Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism

Synthese

Volumn 178, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 67-85

  Williamson, Jon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian epistemology; Conditionalisation; Formal epistemology; Maxent; Maximum entropy; Objective Bayesianism

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650196773     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9515-y     Document Type: Article

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