What is Russellian monism?

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 9-10, 2012, Pages 67-95

  Alter, Torin ^a   Nagasawa, Yujin ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84867682149     PISSN: 13558250     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (70)

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