Objective Bayesianism with predicate languages

Synthese

Volumn 163, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 341-356

  Williamson, Jon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian epistemology; Bayesianism; Formal epistemology; Inductive logic; Objective Bayesianism; Probabilistic logic

Indexed keywords

EID: 46249098779     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9298-y     Document Type: Conference Paper

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