FEMA and the prospects for reputation-based autonomy

Studies in American Political Development

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 57-87

  Roberts, Patrick S ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745656040     PISSN: 0898588X     EISSN: 14698692     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0898588X06000010     Document Type: Review

References (213)

1. Brian Hayes, "Natural and Unnatural Disasters," American Scientist, 93 (Nov.-Dec. 2005): 496.
2. Russell J. Hopley, "Civil Defense For National Security," a Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Office of Civil Defense Planning (Oct. 1, 1948).
3. Quoted in Jerry Conley, "The Role of the U.S. Military in Domestic Emergency Management: The Past, Present and Future," Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Newsletter, George Washington University, 3:4,Jan. 2003.
4. Also see Memorandum, Forrestal to Truman, New. 8, 1948, PHST, OF, Box 1651, Office of Civil Defense Planning Folder; "Progress Report on Civil Defense Planning Under the N.S.R. B. March 3, 1949-March 3, 1950," NA, NSRB, RG-304, Box 94, Folder E4-12. For studies of early civil defense programs, see Nehemiah Jordan, "U.S. Civil Defense before 1950: The Roots of Public Law 920," Study S-212 (Washington, DC: Institute For Defense Analyses Economic and Political Studies Division, May 1966).
5. Various civil defense leaders recall that the earliest conceptions of civil defense included defense against natural disasters; for example, civil defense agencies during the Truman administration cooperated with the General Services Administration to share knowledge about how to fight fires. See Richard Gerstell, Director of Civil Defense, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, "Slate Civil Defense Plans and Programs," lecture given Nov. 22, 1963, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, DC.
6. Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 49-50.
7. NSRB Doc, 76, Aug. 19, 1948, "Preliminary Statement on guiding Principles and Program Framework for Mobilization Planning," PHST, WHCF, Box 27, NSRB Folder 1.
8. nd session. Also see Federal Civil Defense Administration, "The National Plan for Civil Defense Against Enemy Attack" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1956), 7-103.
9. This was a popular theme in general interest magazines such as Life or Collier's. See Andrew D. Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red; Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War (New York; Routledge, 2001), 54-57, 142.
10. Also see "Defense Lack seen as Pearl Harbor," New York Times, 10 Oct. 1949, 9;
11. "Baruchis Critical of Defense Plans," New York Times, 31 Oct. 1949, 41;
12. st Congress, 2nd sess., 1950, 140-150.
13. The Aug. 21, 1953 issue of Collier's magazine included a FCDA-sponsored quiz intended to prevent readers from becoming "victims of panic." The government's publicity campaigns were aimed at frightening people sufficiently so that they would take part in civil defense drills but not so much that they would be paralysed, Take the quiz at: 〈http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/ sfeature/panicquiz.html〉 (accessed 16 Apr. 2004).
14. Spencer Weart, Nuclear fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 103-269.
15. Also see Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red.
16. During hearings on the National Security Act, policymakers maintained that to forestall a post-war retreat into isolationism, the government had to reassure the public that the United States was prepared for an attack and that something could be done about it, both to prevent it and in recovery. This would help maintain the link between deterrence and credibility. James Forrestal, said in 1945 to the House Military Affairs Committee, that "the world must know, with equal conviction that, as much as we hate war, we are ready to wage swift and effective war against any nation which to overthrow by law and justice, replacing it with rule by force. We should make the determination clear - by deeds as well as words - to any dreamer anywhere who may be scheming for world domination." See Forrestal, Miscellaneous Files, Box 44, 1945 folder, "Statement by James Forrestal to the House Military Affairs Committee on HR 515 'Universal Military Training,"' New. 26, 1945, 2. Forrestal was speaking in favor of universal military training, a proposal that was defeated but which still makes the connection between credibility and commitment to preparedness at home. (Quoted in Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red, 143).
17. Ansley J. Coale, The Problem of Reducing to Atomic Attack (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947);
18. Robert Jervis, Janice Gross Stein, and Richard Ned LeBow, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 3-33, 125-52;
19. Robert J. McMahon, "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History 15 (1991).
20. "Enclosure A", "The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon," (PHST, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Box 202, NSC-Atomic Crossroads Folder, p.11, 1947); Also see Marc Trachlenberg, '"A Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," International Security 13 (1988/89).
21. Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at How: Militarization Meats Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 2000).
22. Eli Lehrer and Amanda Dory advocate expanding civic participation in homeland security based on lessons from the civil defense era. See Eli Lehrer, "The Secret to Homeland Security," The Weekly Standard, 8 Dec. 2003, 13-14
23. and Amanda Dory, Civil Security Washington, DC: CSIS, 2003.
24. Jerry Conley, "The Role of the U.S. Military in Domestic Emergency Management: The Past, Present and Future," Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management Newsletter, George Washington University 3 (2003).
25. John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis," July 1961.
26. See Figure 1, Civil Defense Spending, 1951-1975. For a description of the activities of civil defense programs, see various reports to Congress, including "Activities and Status of Civil Defense in the United States," Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, Oct. 26, 1971.
27. Amanda J. Dory, Civil Security: Americans and the Challenge, of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2003), 10-13.
28. General Accounting Office, "The Federal Emergency Management Agency's Plan for Revitalizing U.S. Civil Defense," GAO/NSIAD-8441, April 16, 1984, pp. i-iii.
29. National Security Decision 23 on "U.S. Civil Defense Policy," Feb. 3, 1982.
30. In 1994, Congress repealed the Federal Civil Defense Act; Public Law 103-337, Oct. 5, 1994; available at 〈http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/ uue50A〉.
31. That decision had little immediate impact, but it laid the foundation for policymakers to later expand dual use and all hazards approaches. In 1976, Congress amended the Civil Defense Act of 1950 to recognize "that the organizational structures established jointly by the federal government and several stales and their political subdivisions for civil defense purposes can be effectively utilized, without adversely affecting the basic civil defense objectives of this Act, to provide relief and assistance to people in areas of the United States struck by disasters other than disasters caused by enemy attack." Also see Keith Bea, "Proposed Transfer of FEMA to the Department of Homeland Security," Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, July 29, 2002.
32. In June 1978 President Carter submitted to Congress "Reorganization Plan Number 3" to establish FEMA, After congressional approval the Reorganization Plan creating FEMA took effect Apr. 1,1979. (See also Executive Order 12127; 44 FR 19367, Apr. 3, 1979.)
33. National Academy of Public. Administration, Coping with Catastrophe. (Washington, DC) Feb. 1993, 13.
34. Macy was Director from Aug. 1979 to Jan. 1981.
35. "FEMA History," at 〈http;//www.fema.gov/about/history. shtm〉 (accessed 12 Nov. 2003).
36. Michael Thompson-Noel, 'This Televisual Life," New Statusman, 26 July 1996.
37. "Domestic Terrorism," Emergency Preparedness Project (Washington, DC: Center for Policy Research, National Governors' Association, 1978), 107.
38. In hearings on the plan to establish FEMA, members of Congress came to the conclusion that the agency would be responsible for the consequences of terrorism because such consequences resembled those of other kinds of incidents. One example of that conclusion is the following exchange: Mr. McIntyre: We think the consequences of terrorist acts can he quite similar to the consequences of major natural and manmade disasters. For example, in both instances there will be serious disruptions of essential services or resources, or certainly could be, and I would emphasize the new Agency would be involved only with the consequences of terrorism and not with the incident itself. I want to underscore that point. Mr. Levitas: That is the point I am most concerned about. Mr. McIntyre: And so we felt that if you were going to have a broad-based agency to respond to emergency situations, that since the consequences of these terrorist acts could be expected to be similar to other emergencies, that this agency should be in a position to response. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Reorganization Plan No. 3 (1978): 52. Also see Keith Bea, "FEMA's Mission; Policy Directives of the Federal Emergency Management Agency," CRS Report for Congress, Feb. 13, 2002, 14.
39. Giuffrida was an expert on domestic terrorism. At the U.S. Army War College in 1970, he wrote a thesis which in part concerned the logistics of interning African-Americans in the event of an urban riot. The thesis is reprinted here: Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nomination of Louis O. Giuffrida, Washington, DC. 97th Cong., 1st Sess, (1981): 34-83.
40. In a memo requested by Giuffrida, FEMA Counsel George Jett lays out FEMA's authority in civil disturbances, "riots, demonstrations which get out of hand, etc." This memo and others refer to a previous Department of Justice memo that rejects FEMA's authority in "nonnatural catastrophes." The FEMA counsels explicitly disagree with Justice and advise that "dual use" provisions and FEMA's authority under executive order 12148 may allow FEMA to recommend declarations and assert authority in nonnatural disasters including Love Canal and "the Cuban inflex" as well as in "major civil disturbances," See George Jett, General Counsel, "Memorandum for Louis O. Giuffrida, Responsibilities in Civil Disturbances," July 10, 1981; Craig B, Annear, Assistant General Counsel, "Note for Lee Thomas, The Applicability of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 to Riots and Civil Disorders," May 21, 1981, Other disasters cross multiple categories. The 1992 Los Angeles riots were declared a presidential disaster because of fire damage rather than riots. Giuffrida's desire for FEMA to become a national security agency is reflected in a proposed executive order on intelligence activities in which Jett writes, "I have suggested that consideration he given to the inclusion of a provision concerning FEMA involvement in intelligence matters in times of national emergency planning and response," See Jett, "Memorandum for Louis O. Giuffrida," Nov. 9, 1981.
41. It is not clear whether Reagan actually signed an executive order approving the contingency plan; the full facts remain obscured in part because President George W. Bush sealed some 68,000 pages of Reagan's White House records in November 2002, Elements of the draft executive order do appear in E.O. 12656 issued Nov. 18, 1988.
42. The scenario outlined in the Brinkerhoff memo somewhat resembles Giuffrida's thesis at the Army War College, Pa. in which he portrays the establishment of martial law in case of a national uprising by black militants. The paper also analyzed the roundup and transfer to "assembly centers or relocation camps" of at least 21 million "American Negroes." See Alfonso Chardy, "Reagan Aides the 'Secret' Government," Miami Herald, 5 July 1987.
43. William French Smith, Attorney General, letter to Robert C, McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC, Aug. 2, 1984.
44. Two other ambitious military men, Lt. Col. Oliver North and General Richard Secord, both later connected to the Iran-Contra scandal, were assigned to FEMA in the early 1980s.
45. It is notable that Giuffrida is riot mentioned in FEMA's online history of the agency, 〈http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm〉 (accessed 20 Aug. 2004).
46. A number of articles in the 1980s criticized FEMA's secret continuity of government programs, including a much cited article in Penthouse featuring Giuffrida. See Donald Goldberg and Indy Badhwar, Penthouse Aug. 1985).
47. Other critical articles included: Steven Emerson, "America's Doomsday Project," U.S. Naws & World Report, 7 Aug. 1989;
48. Alfonso Chardy, "North Helped Revise Wartime Plans," Miami Herald, 9 July 1987.
49. For a more judicious judicious evaluation of FEMA's continuity of government programs see Harold G. Relyea, "Continuity of Government.: Current Federal Arrangements and the Future," CRS Report, Nov. 7, 2003.
50. Peter J. May, Recovering from Catastrophes: Federal Disaster Relief Policy and Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985);
51. Roy S, Popkin, "The History and Politics of Disaster Management in the United States," in Nothing to Fear, ed. Andrew Kirby (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1990).
52. Read more about the bunker complex here: 〈http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ amex/bomb/sfeature/floorplan.html〉 The government now offers tours, for a fee, to help defray the cost of upkeep for a Cold War hotel built for 1,000.
53. For the classic work showing that in most disasters the public does not panic, see E. L. Quarantelli, Looting and Antisocial Behavior in Disasters, Preliminary Paper #205 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Disaster Research Center, 1994).
54. Patrick S. Roberts and Robert B. Bateman, "The Roots of Extreme Practice in Emergency Management," paper presented at the Conference on Race and American Political Development, Eugene, Oregon, May 11-12, 2006.
55. Baker, James N., Howard Manly, and Daniel Glick, "The Storm After Hugo," Newsweek, 9 Oct. 1989, 40.
56. Economist, "Hurricane Hugo; When the Wind Blows," Oct. 1989, 22.
57. Fortunately, Andrew did not cause a major loss of life because the warning systems had been effective and the hurricane missed the population center of central Miami, But the storm did destroy property, including buildings that were built after the adoption of the South Florida Building Code. It was later revealed that new construction had been in violation of the code.
58. National Academy, Coping with Catastrophe, Gary L. Wamsley and Aaron D. Schroeder, "Escalating in a Quagmire: The Changing Dynamics of the Emergency Management Policy Subsystem," Public Administration Review 56 (1996).
59. Peter Slevin and Dexter Filkins, "We Need Help," Miami Herald, 28 Aug. 1992.
60. Bob Davis, "Brewing Storm," Wall Street Journal, 31 Aug. 1992, A1.
61. FEMA's poor reputation so penetrated public discussion that Wendy Brown, a political theorist writing about identity politics, emphasized the "... popular and media discourse about relevant state and federal agencies (e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]), that came close to displacing onto the agencies themselves responsibility for the suffering of victims." Wendy Brown, States of Injury (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 68-69.
62. National Academy, Coping with Catastrophe, 19.
63. Hurricane Camille was the second most intense hurricane to strike the US in recorded history (ranked according to minimum pressure at landfall), at 909 millibars. Andrew was the fourth most intense, at 922 millibars. Though Camille killed more people, Andrew passed through more developed territory. Camille caused 6.1 billion dollars in damage in 1996 dollars while Andrew caused 26 billion dollars in damage. Data from the US National Weather Center, National Weather Service.
64. Even the response to Camille was an improvement over emergency management in previous generations. When the Great Hurricane hit the Caribbean in 1780, 22,000 people died. "The safety precautions, suggested the authorities, were for residents to put on all their clothes, tie pillows around their heads and hope for the best. By comparison the human toll of Hurricane Hugo was slight. The islanders knew in advance that the wind was coming -though about all they could do was duck." Economist, "Hurricane Hugo; When the Wind Blows," Oct. 1989, 22.
65. See table 1 For a sample of major preparedness organizations.
66. Information from Wayne Blanchard, FEMA's Higher Education Project file and personal communication, June 4, 2005; Arthur Oyola-Yemaiel and Jennifer Wilson, "Three Essential Strategies For Emergency Management Professionalization in the U.S.," International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, March 2005.
67. Noil Britton, "Higher Education in Emergency Management: What is Happening Elsewhere," Emergency Management Higher Education Conference, Emmitsburg, Maryland, June 2004, 2.
68. National Academy, Coping with Catastrophe, 41.
69. Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Renewal, Fedtral Emergency Management Agency National, Performance Review Report (Washington 1993), 2-3.
70. Bachelor's degrees in emergency management were offered at three schools by late 1994 and early 1995: University of North Texas, Thomas Edison University, and Rochester Institute of Technology. In addition, UCLA offered a continuing education certificate program.
71. The BIS listed occupations with the largest expected increase in employment between 2002 and 2012. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Tomorrow's Jobs," 2003, accessed 12 July 2005 〈http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ oco2003.pdf〉.
72. Thomas W. Lippman, "Hurricane May Have Exposed Flaws in New Disaster Relief Plan," Washington Post, 3 Sept. 1992;
73. Thomas W. Lippman, "One Disaster Followed Another," Washington Post, 7 Sep. 1992;
74. Richard Sylves, "Coping with Catastrophe (Review)," Public Administration Review 54 (1994).
75. National Academy, Coping with Catastrophe, x.
76. Charles A. Bowsher, "Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy," GAO/T-RCED-93-4, Jan, 27, 1993, 18.
77. National Academy, Coping with Catastrophe 53-54.
78. William Gumming, Personal Interview, Arlington, VA, Dec. 10, 2003.
79. The FEMA counsel's office advised that defense assets could not be used for natural disastera "However, the [Civil Defense] Act does not presently contain any authority for response, at the federal level, to a natural catastrophe." Patricia M. Gormley, FEMA General Counsel, "Memorandum for Steve Caddy, Deputy Associate Director, External Affairs Directorate (cc: Grant Peterson)," July 14, 1992. Whatever the correctness of the counsel's advice at that time, Congress amended the FCDA in 1993 to make it "all-hazards." See Public Law 103-160.
80. Other divisions of FEMA saw a greater legal and practical role for civil defense funds and programs in natural disasters. For example, see Policy Coordinating Committee on Emergency Preparedness and Mobilization Civil Defense Working Group, Dual Use Memo, 1991. In practice FEMA was used to responding to technological disasters, including the Times Beach, Mo. dioxin contamination in the early 1980s.
81. Sylves, "Coping with Catastrophe (Review)," 1994.
82. Terry M. Mot:, 'The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage," in The Presidency and the Political System, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998);
83. Moe, "Presidents, Institutions, and Theory,"in Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches, ed. George Edwards, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993);
84. Aaron Wildavsky, The Beleaguered Presidency (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991).
85. Barry D. Karl, Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963).
86. National Academy, Coping with Catastrophe, 21-23.
87. Larry Van Dyne, "Perfect Places for Those Hard-to-Place Contributors," Washingtonian, Nov. 1992.
88. William Claibome, "Cultures Being Clubbed," Washington Post, 20 May 1993, A21.
89. Organizationally, FEMA made a step forward in 1992 when it issued the Federal Response Plan, which provided a blueprint for coordinating resources during a disaster and clarified the agency's role as the clearinghouse for disaster assistance. Most importantly, the Plan introduced the all hazards approach into FEMA's fundamental operational document, joined by 25 federal agencies and the American Red Cross.
90. Carla Rivera and Alan C. Miller, "Streamlined FEMA Quake Assistance Seen," Los Angeles Times, 15 May 1994.
91. Witt opposed the bill (S.995) because it reduced the power of FEMA by eliminating most political appointees, transferring the continuity of government functions to the Department of Defense, and establishing a domestic crisis monitoring unit in the White House. See William Claiborne, "Doling Out Praise, FEMA Critic Pressed for Reform at Hearing," Washington Post, 25 Mar. 1994. A21.
92. James Lee Witt, Personal Interview, Washington, DC, Apr. 15, 2004.
93. Alasdair Roberts, "The Master of Disaster; James Lee Win and the Federal Emergency Management Agency" (paper presented at. the Council for Excellence in Government, Apr. 1997).
94. Saundra K. Schneider, "Reinventing Public Administration: A Case Study of the Federal Emergency Management Agency," Public Administration Quarterly 22 (1998), 42.
95. Will's public speeches and internal memos made "all hazards" the centerpiece of FEMA's mission. For example, Witt, "Memorandum for All FEMA Employees, Organizational Structure and Management, Nov. 5, 1993.
96. Kay C. Goss, Personal Interview, Washington, DC, Nov. 20, 2003.
97. See Witt, "Memorandum for All FEMA Employees, Organizational Structure and Management," Nov. 5, 1998.
98. Gary L. Wamsley and Aaron D. Schroeder, "Escalating in a Quagmire: The Changing Dynamics of the Emergency Management Policy Subsystem," Public Administration Review 56 (1996). The Stafford Act and other statutes give FEMA a broad - and vague - mandate. Witt did not have to interpret the statues in the way he did - legally, all FEMA directors could have been more active in disaster response and even more active in national security matters, but they declined intervention on a number of occasions because they lacked the resources.
99. Roberts, "The Master of Disaster."
100. James Lee Witt, Personal Interview, Washington, DC, Apr. 15, 2004.
101. Witt, "Statement Before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control, & Defense Intelligence, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, May 25, 1993;
102. Witt, "Hearing on the Civil Defense Budget," Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Apr. 21, 1994.
103. The Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995 passed the House on Aug. 17, 1994 by a vote of 280 to 137. In 1993, the Civil Defense Act was amended in order to make legal the diversion of funds from civil defense programs to natural hazards programs. Congress deleted a clause that said civil defense funds could be used for natural disaster purposes only "in a manner that is consistent with, contributes to, and does not detract from attack-related civil defense preparedness."
104. See the "Trefry Report," Final Report and Recommendations, FEMA Security Practices Board of Review, Nov. 1992, Richard G. Trefry, Chairman. Also Memorandum From Deputy Associate Director, National Preparedness, Issue 4.B., "Which FEMA Personnel Should Be Required to Have Security Clearances to Fulfill Their Emergency Assignments?" Dec. 18, 1986, Also personal interview, former FEMA official, Washington, DC, Nov. 7, 2004.
105. Roberts, "The Master of Disaster."
106. Rutherford H. Platt, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Kxtreme Natural Kvents (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), 69-110.
107. Testimony to U.S. Senate, Apr. 30, 1996.
108. Platt, Disasters and Democracy, 11-46.
109. See figure 4. Peter J. May, Recovering from Catastrophes: Federal Disaster Relief Policy and Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 49.
110. Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 37.
111. Thomas A. Garrett and Russell S. Sobel, "The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments," Economic Inquiry 41 (2003),
112. Other studies have found that the president's decision to issue a disaster declaration is influenced by congressional and media attention. See Richard T. Sylves, "The Politics of Federal Emergency Management," in Richard T. Sylves and William H. Waugh, Jr., Eds., Disaster Management in the US and Canada, (Spring-field, II:" Charles C. Thomas), 1996.
113. "FEMA Hurricane Payouts Under Attack," FOX News, Feb. 1, 2005. Michael Eric Dyson, Come Hell or High Water (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
114. FEMA News Brief, 1:2, Sept. 17, 1993, Letter From James Lee Witt to All FEMA Employees, "FEMA's Reorganization," Sept. 7, 1993. Also see various "Director's Weekly Update," including June 13, 1997.
115. James Lee Will, Personal Interview, Washington, DC, Apr. 15, 2004. Witt mandated that all of FEMA's 4,000 full and part time staff receive training in customer service techniques.
116. Former Senior FEMA official, Personal Interview, Washington, DC, Mar. 12, 2004.
117. Frank G. Huffman, Personal E-mail Correspondence, Dec. 11, 2003. FEMA's witnesses before the Hart-Rudman Commission were Lacey Suiter and V. Clay Hollister. Notes of their briefing do not exist.
118. Letter from Maxwell Alston, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, to John McKay, FEMA, and Chris Heiser, OMB, May 7, 1993.
119. See a listing of major reports in "Commissions' Recommendations, " by Steve Bowman in the CRS Electronic Briefing Book on Terrorism, at 〈http://www.congress.gov/brbkl/html/ebter93.html〉 (accessed 10 Dec. 2003).
120. P.L. 103-360, 107 Slat. 1855-56. Nov. 30, 1993.
121. Clarke sent a memo on Oct. 16, 1996 to Lacy Suiter, FEMA's Executive Assistant Director for Response and Recovery, asking the agency to clarify its responsibilities in the even of a terrorist incident. Clarke asked FEMA a series of questions about what prevented the agency from taking a greater role in terrorism preparedness and consequence management, especially during the recently completed Atlanta Olympics. The agency responded by saying that FEMA's policy was that it did not generally have the authority to use money for preparedness in advance of disaster threats. It also requested that "each agency with an emergency preparedness function For terrorist incident consequence management is responsible for requesting funding for its predeployment activities and emergency preparedness." See John P. Carey, FEMA General Counsel, "FEMA's Role in Advance of a Terrorist Incident," Memorandum for Richard A. Glarke, NSC, Nov. 21, 1996. Information about Clarke's actions comes from conversations with two of his colleagues in FEMA.
122. The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate of DHS as of Mar. 1, 2003, was formerly in the Department of Justice. It is assigned by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, as the principal component of the Department of Homeland Security responsible for preparing state and local governments and private entities for acts of terrorism. In carrying out its mission, ODP is the primary office responsible to providing training, funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises, technical assistance and other support to assist states and local jurisdictions.
123. Telephone interview, Nov. 10, 2003, Washington, DC.
124. James Lee Witt, Personal Interview, Washington, DC, Apr. 15, 2004. Also see James Lee Witt and Associates, Department of Homeland Security and FEMA (Washington, DC 2002), unpublished.
125. Terrorism Annex of the Federal Response Plan, issued Feb. 7, 1997. The Federal Response Plan was first published in May 1992 by FEMA pursuant to the authority in the Stafford Act and after a lengthy coordination process with the other signatory agencies. The Plan coordinates delivery of disaster response services among 25 federal agencies and the American Red Cross. See Keith Bea, "Overview of Components of the National Response Plan and Selected Issues," CRS Reports (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service), Dec. 24, 2003.
126. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
127. Government memoranda during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations show that this kind of thinking was common. See Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red.
128. The Hart-Rudman Commission envisioned FEMA as a the centerpiece of a new domestic security effort.
129. FEMA made minor adjustments to accommodate new concerns about terrorism, forming working groups on the subject and hiring emergency managers with some terrorism experience. For instance, Shawn Fenn was a graduate student at the University of Florida researching how to integrate terrorist threats into urban planning when terrorists struck on Sep. 11. He soon found that his research was a hot commodity and after working for the stale of Florida, he joined FEMA's mitigation division in order to integrate counterterrorism into federal, state, and local "all hazard" mitigation programs. "There's a mitigation posture in the (emergency management) community right now," Fenn said. "How do you fold terrorism into that? That's the challenge." In Jan. 2002, FEMA issued a paper stating that terrorism is just another hazard and therefore can be mitigated like any other. Of course it is not exactly like any other hazard, but FEMA found authority in the Stafford Act to provide mitigation for fire, floods, and explosions, regardless of their cause. One way FEMA can engage in terrorism mitigation is to encourage the adoption of building standards that can protect against earthquakes and floods while also providing defense against car bombs. But terrorism will lake some time to he included in the mitigation division, Fenn says, because few people in his division have security clearances or are in contact with national security personnel who have access to threat information. Examples of publications advising risk management for terrorism, published in Dec. 2003, include: FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Building; FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks; FEMA 428, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks; FEMA 429, Insurance, Finance, and Regulation Primer for Risk Management in Buildings. See 〈http://www.fema.gov/fima/rmsp.shtm〉
130. Allbaugh reestablished the ONP on May 8, 2001. The original ONP was established in September 1981 and lasted until November 1993. This was not directly opposed to the direction agency took under Witt - Witt advised to move the Office for Domestic Preparedness from the Justice Department to FEMA.
131. George D. Haddow and Jane A. Bullock, Introduction In Emergency Management (Amsterdam, Netherlands; Butterworth-Heiuemann, 2003), 13.
132. The FRP derived from the Federal Plan for Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake published in 1987, The FRP was published in May 1992.
133. Personal Interview, Washington, DC, Nov. 19, 2003.
134. Much of the substance of the initial response plan came from documents prepared by RAND corporation at the request of the DHS. RAND had never before prepared a response plan. The original mandate for the plan came from HSPD #5.
135. In biology, "niche construction" is the process in which an organism alters its environment in order to increase its chance of survival. By building a reputation as the lead natural disaster agency, FEMA altered the expectations of the president, congressional committees, and the the public. See Rachel L. Day, Kevin L. Laland, and John Odling-Smee, "Rethinking Adaptation: The Niche-Construction Perspective," Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46 (2003).
136. The initial official version of the plan was issued in Oct. 2003. Details about the plan presented by Charles Hess, Director of Advisory Services in the FEMA Response Division, at the GWU Workshop on Emergency Management in the Homeland Security Environment, Nov. 19-20, 2003; available at: 〈http://www.gwu.edu/~workshop/download/1〉 (accessed 30 Mar. 2004).
137. No other state had been affected by four hurricanes in one season since Texas in 1886, An estimated one in five homes in Florida were damaged by hurricanes during Aug. and Sept. 2004 and 117 people in the state lost their lives from the storms. National Climatic Data Center, "Climate of 2004 Atlantic Hurricane Season," National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, Dec. 13, 2004.
138. The 2000"census shows that 27% of New Orleans house-holds, or approximately 120,000 people, lacked privately-owned transportation. In addition, New Orleans has one of the highest poverty rates in the United States, at 38%.
139. Patrick S. Roberts "What Katrina Means for Emergency Management," The Forum 3: New. 2005.
140. Audrey Hudson, "'Malfeasance' cited in Katrina flooding," Washington Times, 3 Nov. 2005.
141. Also see the Oct. 2005 Social Science Research Council Forum "Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences," accessed 31 Oct. 2005 at 〈http;//understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/〉.
142. Spencer S. Hsu, "Leaders Lacking Disaster Experience," Washington Post., 9 Sept. 2005, A1, In addition to former FFMA director Michael Brawn's lack of disaster experience, as of September 2003 others agency leaders lacked emergency management credentials before their FEMA appointments: chief of staff Patrick Rhode formerly planned events for Bush's campaign; the deputy chief of staff, Scott Morris, was previously a media strategist for campaigns, Neither had previous emergency management experience.
143. Witt tells a story of how Congress and the president wanted to give FEMA (and him) responsibilities beyond the agency's mission. "Senators Stevens and Byrd called me up and said they wanted to write a bill that would put USAID under you at FEMA because of problems we were having in Bosnia. I said please don't do that." Witt also recounts that the senators wanted to introduce a bill appointing Witt as director of FEMA for 10 years, but Witt refused. Despite rumors that some in the Bush administration wanted Witt to be reappointed, 1 have found no evidence that be had an opportunity to thrice refuse the crown. Witt, Personal Interview.
144. th out of 30) as "best places" to work in government. Stephen Barr, "Morale Among FEMA Workers, on the Decline for Years, Hits Nadir," Washington Post, 14 Sept. 2005; Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges (GAO-01-832, July 9, 2001).
145. Two former FEMA mitigation officials complained of politicization after 2001 for these reasons. From Personal Interviews, June 23, 2003 and Oct. 15, 2004. In addition Frank Reddish, the emergency-management coordinator of Miami-Dade County and a self-described "longtime Republican," sums up his view that the Bush administration rejected programs associated with Clinton in order to claim credit for new innovations by saying "They politicized it." See Sham: Harris, "Cuts to Disaster Mitigation Program Questioned," Govexec.com Daily Briefing, Sept. 16, 2005.
146. There is evidence that industrial accidents can be "prevented" though we may have to live with a certain level of "normal accidents" in a complex society. See Charles Perrow Normal Accidents (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
147. The Department of Defense may have been reluctant to allow military assets to he used for homeland security because of a fear that such uses could set precedent and drain resources. For instance, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has ordered that aid requests from the DHS must go through the Office of the Secretary of Defense before they are given to Northern Command, which can then permit military assets to be used for disaster response. James Kiltfield, "Poor Communications Slowed Military's Hurricane Response," National Journal Daily Briefing, Sept. 19, 2005. Confirmed by personal interview with former military official, Oct. 21, 2005.
148. Patrick S. Roberts, "Shifting Priorities; Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process," Review of Policy Research 22:4 July 2005, 437-50.
149. National Response Plan, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, Dec. 2004, CAT-3.
150. st Sess. 27 Sept.
151. Most replaced the term "mitigation," long associated with natural disasters, with the more security-oriented term "prevention." National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, White House, July 2002.
152. "National Preparedness," Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, White House, Washington, DC, Dec. 17, 2003.
153. "DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve GAO-05-652." General Accountability Office, Washington, DC, Aug. 11, 2005.
154. Roberts, "Shifting Priorities."
155. Eric Holdeman, "Destroying FEMA," Washington Post, Tuesday, 30 Aug. 2005, A17;
156. Amanda Lee Hollis, "A Tale of Two Federal Emergency Management Agencies," The Forum 3 (2005).
157. Testimony to U.S. Senate, Apr, 30, 1996; Also see David Mayhcw, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).
158. See Mark Schneider, Paul Eric Teske, and Michael Mintrom, Public Entrepreneurs: Agents for Change in American Government (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 3;
159. Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000);
160. Adam Sheingate, "Enhepreneurial Innovation, Institutional Change, and American Political Development," Studies in American Political Development 17 (2003).
161. Pinchot and Wiley both courted symbolically important politicians just like the courted other symbolically important social leaders. Convincing politicians that their agency's success was crucial to electoral ambitions was less important to Pinchot and Wiley's project, however, than it was to Witt.
162. National Academy, Coping with Catastrophe.
163. In particular, the report criticized FEMA's national security division, which often prohibited resources from being used to respond to natural disasters. See Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 17.
164. Carpenter claims that autonomy occurs when agencies "can bring their political legitimacy to bear upon the very laws that give them power."
165. Barnett and Finnemore define autonomy as multiple periods in which an institution acts independently, though not necessarily defiantly, of its political superiors, See Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 11.
166. Also see Anne M. Khademian, Checking on Banks: Autonomy and Accountability in Three Federal Agencies (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996).
167. Herbert Emmerich, Federal Organization and Administrative Management (University of Alabama Press, 1971), 17.
168. David A. Stockman, The Triumph of Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1986);
169. Bruce E. Johnson, "From Analyst to Negotiator: The OMB's New Role," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 3 (Summer 1984): 504-15.
170. Krause defines autonomy as influence. See George A. Krause, "The Institutional Dynamics of Policy Bureaucratic Influence over Securities Regulation, "American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996).
171. According to this definition, agencies might depend upon some source of external support and yet still be autonomous from other political institutions.
172. Carpenter, Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy 353, 364.
173. John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan Delaberate Discretion? The Institutional foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), FEMA's authorizing statues grant it wide and vague authority that the staff of its counsel's office said was often not used because of political concerns. After overstepping its bounds in the early 1980s, the agency did not want to appear too ambitious nor did it want to take on missions that it lacked the resources to accomplish.
174. Legal autonomy is not impervious to political control. To take one example, local school districts once possessed substantial legal autonomy. Over time federal authorities, driven by organized interests, intervened in local affairs. Terry M. Moe uses "autonomy" to describe the former legal and organizational independence of state of local school districts in "The Two Democratic Purposes of Public Education," Rediscovering the Democratic Purposes of Education, eds. Lorraine M. McDonnell, P. Michael Timpane, and Roger Benjamin (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 134.
175. Amy B. Zegart, "An Emperical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11," Political Science Quarterly 121 (Spring 2006), 33-60.
176. Carpenter, Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy (2001): 13, 364-65.
177. Witt claims that after FEMA gained notoriety some members of Congress who had not struggled with disasters asked him whether the agency might take on responsibility for other tasks beyond its traditional mission.
178. Before the 1998 reorganization, assessments of disaster politics bemoaned FEMA's lack of a constituency that could lend support to an effective emergency management system. The NAPA report notes that "emergency management has almost no natural consistency base until an emergency or disaster occurs. Except for those personas and agencies with responsibilities for emergency management, which are modest in number and influence, the function has no generally attentive, supportive set of constituents or clients, which is so important to the survival and effectiveness of public agencies," National Academy, Coping with Catastrophe, viii.
179. For more on privatization and homeland security sec Eric Klinenberg and Thomas Frank, "Looting Homeland Security,"-Rotting Stone, 15 Dec. 2005.
180. The trend toward politicization, with roots in the Progressive Era and the New Deal, became a central feature of public life in the last quarter of the twentieth century as "responsive competence"replaced "neutral competence"as the organizing principle of bureaucratic power. Presidents began to use administrative reorganization as a tool of political control. See Peri Arnold, Making the Manngerial, Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905-1980 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986);
181. Terry Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, The New Direction in American Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985).
182. Disasters can spawn disjointed and reactive media coverage, which can lead policy responses to be similarly disjointed and reactive. See Roger W. Cobb and David M. Primo, The Plane Truth (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003).
183. Paul Stockton makes a convincing case that both FEMA and the Bush administration retained a commitment to all hazards, even as the administration emphasized the terrorist threat. See Paul Stockton, "Katrina: Redefining the Essence of Homeland Security," working paper, Nov. 16, 2005.
184. Roberts, "Shifting Priorities."
185. See Michigan Executive Order No. 2003-6.
186. Phil Roberts, telephone interview, Oct. 6, 2003.
187. Jonathan R. Macey, "Organizational Design and Political Control of Agencies," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8 (1992): 93-110.
188. For a study of the changing level of autonomy in a Dutch independent commission, see: Kutsal Yesilkagit, "Bureaucratic Autonomy, Organizational Culture, and Habituation," Administration & Society 36 (2004): 528-52.
189. Michael Barzelay and Colin Campbell, Preparing for the Future (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), 226.
190. See Steven J. Balla, "Administrative Procedures and Political Control of Bureaucracy," The American Political Science, Review 92 (1998): 663-73;
191. David Epslein and Sharyn O'Halloran Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Balla ("Administrative Procedures," 1998, 664, 671) uses the term "autonomy" to describe sustained bureaucratic discretion and concludes that "Given the technical nature of Medicare reform, legislators may have been willing to trade strict control over redistribution for accurate information about physicians' resource costs."
192. Terry M. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science 28 (1984): 769.
193. See Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State in America, 1859-1877 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990);
194. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy (New York: Basic Books, 1989);
195. Joel D. Aberhach, Keeping a Watchful. Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990);
196. Lawrence C. Dodd and Richard L. Schott, Congress and the Administrative State (New York: Wiley, 1979).
197. Carter announced that "...Federal hazard mitigation activities should be closely linked with emergency preparedness and response functions. This reorganization would permit more rational decisions on the relative costs and benefits of alternative approaches to disasters..." From "Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978," June 1978, in Public Papers of the Presidents, 1978, I, 1128-1131.
198. For a discussion of how Carter's reorganization plans fits with other presidential attempts at control see Arnold, Making the Managerial Presidency.
199. Carpenter, Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy (2001); 13, 364-65.
200. The sociological literature has made attempts to understand the role of ideas and evolving beliefs in organizations. See Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter Powell, "The Iron Gage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review 48 (1983);
201. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52 (1998): 887-918,
202. In political science, the comparative politics field has had a resurgence of scholarship on ideas in politics. See Judith Goldslein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
203. In public administration Charles Goodsell has examined how the idea of a "mission mystique" shapes agencies. See Goodsell, "The Creation of Mission Mystique," unpublished manuscript (2005).
204. See Daniel P. Carpenter, "State Building through Reputation Building: Coalitions of Esteem and Program Innovation in the National Postal System, Studies in American Political Development 14 (2000), 124.
205. See the literature on professionalism, including: Steven G. Brint, In an Age of Experts (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994)
206. and Anurag Sharma, "Professional as Agent," Academy of Management Review 22 (1997): 748-98.
207. Consider the Performance Assessment Rating Tool and Government Performance and Results Act reporting requirements. For accounts of "news values"see Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997);
208. Larry Sabato, Feeding Frenzy (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
209. Carpenter calls the Food and Drug Administration "one of the nation's most powerful federal agencies" and a "highly legitimized actor in contemporary American politics" that "accords more or less with the theory presented here," See Carpenter, Forging Bureaucratic. Autonomy, 2, 366.
210. It is difficult to know whether demand always exists, wailing to be tapped, or whether demand can be created out of whole cloth.
211. FEMA is one of only a very few agencies to keep its name while being included in the Department of Homeland Security. After Katrina, some policymakers suggested eliminating the FEMA acronym and using "Emergency Response and Recovery" instead.
212. It is not clear whether even the EPA can be successful at environmental protection and still avoid strategies that make it appear to be an organization of compromise with business and property owners rather than one of advocacy for the good and the just. See Christopher J. Bosso, Environment, Inc. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005);
213. Marc K. Landy, Marc J, Roberts, and Stephen R, Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).