What determines how long political appointees serve?

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 375-396

  Wood, B Dan ^a   Marchbanks III, Miner P ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 45549103237     PISSN: 10531858     EISSN: 14779803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mum019     Document Type: Article

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