Bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods: Theory and evidence

Public Choice

Volumn 94, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 1-20

  Hayes, Kathy J ^a   Razzolini, Laura ^c   Ross, Leola B ^b  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032354798     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1017921227907     Document Type: Article

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