Varieties of propensity

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 51, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 807-835

  Gillies, Donald ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039257537     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/51.4.807     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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