Appointee confirmation and tenure: The succession of U.S. Federal Agency Appointees, 1989-2009

Public Administration Review

Volumn 72, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 902-913

  Dull, Matthew ^a   Roberts, Patrick S ^a   Keeney, Michael S ^a   Choi, Sang Ok ^b  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Korea University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873456445     PISSN: 00333352     EISSN: 15406210     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02676.x     Document Type: Note

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