predominantly generalist-").
252. See 28 U. S. C. § 152 (a) (2) (2006).
253. See Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy Bench: How Are the "Units" Faring?, 47 B. C. L. REV. 105, 123 (2005).
254. See 28 U. S. C. § 152 (a) (1) (providing that bankruptcy judges are appointed for a term of fourteen years);
255. See, e.g., In re 400 Madison Ave. Ltd. Fship, 213 B. R. 888, 890 n. 2 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1997) (stating that the decision of one bankruptcy judge in a multijudge bankruptcy court was not binding on the other bankruptcy judges);
256. In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey, 160 B. R. 882, 898 (Bankr. S. D. N. Y. 1993) (same);
257. In re Jones, 112 B. R. 975, 977 (Bankr. W. D. Mo. 1989) (stating that the decision of a bankruptcy court from one district is not binding on a bankruptcy court from another district).
258. 28 U. S. C. § 158 (c) (1).
259. See 28 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (1), (c) (1).
260. For a detailed discussion of the use of this appellate path, see Laura B. Bartell, The Appeal of Direct Appeal-Use of the New 28 U. S. C. § 158 (d) (2)
261. 84 AM. BANKR. L. J. 145 (2010).
262. See 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (1).
263. See Douglas K. Moll, "Less Is More": An Interview With Edith Hollan Jones, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, HOUS. LAW., Nov/Dec. 2001, at 42, 42;
264. John Schwartz, Long Shot for Court Has Reputation for Compassion and Persuasion, N. Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A17.
265. As for the Supreme Court, Justice William Douglas is the most prominent example. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: AHISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAWIN AMERICA 109 (2001).
266. In re Assignment of Bankruptcy Appeals, Admin. Order No. 2011-61 (S. D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2011), available at http://www.flsd. uscourts.gov/wp-content/ uploads/adminOrders/2011/2011-61.pdf
267. see also S. D. FLA. LOCAL B ANKR. R. 87. 4 (a), available at http://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/ FINALDecember2011LocalRules.pdf ("Appeals from orders or judgments entered by the Bankruptcy Court shall generally be assigned in accordance with the Court's Internal Operating Procedures.").
268. See New Jersey v. Reading Co., 451 U. S. 918, 918 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Bankruptcy cases seldom receive much notice outside of those who are familiar with this branch of the law-");
269. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BROOKINGS INST., BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 157 (1971) (referring to district "judges' lack of familiarity with and interest in bankruptcy law and procedure" when hearing a bankruptcy appeal);
270. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 791-92 (2010) (discussing "the disinclination of Article III courts toward matters arising from the bankruptcy courts").
271. The referral of bankruptcy appeals by district judges to magistrate judges may be concrete evidence of such disinterest. See, e.g., Hall v. Vance, 887 F.2d 1041, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1989) (determining that referral was proper);
272. Minerex Erodel, Inc. v. Sina, Inc. 838 F2d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that referral was improper).
273. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) (noting that both case law and the Administrative Procedure Act support a presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action);
274. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F2d 1, 68 (D. C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal J., concurring) ("Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly and courts have upheld such delegation because there is court review to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits...." (footnote omitted)).
275. Chevron, U. S A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 865 (1984).
276. See, e.g., SNTL Corp. v. Ctr. Ins. Co. (In reSTNL Corp.), 571 F.3d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("We adopt the BAP opinion as our own and attach it as an appendix to this opinion. " (citation omitted));
277. *2 (N. D. Ohio July 27, 2010) ("Having carefully reviewed the record, the applicable law and the parties' briefs, and entertained oral argument, this Court adopts the bankruptcy court's thorough and well-reasoned [opinion] that correctly sets out the facts and includes citations to the relevant statutes and caselaw.");
278. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 102 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
279. See Foulston v. BDT Farms, Inc. (In re BDT Farms, Inc.), 21 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1994) (giving Chevron deference to the EOUSTs permissible interpretation of a statutory provision involving a standing trustee's compensation);
280. see also Bolen v. Dengel (In re Dengel), 340 F.3d 300, 310 (5th Cir. 2003) (giving Skidmore deference);
281. In re Jackson, 321 B. R. 94, 96-97 (Bankr. S. D. Ga. 2005) (same).
282. 28 U. S. C. § 586 (e) (l) (A) - (B) (2006) (emphasis added);
283. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944) (providing that even agency interpretations that do not control the courts, such as views set forth in an interpretive bulletin or amicus briefs, may "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance" based on the persuasiveness of the agency's views).
284. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1113 (2008).
285. Cf Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial Process, 74 N. C. L. REV. 75, 132 (1995) ("A second institutional feature of the bankruptcy process that limits its competence to resolve distributional questions is that bankruptcy courts act on an uncoordinated basis. The economic effect of redistributive decisions made by any one bankruptcy judge may be small in comparison to the aggregate, economy-wide effect of decisions made by all judges.").
286. See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. §§ 1129 (a) (7), (a) (9), (a) (15) (A), (b) (2) (A) (i) (II), (b) (2) (B) (i), (b) (2) (C) (i), 1325 (a) (4), (a) (5) (B) (ii) (2006).
287. See, e.g., Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U. S. 465, 474 (2004) (plurality opinion).
288. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 948 (1999) ("A central goal of this Article is to move the regulatory process towards a more thoughtful valuation of human lives threatened by environmental
289. See 11 U. S. C. § 1121 (indicating who may file a Chapter 11 plan);
290. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place far Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE LJ. 2, 35 (2009) (noting that political control and accountability help legitimize agencies).
291. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 64 (2006);
292. Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: Tie President Is No Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568 (1987).
293. See Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944-47 (1980).
294. See, e.g., Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12, 866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51, 735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (setting forth principles and requirements for agencies to follow relating to regulatory planning and review)
295. reprinted as amended in 5 U. S. C. § 601 app. at 745 (2006).
296. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600 (2010) ("The President cannot fire the members of these agencies for political reasons, including failure to follow administration policy, but only for 'good cause', such as neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.").
297. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) ("[I]ndependent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction. ").
298. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-99 (1985).
299. See U. S. CONST, art. III, § 1 (The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
300. See 28 U. S. C. § 152 (a) (1) (2006).
301. See 28 U. S. C. § 152 (e).
302. Chevron, US A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
303. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987).
304. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (Harvard Univ. Press 2009);
305. cf. Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2483 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Bankruptcy protection is not a birthright-How long to wait before throwing the debtor a lifeline is inherendy a policy choice.");
306. Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Does Ideology Matter in Bankruptcy? Voting Behavior on the Courts of Appeals, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919, 927 (2012) ("[T]o the extent that the argument is that bankruptcy is essentially devoid of issues over which judges divide ideologically, we flady disagree.").
307. Evan J. Criddle, Chevroni Consensus, 88 B. U. L. REV. 1271, 1291 (2008).
308. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred and Fifty Cases Per Year Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987).
309. Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals: A Further Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. L. J. 137, 140 (1997).
310. Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L. J. 525, 526-27, 527 n. 9 (1995);
311. Cf. J. Christopher Marshall, Civil Enforcement: An Early Report J. NAT'L ASS'N BANKR. TRUSTEES, Fall 2002, available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ public-affairs/articles/docs/nabtalkfall2002.pdf (describing the UST Program's civil enforcement initiatives).
312. See Application Procedures and Criteria for Approval of Providers of a Personal Financial Management Instructional Course by United States Trustees, 73 Fed. Reg. 67, 435 (proposed Nov. 14, 2008)
313. (to be codified at 28 C. F. R. pt. 58);
314. Application Procedures and Criteria for Approval of Nonprofit Budget and Credit Counseling Agencies by United States Trustees, 73 Fed. Reg. 6062 (proposed Feb. 1, 2008)
315. (to be codified at 28 C. FR. pt. 58).
316. Although the Bankruptcy Code expressly gives USTs (and BAs) the authority to "approve" counseling and instructional course providers, see 11 U. S. C. § lll (b) - (d) (2006), nothing in the Code specifically gives USTs or BAs rulemaking powers in this arena. Perhaps rulemaking powers could be inferred from language in the statute that states that "[t]o be approved by the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy administrator, if any), a nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency shall, at a minimum" meet certain statutorily defined criteria. Id. § 111 (c) (2) (emphasis added).
317. See Admin. Office of the U. S. Courts, Approval Process for Credit Counseling and Debtor Education Courses, U. S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ federalcourts/bankruptcy/bankruptcyresources/approvalprocessforcreditcounseling. aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (providing instructions and application form).
318. 541 U. S. 465 (2004).
319. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1997)
320. overruled by Drive Fin. Servs., L. P. v. Jordan, 521 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2008).
321. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2071 (a), 2075 (2006).
322. D. HAW. LOCAL BANKR. R. 30l5-l (g) (l) ("[T]he clerk will set and publish a standard interest rate applicable to secured and other claims under a confirmed Chapter 13 plan. The setting of a standard interest rate does not bar a debtor or creditor from proposing a different interest rate.");
323. D. S. C. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-6 (a)
324. ("In order to expedite the determination of an effective interest rate to be used by debtors in meeting the requirement of 11 U. S. C. § 1325, a presumed effective interest rate ('Periodic Interest Rate') will be set by the Court with the assistance of a committee of trustees and members of the consumer bar. If applied to a secured claim in a chapter 13 plan, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the Periodic Interest Rate-for plan confirmation purposes-is reasonable.");
325. WD. MO. LOCAL BANKR. R. 3084-l (g) (l), (3) ("The posted 'CHAPTER 13 RATE' shall be determined by the standing Chapter 13 trustee for the Western District of Missouri semiannualry - The posted Chapter 13 rate is, absent evidence to the contrary, presumed to be the applicable rate.");
326. U. S. BANKR. COURTFOR THE S. DIST. OF CAL., CHAPTER 13 PLAN (RECOMMENDED FORM) ¶ 5(2005), available at http://www.casb.uscourts.gov/html/csdforms/ Chapterl3Plan.pdf (providing that, for claims secured by personal property, "[e]ach named creditor shall be paid in installments... until claim is paid in amount allowed secured plus interest at seven percent (7%) per annum unless a different percentage is specified").
327. Richard Fink, Chapter 13 Trustee, Kansas City, Mo., 13 NETWORK. COM, http://www.13network.com/kschome.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
328. U. S. BANKR. COURT FOR THE DlST. OF HAW., NOTICE OF STANDARD INTEREST RATE FOR CHAPTER 13 PLANS (2012), available at http://www.hib.uscourts.gov/news/ 2012-0601-Ch%2013% 20Interest.pdf.
329. In re Interest Rate in Chapter 13 Cases, Amended Operating Order No. 09-02 (Bankr. D. S. C. Nov. 20, 2009), available at http://www.scb.uscourts.gov/ pdf/oporder/opor09-02.pdf.
330. For other examples, see Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of "Uniform Laws", 42 SETON HALLL. REV. 1081 (2012).
331. The four decisions were Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010);
332. Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010);
333. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010);
334. and Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetzv. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
335. One empirical study analyzed certiorari petitions on the Court's paid docket that involved issues of federal bankruptcy law under the Code and that were filed at any point from the Court's 1978 October Term through its 1995 October Term. Robert M. Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, An Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 MO. L. REV. 101, 113-14, 116-17, 116 n. 57 (1997). The researchers found that "the Supreme Court receives approximately 50 to 60 bankruptcy certiorari petitions per year, granting cert in an average of 7.0% of these cases and hearing an average of 3 or 4 bankruptcy cases per year"
336. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539-40 (2011) (noting in the context of the regulation of greenhouse emissions that the EPA is better suited than federal district courts sitting as sole adjudicators to regulate given that federal district courts, among other things, "lack authority to render precedential decisions binding other judges, even members of the same court").
337. Lemos, supra note 8, at 450 (quoting Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781-82 (1999)).
338. see also 5 U. S. C. § 553 (e) (2006) ("Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.").
339. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539-40 (2011) (noting that the EPA is better suited than federal district courts to set policies for greenhouse gases because, among other things, courts do not "issue rules under notice-and-comment procedures inviting input by any interested person").
340. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Crystals, Mud, BAPCPA, and the Structure of Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 71 MO. L. REV. 1069, 1078 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
341. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 546 (2002) (describing how the twin concerns of efficiency and fairness helped increase reliance on rulemaking, which was viewed as much more likely than adjudication "to result in standards that apply prospectively, providing clear notice of the law's requirements to all concerned").
342. Lissa Lamkin Broome, Bankruptcy Appeals: The Wheel Is Come Full Circle, 69 AM. BANKR. L. J. 541, 542 (1995).
343. 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010).
344. 11 U. S. C. § 522 (1) (2006).
345. In re Reilly, 543 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Or. 2008)
346. rev'd sub nom. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010).
347. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2658.
348. See Memorandum from the Honorable Eugene R. Wedoff, Chair of the Advisory Cornm. on Bankr. Rules, to the Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U. S. 15-16 (May 6, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/B K05-2011.pdf.
349. However, the process of amending the bankruptcy rules is a time-intensive one, which can span anywhere from thirty months to three years. See Alan N. Resnick, The Bankruptcy Rulemaking Process, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 245, 246 (1996).
350. Agency rulemaking also can take significant time to complete, but procedural rules adopted by agencies are exempt from notice-and-comment requirements, see 5 U. S. C. § 553 (b) (2006), and hence an agency likely could act fairly quickly to eliminate ambiguities in its procedural rules.
351. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct 1800, 1810-11 (2009) (discussing how agencies may change policy so long as they acknowledge the change and adequately explain the new policy).
352. Chevron, U. S A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 863-64 (1984).
353. Cf. Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 555, 569 (2011) ("Stare decisis in the judicial sphere is closely bound up with the aspiration (or if you prefer, the myth) of the rule of law. Agencies, however, act in a quasi-legislative capacity as acknowledged policymakers, and the issues of legitimacy that arise when they jettison a precedent are simply not the same.").
354. Cf Chevron, 467 U. S. at 865 ("[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments.").
355. *9 n. 13 (Bankr. CD. I1l Dec. 27, 2011) (The dischargeability of student loans is primarily a question of policy that is for Congress to determine. The judicially created Brunner test is not a source of Congressional policy.
356. Compare Sederlund v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Sederlund), 440 B. R. 168, 174 (B. A. P. 8th Cir. 2010)
357. *7 (Bankr. D. Mont. June 7, 2012) ("In addition the overwhelming fact of the Great Recession which struck this nation, and the Flathead Valley, cannot be ignored when evaluating Leslie's employment prospects or chances for more lucrative earnings.").
358. Natural disasters are yet another example of changed circumstances that could warrant revisiting discharge policies in bankruptcy. Cf. Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B. R. 728, 733-34 (Bankr. M. D. Term. 2011) ("Under Congress' current legislation, victims of natural disasters such as Ms. Pigg, would lose their homes and be required to continue to pay HOA fees for houses they no longer occupy, have surrendered in bankruptcy, but cannot force lenders to accept by deed in lieu of foreclosure or force foreclosure.
359. Richard B. Levin, Towards a Model of Bankruptcy Administration, 44 S. C. L. REV. 963, 965-66 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
360. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 325, 364-65 (1991).
361. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT: REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY General's Committee on Bankruptcy Administration 4-6 (1941);
362. Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 80 (1997) ("Evidence of the bankruptcy judges' practice of appointing cronies to the position of trustee supports the hypothesis that the bankruptcy judges opposed the bankruptcy agency because they feared losing their patronage power.").
363. Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, Address at the Annual Dinner of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Conference of the National Association of Referees in Bankruptcy (Oct. 23, 1962), in 37 J. NAT'L ASS'N REF. BANKR. 3, 4 (1963) (discussing the high costs of bankruptcy administration, such as the salaries and expenses of the referees and trustees).
364. See H. R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 4 (1977)
365. ("The bill removes many of the supervisory functions from the judge in the first instance, transfers most of them to the trustee and to the United States trustee, and involves the judge only when a dispute arises."), reprinted in 1978 U. S. C. CAN. 5963, 5966.
366. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 71ST CONG., ADMINISTRATION OF BANKRUPTCY ESTATES 26-33 (Comm. Print 1931) (Colonel William Donovan).
367. See STRENGTHENING OF PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, S. DOC. NO. 72-65, at 93-94 (1932) (Solicitor General Thomas Thacher).
368. See ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, supra note 396, at 122, 127-32 (suggesting the creation of a Division of Bankruptcy in the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, which would examine and audit referees, collect bankruptcy statistics, make recommendations to Congress, and investigate complaints regarding bankruptcy officials).
369. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H. R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 117 (1973) (quoting the Brookings Report).
370. See H. R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 103.
371. H. R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2., at 55.
372. rOn the one hand, the Commission Report did speak of the need for a national organization capable of developing "procedures, practices, and guidelines appropriate for national uniform application. " H. R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 126.
373. Yet on the other hand, the Report seemed to suggest that the rulemaking grant would simply transfer to the new agency those rulemaking powers that were at the time already vested in the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court. See id In addition, the proposed rulemaking grant would have merely given the agency's administrator the power to make rules and regulations "necessary to discharge his authority, duties and functions? H. R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2, at 55 (emphasis added).
374. Yet in listing examples of what he views as the administrative work conducted by bankruptcy courts, Lipson notes that "bankruptcy judges... manage the filing, and allowance or disallowance, of claims." Id. at 655. Hence, Lipson fails to distinguish between (1) administrative tasks and (2) the policymaking that can result from administration of a statutory scheme. Lipson is correct that the claim-filing process entails ministerial administration (although the bankruptcy court clerk, see 28 U. S. C. §156 (b) (2006), rather than the bankruptcy judge, manages such filings).
375. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 5005 (a) (1).
376. On the other hand, the claimallowance process is one that potentially presents an opportunity for judicial policymaking. The Code provides that a filed claim "is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest... objects." 11 U. S. C. § 502 (a) (2006);
377. see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007 (a).
378. If such an objection is made, the court is to determine the validity and amount of the claim, see 11 U. S. C. § 502 (b), with the possibility that the claim will be disallowed to the extent required by certain statutory limitations, see id §502 (b) (l) - (9). Residual policymaking inheres in such a determination.
379. See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U. S. 443, 449 (2006) ("This case requires us to consider whether the Bankruptcy Code disallows contract-based claims for attorney's fees based solely on the fact that the fees at issue were incurred litigating issues of bankruptcy law. We conclude that it does not."). Hence, it is descriptively incorrect to categorize the claim-allowance process, with its potential to give rise to a contested matter, as an administrative task.
380. See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy's Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1980-2022 (2011).
381. Id Missing from Littwin's argument is any acknowledgment that a debtor must attend the meeting of creditors, see 11 U. S. C. § 343 (2006) ("The debtor shall appear and submit to examination under oath at the meeting of creditors under section 341 (a) of this title."), and that failure to attend the meeting is one of the primary grounds for dismissal of a debtor's case, see Pardo, supra note 124, at 27 tbl.4 (reporting that, among the consumer Chapter 7 cases that were dismissed in the Western District of Washington between 2003 and 2007, 31.6 percent of such cases were dismissed on the grounds that the debtor failed to attend the meeting of creditors). This is quite significant given that "dismissal of a debtor's case will dispositively result in the failure of the debtor to obtain a discharge and thus bankruptcy's fresh start." Id at 19. These are just a few of the many instances in which Littwin overstates the advantages of the court-centered model over the agency-centered model.
382. James M. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies Outperform Generalist Judges? Some Preliminary Evidence From the Federal Trade Commission (Jan. 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=l990034.
383. More study is needed in part because scholars have reached different conclusions. Compare id (finding that generalist judges perform adjudicatory functions better than the FTC), with Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Trainingon Appeals, 54 J. L. & ECON. 1 (2011) (concluding that antitrust cases are too complex for judges).
384. The expeditious and efficient administration of bankruptcy estates is certainly a concern underlying the Bankruptcy Code. See REPORT OFTHE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H. R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 75, 81-82 (1973).
385. See George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model Some Conclusions From the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 344-45 (1987) (suggesting that whether or not split models do achieve better results, there may be a perception that separating the adjudicatory and rulemaking functions better protects due process notions and instills confidence in the system).
386. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U. S. 967, 982-83 (2005) ("Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction. ").
387. See supra Part II. A.1 But see Deitzv. Ford (In re Deitz), 469 B. R. 11, 23 (B. A. P. 9th Cir. 2012) ("[W]e conclude that the holding in Stern is not clearly irreconcilable with the existing precedent... that a bankruptcy court may liquidate a debt and enter a final judgment in conjunction with finding the debt nondischargeable.").
388. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 62 (1989).
389. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (holding that it is primarily in the discretion of agencies to decide whether to proceed via rulemaking or adjudication).
390. The serious political battles that can erupt over the creation of new agencies is nicely illustrated by the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). After Congress created the agency in 2010, President Obama was unable to get the Senate to consider his nomination to head the CFPB due to Republican Senators' displeasure with the structure and powers of the agency. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Former Ohio Attorney General to Head New Consumer Agency, N. Y. TIMES, July 18, 2011, at Bl.
391. Specifically, the Republican Senators argued that the single-headed CFPB was too politically insulated; they wanted the agency to be multi-membered rather than single-headed; and they wanted Congress to exercise more control over the agency's budget. See id After President Obama's nomination to head the CFPB stalled out in the Senate because of the Republicans' concerns about the agency's structure, President Obama-in a highly controversial move-ultimately resorted to a recess appointment. See Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate: Obama Appoints Consumer Chief, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, at Al.
392. 5 U. S. C. §§ 500-596 (2006).
393. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 37 (2010) ("It is often remarked that independent agencies are characterized not only by their statutory for-cause removal protections but also by the fact that they are typically multimember bodies.");
394. See REPORT OFTHE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H. R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 119 (1973) (recommending that the proposed bankruptcy agency be funded through fees and charges as well as any funds Congress chooses to appropriate because "[e]ffective Congressional oversight is best assured by control over the financing of the Administration");
395. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American Bankruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 498 (1998) ("The bankruptcy bar not only helped to assure the permanence of American bankruptcy law, the bar also has had an enormous influence on the [1898] Act's subsequent development. Other interest groups, from lenders and other creditors to debtors and potential debtors, have always had a big stake, too. Collective action problems and related considerations, however, have limited the influence of unsecured creditors and debtors. Although banks and other lenders are not similarly constrained, their priority status and ability to adjust their interest rates in response to debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws limit the range of issues they are concerned with. As a result, no other group has had nearly so pervasive an impact on bankruptcy law as the bankruptcy bar. Bankruptcy lawyers' influence on the evolution of bankruptcy law is, in a sense, the rest of the story of bankruptcy in the United States.").
396. For a recent example of lobbying by bankruptcy lawyers, see Editorial, The Trouble With Bankruptcy Lawyers, N. Y. TIMES, June 10, 2012, at SR10 ("[A]t a contentious meeting at the Justice Department last week, law firms with big bankruptcy practices made clear that they were not about to accept [new Chapter 11 fee] guidelines willingly.").
397. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 243 (2005) ("The courts' incentives were to serve managers and those managers' lawyers and contract allies. When any of those interests come into conflict with the interests of prepetition unsecured creditors, employees, taxing authorities, regulatory authorities, pensioners, and other corporate constituencies, competition forces the courts to squeeze the latter groups. The bankruptcy court competition is not a market but a market failure.").
398. see also Letter From Senator Mitch McConnell to President Barack Obama (May 2, 2011), available at http://www.blunt.senate.gov/public/-cache/files/ b78a4ff6-58c9-48d8-a708-9e62ee360cc3/5-5-11 Letter to President Obama regarding confirmation of CFPB nominee.pdf ("No agency or institution, including Congress, can review the CFPB budget, and no mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the director is effectively managing public money.").
399. 478 U. S. 833 (1986).
400. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct 2594, 2610-11 (2011) (discussing whether a bankruptcy court's order is enforceable without resort to an Article III court under the current scheme).
401. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U. S. 568, 594 (1985).
402. Alec P. Ostrow, Constitutionality of Core Jurisdiction, 68 AM. BANKR. L. J. 91 (1994).
403. Compare Brief for the United States, N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982) (Nos. 81-150 & 81-546)
404. *34
405. ("Just as non-Article III administrative agencies constitutionally may grant government benefits such as radio station licenses, pilot licenses, or certificates for common carriers, an administrative agency could be established to adjudicate bankruptcy petitions and grant discharges."), with Douglas Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 38-39, 44-45 (arguing that it is difficult to fit bankruptcy into the public rights model)
406. and David P. Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441 (1983).