Solidary and functional costs: Explaining the presidential appointment contradiction

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 547-569

  Gill, Jeff ^a   Waterman, Richard W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4644281628     PISSN: 10531858     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muh036     Document Type: Review

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