Why VCG auctions can hardly be applied to the pricing of inter-domain and ad hoc networks

NGI 2007: 2007 Next Generation Internet Networks - 3rd EuroNGI Conference on Next Generation Internet Networks: Design and Engineering for Heterogeneity

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 36-39

  Maillé, Patrick ^a   Tuffin, Bruno ^b  

^a ECOLE DES MINES DE NANTES   (France)

^b CAMPUS DE BEAULIEU   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; NETWORK ARCHITECTURE; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC;

OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS; RELAY NODES; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES (VCG) AUCTION;

AD HOC NETWORKS;

EID: 34548844184     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/NGI.2007.371195     Document Type: Conference Paper

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