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Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

Coordinating service composition
[No Author Info available]

Author keywords

Coordination; Mechanism design; Pricing model; Semantics; Service value network

Indexed keywords

ABSTRACT MODELS; BIDDING LANGUAGES; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; COMPLEX SERVICES; COMPOSITE SERVICES; COORDINATION; COORDINATION MECHANISMS; FUNCTIONAL PARTS; GRAPH-BASED; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-ATTRIBUTES; PARADIGM SHIFTS; PRICING MODELS; QOS ATTRIBUTES; SERVICE COMPOSITIONS; SERVICE EXECUTION; SERVICE VALUE NETWORK; TRADITIONAL VALUES;

EID: 84870706252     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (3)

References (28)
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  • 7
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    • Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions
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  • 27
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.