From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People's Folk Concept of Free Will

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 211-224

  Monroe, Andrew E ^a   Malle, Bertram F ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79958753230     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-009-0010-7     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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