Dynamic Security Design and Corporate Financing

Handbook of the Economics of Finance

Volumn 2, Issue PA, 2013, Pages 71-122

  Sannikov, Yuliy ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Dynamic contracts; Incentives; Moral hazard; Security design; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873486060     PISSN: 15740102     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-44-453594-8.00002-1     Document Type: Chapter

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