Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized

Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-352

  Ladyman, James ^a   Ross, Don ^b,c   Spurrett, David ^c   Collier, John ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN   (South Africa)

Author keywords

Causation; Complex systems theory; Eliminativism; Information theory; Metaphysics; Ontic structural realism; Philosophy of science; Physics; Rainforest realism; Thermodynamics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922008343     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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