Capabilities and Strategic Entrepreneurship in Public Organizations

Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 70-91

  Klein, Peter G ^a   Mahoney, Joseph ^b   Mcgahan, Anita M ^c   Pitelis, Christos N ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Capabilities; Public organizations; Strategic entrepreneurship

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874704450     PISSN: 19324391     EISSN: 1932443X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/sej.1147     Document Type: Article

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