Nearly optimal multi attribute auctions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 279-285

  Ronen, Amir ^a   Lehmann, Daniel ^b  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Multi attribute auctions; Optimal auctions; Polynomial time

Indexed keywords

NETWORK PROTOCOLS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

MULTI ATTRIBUTE AUCTIONS; OPTIMAL AUCTIONS; POLYNOMIAL TIME;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 30044447125     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1064009.1064039     Document Type: Conference Paper

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