The dynamics of decision making in risky choice: An eye-tracking analysis

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 3, Issue OCT, 2012, Pages

  Fiedler, Susann ^a   Glöckner, Andreas ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS   (Germany)

Author keywords

Arousal; Decision field theory; Eye tracking; Gaze cascade effect; Heuristics; Parallel constraint satisfaction; Risky choices

Indexed keywords

EID: 84870935218     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00335     Document Type: Article

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