Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions

The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Gillman, Howard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Courts; Credible commitments; Law; National governing coalitions; Party politics; Politics; Regime politics; Regional outliers; Roald Dahl; Supreme court

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865407844     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0037     Document Type: Chapter

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