The racial origins of modern criminal procedure

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 99, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 48-97

  Klarman, Michael J ^a,b,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0347671169     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1290325     Document Type: Article

References (281)

1. See Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
2. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confessions); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (perjury); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (financially biased judge); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trial).
3. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
8. By "subconstitutional" rules, I mean not the substantive liability standards, but rather the all-important rules bearing on standards of proof, standards of appellate review, and access to federal court. For a fuller discussion, see Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303,376-78 [hereinafter Klarman, Plessy].
9. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
10. The most detailed treatment of Moore is RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES (1988) [hereinafter CORTNER, MOB]. A briefer description appears in O.A. Rogers, Jr., The Elaine Race Riots of 1919, 19 ARK. HIST. Q. 142 (1960).
11. The most detailed treatment of Moore is RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES (1988) [hereinafter CORTNER, MOB]. A briefer description appears in O.A. Rogers, Jr., The Elaine Race Riots of 1919, 19 ARK. HIST. Q. 142 (1960).
12. For extensive treatment of the Scottsboro Boys episode, see DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979), and JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994).
13. For extensive treatment of the Scottsboro Boys episode, see DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979), and JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994).
14. The most complete treatment is RICHARD C. CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE IN MISSISSIPPI: THE SUPREME COURT AND BROWN v. MISSISSIPPI (1986) [hereinafter CORTNER, BROWN].
15. On Scottsboro, see CARTER, supra note 11, chs.1-2; GOODMAN, supra note 11, chs.1-2. On Moore, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.1. On Brown, see CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, chs.1-2. The Scottsboro Boys certainly were innocent of the crimes charged, as revealed in a subsequent recantation by one of the alleged victims. Their innocence should have been reasonably clear at the trial both from the medical evidence and from the conflicting testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. See Brief for Petitioners at 28-30, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Nos. 98-100) [hereinafter Powell Petitioners' Brief], reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291, 324-26 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]; CARTER, supra note 11, at 27-30,227-28, 232. The Brown defendants possibly were innocent, and the State surely lacked sufficient evidence to convict them apart from their tortured convictions. See Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 471 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting). The Moore defendants at most were guilty of being present when the lethal shots were fired, and not even clearly of this. See CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 124-25. For a very similar case that never reached the Supreme Court, see Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1931). For fascinating background on Downer, see Anne S. Emanuel, Lynching and the Law in Georgia Circa 1931: A Chapter in the Legal Career of Judge Elbert Tuttle, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 215 (1996).
16. On Scottsboro, see CARTER, supra note 11, chs.1-2; GOODMAN, supra note 11, chs.1-2. On Moore, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.1. On Brown, see CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, chs.1-2. The Scottsboro Boys certainly were innocent of the crimes charged, as revealed in a subsequent recantation by one of the alleged victims. Their innocence should have been reasonably clear at the trial both from the medical evidence and from the conflicting testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. See Brief for Petitioners at 28-30, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Nos. 98-100) [hereinafter Powell Petitioners' Brief], reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291, 324-26 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]; CARTER, supra note 11, at 27-30,227-28, 232. The Brown defendants possibly were innocent, and the State surely lacked sufficient evidence to convict them apart from their tortured convictions. See Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 471 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting). The Moore defendants at most were guilty of being present when the lethal shots were fired, and not even clearly of this. See CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 124-25. For a very similar case that never reached the Supreme Court, see Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1931). For fascinating background on Downer, see Anne S. Emanuel, Lynching and the Law in Georgia Circa 1931: A Chapter in the Legal Career of Judge Elbert Tuttle, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 215 (1996).
17. See cases cited supra note 1.
18. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (privilege against selfincrimination); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (right to a grand jury proceeding); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (same).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. On Griswold and Roe and the general propensity of constitutional law to suppress outliers, see Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1996) [hereinafter Klarman, Civil Rights], and Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 172-73 (1998).
22. On Griswold and Roe and the general propensity of constitutional law to suppress outliers, see Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1996) [hereinafter Klarman, Civil Rights], and Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 172-73 (1998).
23. See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (unanimously sustaining the constitutionality of the white primary); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (unanimously (albeit indirectly) sustaining the constitutionality of public school segregation).
24. On mob-dominated trials not being concerned with determining factual guilt, see NEIL MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 206-07 (1989); George C. Wright, By the Book: The Legal Executions of Kentucky Blacks, in UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 250, 251 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997) [hereinafter Wright, Legal Executions]; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 246.
25. On mob-dominated trials not being concerned with determining factual guilt, see NEIL MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 206-07 (1989); George C. Wright, By the Book: The Legal Executions of Kentucky Blacks, in UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 250, 251 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997) [hereinafter Wright, Legal Executions]; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 246.
26. On rape cases, see RAY STANNARD BAKER, FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN NEGRO CITIZENSHIP IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 198-99 (Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1908); CARTER, supra note 11, at 133-35, 241; ARTHUR RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 50 (1933); Kathleen Atkinson Miller, The Ladies and the Lynchers: A Look at the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, 17 S. STUD. 221, 230 (1978); Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20, at 257.
27. On rape cases, see RAY STANNARD BAKER, FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN NEGRO CITIZENSHIP IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 198-99 (Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1908); CARTER, supra note 11, at 133-35, 241; ARTHUR RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 50 (1933); Kathleen Atkinson Miller, The Ladies and the Lynchers: A Look at the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, 17 S. STUD. 221, 230 (1978); Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20, at 257.
28. On rape cases, see RAY STANNARD BAKER, FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN NEGRO CITIZENSHIP IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 198-99 (Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1908); CARTER, supra note 11, at 133-35, 241; ARTHUR RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 50 (1933); Kathleen Atkinson Miller, The Ladies and the Lynchers: A Look at the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, 17 S. STUD. 221, 230 (1978); Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20, at 257.
29. On rape cases, see RAY STANNARD BAKER, FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN NEGRO CITIZENSHIP IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 198-99 (Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1908); CARTER, supra note 11, at 133-35, 241; ARTHUR RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 50 (1933); Kathleen Atkinson Miller, The Ladies and the Lynchers: A Look at the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, 17 S. STUD. 221, 230 (1978); Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20, at 257.
30. John Gould Fletcher, Correspondence, Is This the Voice of the South?, 137 THE NATION 734 (1933).
31. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 134 (citing BIRMINGHAM REP., Apr. 1, 1933).
32. KELLY MILLER, RACE ADJUSTMENT: ESSAYS ON THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 79 (1908).
33. For the claim that the Scottsboro Boys would have been lynched in an earlier era, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 105, 189. The rest of this paragraph is based on EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 238-55 (1984); BAKER, supra note 21, ch.9; Brundage, supra note 20; W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993) [hereinafter BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING]; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, ch.7; 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY ch.27 (1944); RAPER, supra note 21, chs.1-3; GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES 1877-1900 ch.12 (1952); GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE].
34. For the claim that the Scottsboro Boys would have been lynched in an earlier era, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 105, 189. The rest of this paragraph is based on EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 238-55 (1984); BAKER, supra note 21, ch.9; Brundage, supra note 20; W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993) [hereinafter BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING]; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, ch.7; 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY ch.27 (1944); RAPER, supra note 21, chs.1-3; GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES 1877-1900 ch.12 (1952); GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE].
35. For the claim that the Scottsboro Boys would have been lynched in an earlier era, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 105, 189. The rest of this paragraph is based on EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 238-55 (1984); BAKER, supra note 21, ch.9; Brundage, supra note 20; W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993) [hereinafter BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING]; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, ch.7; 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY ch.27 (1944); RAPER, supra note 21, chs.1-3; GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES 1877-1900 ch.12 (1952); GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE].
36. For the claim that the Scottsboro Boys would have been lynched in an earlier era, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 105, 189. The rest of this paragraph is based on EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 238-55 (1984); BAKER, supra note 21, ch.9; Brundage, supra note 20; W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993) [hereinafter BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING]; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, ch.7; 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY ch.27 (1944); RAPER, supra note 21, chs.1-3; GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES 1877-1900 ch.12 (1952); GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE].
37. For the claim that the Scottsboro Boys would have been lynched in an earlier era, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 105, 189. The rest of this paragraph is based on EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 238-55 (1984); BAKER, supra note 21, ch.9; Brundage, supra note 20; W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930 (1993) [hereinafter BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING]; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, ch.7; 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY ch.27 (1944); RAPER, supra note 21, chs.1-3; GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES 1877-1900 ch.12 (1952); GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" (1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE].
38. See RAPER, supra note 21, at 26-27; see also 1 CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, 1909-1920, at 210 (1967).
39. On various explanations for the decline in lynchings, see BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING, supra note 25, at 209, 238; MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 565; GEORGE B. TINDALL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH 1913-1945, at 174, 554 (1967); Miller, supra note 21, at 237; Todd E. Lewis, Mob Justice in the 'American Congo': 'Judge Lynch' in Arkansas During the Decade After World War 1, 52 ARK. HIST. Q. 156 (1993).
40. On various explanations for the decline in lynchings, see BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING, supra note 25, at 209, 238; MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 565; GEORGE B. TINDALL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH 1913-1945, at 174, 554 (1967); Miller, supra note 21, at 237; Todd E. Lewis, Mob Justice in the 'American Congo': 'Judge Lynch' in Arkansas During the Decade After World War 1, 52 ARK. HIST. Q. 156 (1993).
41. On the replacement of lynchings with mob-dominated trials, see AYERS, supra note 25, at 246; CARTER, supra note 11, at 115; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 206-17; Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20.
42. For examples of "special sessions" to avoid lynchings, see Bettis v. State, 261 S.W. 46 (Ark. 1924); CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 298 (1940); LAWRENCE D. RICE, THE NEGRO IN TEXAS 1874-1900, at 253 (1971); TINDALL, supra note 25, at 252.
43. For examples of "special sessions" to avoid lynchings, see Bettis v. State, 261 S.W. 46 (Ark. 1924); CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 298 (1940); LAWRENCE D. RICE, THE NEGRO IN TEXAS 1874-1900, at 253 (1971); TINDALL, supra note 25, at 252.
44. See RAPER, supra note 21, at 46-47; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 229.
45. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1923); Graham v. State, 82 S.E. 282, 285 (Ga. 1914); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 3-4, 8; WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE, supra note 25, at 251, 255; Powell Petitioners' Brief, supra note 13, at 36-37, reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 332-33.
46. See, e.g., Cleveland v. State, 94 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936); Williams v. State, 84 So. 8 (Miss. 1919); Harris v. State, 50 So. 626 (Miss. 1909); Thompson v. State, 26 S.W. 987 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894).
47. See, e.g., Moore, 261 U.S. at 90; CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 101.
48. See, e.g., Downer v. Dunaway, 1 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (M.D. Ga. 1932).
49. Editorial, Playing with Fire, FORUM (Washington, Ga.), June 25, 1931, quoted in Emanuel, supra note 13, at 246 n.161.
50. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 105-06; CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 11.
51. CARTER, supra note 11, at 113.
52. See Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 211 (Ala. 1932).
53. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 107, 111-13; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 55-57; Frank L. Owsley, Scottsboro: The Third Crusade, 1 AM. REV. 257, 285 (1933).
54. 161 So. 465, 472 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting).
55. See MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 208; see also ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 1915-1972, at 26-29 (1995). On rare occasions, lynch mobs actually constituted themselves into extralegal adjudicative bodies, taking evidence and occasionally freeing a wrongly accused suspect. Thus, at the extremes, lynchings and legal lynchings converged into one another. On lynch mobs dispensing populist justice, see MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 226-27, 239-44; Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20, at 252.
56. See MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 208; see also ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 1915-1972, at 26-29 (1995). On rare occasions, lynch mobs actually constituted themselves into extralegal adjudicative bodies, taking evidence and occasionally freeing a wrongly accused suspect. Thus, at the extremes, lynchings and legal lynchings converged into one another. On lynch mobs dispensing populist justice, see MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 226-27, 239-44; Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20, at 252.
57. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). The fullest account of the Frank case is LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (1968); see also Nancy MacLean, Gender, Sexuality, and the Politics of Lynching: The Leo Frank Case Revisited, 78 J. AM. HIST. 917 (1991); Appellant's Argument at 3-8, Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (No. 775) reprinted in 17 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 476-81.
58. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). The fullest account of the Frank case is LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (1968); see also Nancy MacLean, Gender, Sexuality, and the Politics of Lynching: The Leo Frank Case Revisited, 78 J. AM. HIST. 917 (1991); Appellant's Argument at 3-8, Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (No. 775) reprinted in 17 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 476-81.
59. Frank, 237 U.S. at 334-38.
60. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1923).
61. Id. at 91-92.
62. Hicks v. State, 220 S.W. 308, 309-10 (Ark. 1920). Whether Moore is consistent with Frank has occasioned much historical debate. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420-21 (1962); id. at 457-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 185-88; Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 488-91 (1963); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part II. Leo Frank Lives: Untangling the Historical Roots of Meaningful Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1530-35 (2000). Justice McReynolds, who dissented in Moore, certainly saw the two decisions as inconsistent. See Moore, 261 U.S. at 93-96 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). For contemporary commentators viewing the decisions as inconsistent, see Note, Mob-Domination of State Courts and Federal Review by Habeas Cor-pus, 33 YALE L.J. 82 (1923); Note, Mob Domination of a Trial as a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 37 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1924) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. Naturally, appellants in Moore adhered to the contrary view. See Brief for the Appellants at 35-37, 40, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (No. 199), reprinted in 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 230-32, 235. The different outcomes also could be attributable to the more egregious facts of Moore. While Frank's trial was indeed mob dominated, he at least received a genuine defense in a trial lasting an entire month. In Moore, by way of contrast, defense lawyers were appointed the day before a trial that lasted just forty-five minutes. On the comparison between the quality of the defense in Frank and Moore, see Appellants' Brief at 35-37, Moore (No. 199), at 230-32.
63. Hicks v. State, 220 S.W. 308, 309-10 (Ark. 1920). Whether Moore is consistent with Frank has occasioned much historical debate. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420-21 (1962); id. at 457-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 185-88; Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 488-91 (1963); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part II. Leo Frank Lives: Untangling the Historical Roots of Meaningful Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1530-35 (2000). Justice McReynolds, who dissented in Moore, certainly saw the two decisions as inconsistent. See Moore, 261 U.S. at 93-96 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). For contemporary commentators viewing the decisions as inconsistent, see Note, Mob-Domination of State Courts and Federal Review by Habeas Cor-pus, 33 YALE L.J. 82 (1923); Note, Mob Domination of a Trial as a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 37 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1924) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. Naturally, appellants in Moore adhered to the contrary view. See Brief for the Appellants at 35-37, 40, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (No. 199), reprinted in 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 230-32, 235. The different outcomes also could be attributable to the more egregious facts of Moore. While Frank's trial was indeed mob dominated, he at least received a genuine defense in a trial lasting an entire month. In Moore, by way of contrast, defense lawyers were appointed the day before a trial that lasted just forty-five minutes. On the comparison between the quality of the defense in Frank and Moore, see Appellants' Brief at 35-37, Moore (No. 199), at 230-32.
64. Hicks v. State, 220 S.W. 308, 309-10 (Ark. 1920). Whether Moore is consistent with Frank has occasioned much historical debate. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420-21 (1962); id. at 457-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 185-88; Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 488-91 (1963); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part II. Leo Frank Lives: Untangling the Historical Roots of Meaningful Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1530-35 (2000). Justice McReynolds, who dissented in Moore, certainly saw the two decisions as inconsistent. See Moore, 261 U.S. at 93-96 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). For contemporary commentators viewing the decisions as inconsistent, see Note, Mob-Domination of State Courts and Federal Review by Habeas Cor-pus, 33 YALE L.J. 82 (1923); Note, Mob Domination of a Trial as a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 37 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1924) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. Naturally, appellants in Moore adhered to the contrary view. See Brief for the Appellants at 35-37, 40, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (No. 199), reprinted in 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 230-32, 235. The different outcomes also could be attributable to the more egregious facts of Moore. While Frank's trial was indeed mob dominated, he at least received a genuine defense in a trial lasting an entire month. In Moore, by way of contrast, defense lawyers were appointed the day before a trial that lasted just forty-five minutes. On the comparison between the quality of the defense in Frank and Moore, see Appellants' Brief at 35-37, Moore (No. 199), at 230-32.
65. Hicks v. State, 220 S.W. 308, 309-10 (Ark. 1920). Whether Moore is consistent with Frank has occasioned much historical debate. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420-21 (1962); id. at 457-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 185-88; Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 488-91 (1963); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part II. Leo Frank Lives: Untangling the Historical Roots of Meaningful Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1530-35 (2000). Justice McReynolds, who dissented in Moore, certainly saw the two decisions as inconsistent. See Moore, 261 U.S. at 93-96 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). For contemporary commentators viewing the decisions as inconsistent, see Note, Mob-Domination of State Courts and Federal Review by Habeas Cor-pus, 33 YALE L.J. 82 (1923); Note, Mob Domination of a Trial as a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 37 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1924) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. Naturally, appellants in Moore adhered to the contrary view. See Brief for the Appellants at 35-37, 40, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (No. 199), reprinted in 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 230-32, 235. The different outcomes also could be attributable to the more egregious facts of Moore. While Frank's trial was indeed mob dominated, he at least received a genuine defense in a trial lasting an entire month. In Moore, by way of contrast, defense lawyers were appointed the day before a trial that lasted just forty-five minutes. On the comparison between the quality of the defense in Frank and Moore, see Appellants' Brief at 35-37, Moore (No. 199), at 230-32.
66. On personnel changes, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 144-46.
67. See Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (1906), in 17 THE WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 412, 420-25 (1925) ("The greatest existing cause of lynching is the perpetration, especially by black men, of the hideous crime of rape....").
68. See RICHARD B. SHERMAN, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND BLACK AMERICA: FROM MCKINLEY TO HOOVER, 1896-1933, at 97-98 (1973); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at 26 (1980).
69. See RICHARD B. SHERMAN, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND BLACK AMERICA: FROM MCKINLEY TO HOOVER, 1896-1933, at 97-98 (1973); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at 26 (1980).
70. On the number of lynchings, see ZANGRANDO, supra note 49, at 35.
71. See KELLOGG, supra note 26, at 246; ZANGRANDO, supra note 49, at 38.
72. See KELLOGG, supra note 26, at 227; SHERMAN, supra note 49, at 123-24.
73. For the remainder of this paragraph on the NAACP's anti-lynching campaign, see KELLOGG, supra note 26, ch. 10; SHERMAN, supra note 49, ch.7; ZANGRANDO, supra note 49, chs. 2-3.
74. On the connection between Moore and the federal anti-lynching bill, see Harvard Note, supra note 46, at 250.
75. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 50.
76. See Powell Petitioners' Brief, supra note 13, at 3-4, 34-62, reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 299-300, 330-58.
77. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
78. See, e.g., Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Brownfeld v. South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426 (1903); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903). For discussion of the Plessy-era jury cases, see Klarman, Plessy, supra note 8, at 376-78; Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1462-76 (1983).
79. On the oddity of the Powell Court's reaching out to decide a new legal issue, see BERNARD H. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NEGRO SINCE 1920, at 69 (1946).
80. For the argument that the mob-domination claim was stronger in Moore, see Brief for Respondent at 27-28, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Nos. 98-100), reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 399-400.
81. For contemporary criticism of the Court for ducking more significant issues and "in-structing" Alabama on how to properly execute the Scottsboro Boys, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 163-64; 1 HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS 224-25 (1978). For the claim that the right-to-counsel ground would incite the least southern resentment, see Alfred J. Cilella & Irwin J. Kaplan, Note, Discrimination Against Negroes in Jury Service, 29 ILL. L. REV. 498, 505-06 (1934).
82. For contemporary criticism of the Court for ducking more significant issues and "in-structing" Alabama on how to properly execute the Scottsboro Boys, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 163-64; 1 HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS 224-25 (1978). For the claim that the right-to-counsel ground would incite the least southern resentment, see Alfred J. Cilella & Irwin J. Kaplan, Note, Discrimination Against Negroes in Jury Service, 29 ILL. L. REV. 498, 505-06 (1934).
83. As of 1932, the only Bill of Rights protections that had been held applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment were the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for takings of property and the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. See Otto M. Bowman, Comment, 12 OR. L. REV. 227, 232 n.32 (1933).
84. See Bowman, supra note 62, at 229.
85. Powell Petitioners' Brief, supra note 13, at 48-59, reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 344-55.
86. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
87. For appointment of defense counsel and their performance during trial, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 17-50.
88. For the diffusion of responsibility argument, see Powell, 287 U.S. at 56-57. For the state law violation, see Powell Petitioners' Brief, supra note 13, at 10, reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 306.
89. The inadequacies of defense counsel are enumerated in Powell Petitioners' Brief, supra note 13, at 9-14, 51-59, reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 305-10, 347-55.
90. See, e.g., Stroud v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W. 1021 (Ky. 1914); see also McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 205 S.W. 915 (Ky. 1918); State v. Collins, 29 So. 180 (La. 1900) (discussing numerous additional Louisiana cases).
91. See, e.g., Editorial, The Scottsboro Case, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 8, 1932, at 20; Editorial, The Scottsboro Cases, BALT. SUN, Nov. 9, 1932, at 10; Editorial, Righteously Remanded, RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Nov. 8, 1932, at 8; Editorial, The Scottsboro Case, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 1932, at 10.
92. See supra note 58.
93. Norris v. State, 156 So. 556 (Ala. 1934).
94. 212 U.S. 278 (1909). For Alabama's invocation of Thomas, see Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Norris v. Alabama, at 7.
95. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904). On the inconsistency between Norris and Thomas, see Willard L. Eckhardt, Comment, 24 ILL. B.J. 233 (1936).
96. 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880). Most state courts had long ignored the Neal dicta. See Bernard S. Jefferson, Race Discrimination in Jury Service, 19 B.U. L. REV. 413, 424-25 (1939).
97. Norris, 294 U.S. at 591 (invoking Neal).
98. Id.at 598.
99. Id. at 589-90. Norris is usefully discussed in Schmidt, supra note 58, at 1476-83.
100. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 282-83.
101. See Norris, 294 U.S. at 593 n.1; CARTER, supra note 11, at 319-20; Hits Alabama Jury Book: Scottsboro Defense Charges Forgery of Names List, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1935, at 2.
102. See GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 148-49.
103. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 232; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 132.
104. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 252-53, 270.
105. CHATTANOOGA NEWS, quoted in The South Split Over the Scottsboro Verdict, LITERARY DIG., Apr. 22, 1933, at 4 (reporting other southern newspaper reaction as well).
106. CARTER, supra note 11, at 322.
107. Recent Decision, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 776, 777 (1935).
108. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 243-45; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 149, 152-53.
109. See Recent Decision, supra note 86, at 777 & n2 (reproducing opinions from other newspapers); see, e.g., Editorial, Justice for Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1935, at 20; Editorial, New Scottsboro Opinion, BALT. SUN, Apr. 3, 1935, at 12; Editorial, The Scottsboro Decision, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., Apr. 2, 1935, at 18; Editorial, The Scottsboro Decision, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1935, at 8.
110. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
111. Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 468 (Miss. 1935). For the reliance on Twining, see Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (No. 301), reprinted in 31 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 93, 104-05.
112. For the state constitutions and judicial interpretations thereof, see Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 11 U.S. Comm'n on Law Observance and Enforcement 3-4, 25, 28 (1931) [hereinafter Report on Lawlessness].
113. See infra note 128.
114. Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 341-42 (Miss. 1935), 161 So. at 466-68.
115. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284 (1936); 161 So. at 471 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
116. Brown, 297 U.S. at 279; 161 So. at 471.
117. Report on Lawlessness, supra note 91, at 43-46, 91. On that report's influence, see CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 120-21.
118. See CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 121; Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAUL L. REV. 213, 219 (1959); Klarman, Civil Rights, supra note 18, at 65-66.
119. See infra note 103.
120. CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 145-46.
121. Brown, 161 So. at 470.
122. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-86.
123. On McReynolds's notorious racism, see, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 158-59 (1996); Robert L. Carter, Tribute (to Charles Hamilton Houston), 111 HARV. L. REV. 2149, 2153-54 (1998).
124. On McReynolds's notorious racism, see, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 158-59 (1996); Robert L. Carter, Tribute (to Charles Hamilton Houston), 111 HARV. L. REV. 2149, 2153-54 (1998).
125. On the CIC and ASWPL's involvement, see CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 90-102. On the difficulty of getting such cases to the Supreme Court, see infra notes 174-196 and accompanying text.
126. Hampton v. State, 40 So. 545, 546 (Miss. 1906).
127. Funches v. State, 87 So. 487, 488 (Miss. 1921). For similar examples of colorblind rhetoric, see Jones v. State, 109 So. 189, 190-91 (Ala. Ct. App. 1926); Clark v. State, 59 So. 887, 888 (Miss. 1912); Morehead v. State, 151 P. 1183, 1190 (Okla. Crim. App. 1915).
128. JOHN T. KNEEBONE, SOUTHERN LIBERAL JOURNALISTS AND THE ISSUE OF RACE, 1920-1944, at 91 (1985) (quoting Virginius Dabney).
129. Many such cases are cited and discussed in MANGUM, supra note 29, chs.14, 16; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, ch.6. For a few of these cases, see Williams v. State, 146 So. 422 (Ala. 1933); Byrd v. State, 123 So. 867 (Miss. 1929); Story v. State, 97 So. 806 (Miss. 1923); Graham v. State, 82 S.E. 282 (Ga. 1914); State v. Jones, 53 So. 959 (La. 1911); Tannehill v. State, 48 So. 662 (Ala. 1909); Sykes v. State, 42 So. 875 (Miss. 1907) (mem.); cases cited supra note 69; see also cases cited infra note 128. For the suggestion that southern state appellate courts were less likely to discriminate against blacks because the judges were more professionalized and were relatively independent of local opinion, see 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 552, 555.
130. On southern sensitivity to outside interference, see generally CARTER, supra note 11, at 109-10; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 109-11 (1994); Owsley, supra note 39. Obviously there were exceptions, such as the dissenting state appellate judges in Powell and Brown, and the trial judge in one of the Scottsboro cases who heroically ordered a new trial after the jury had returned a guilty verdict, thereby costing himself his job in the fol-lowing year's election. See Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 214 (Ala. 1932) (Anderson, C.J., dissenting); Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 343 (Miss. 1935) (Anderson, J., dissenting); 161 So. 465, 471 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting); CARTER, supra note 11, at 223-34, 266, 273. My point is one about tendencies, not universal laws.
131. See, e.g., Seay v. State, 93 So. 403, 405 (Ala. 1922); Thompson v. State, 23 So. 676 (Ala. 1898) (mem.).
132. See cases cited supra note 69.
133. Powell v. State, 141 So. 201 (Ala.), rev'd 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
134. On the circling-the-wagons effect of Scottsboro, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 109-10, 180-81; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 47-50; Owsley, supra note 39; Fletcher, supra note 22; John Temple Graves, Alabama Resents Outside Agitation, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1931, § 3, at 5. For a similar effect in Frank, see DINNERSTEIN, supra note 42, at 105-06, 116-17.
135. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 141-44, 243-45, 250-51; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 28-29.
136. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 119-36, 152-53, 174-78; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 27-31.
137. CARTER, supra note 11, at 145; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 47-48; Scottsboro Ruling Evokes Praise Here, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1932, at 11.
138. CARTER, supra note 11, at 156.
139. Quoted in id.; see GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 49-50.
140. CARTER, supra note 11, at 159-60.
141. See id. at 113, 136; Editorial, The Affirmation of the Scottsboro Cases, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 25, 1932, at 52.
142. On the galvanizing effect of Powell, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 190 (quoting the BIRMINGHAM POST).
143. See id. at 118-19, 153; CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 37-39. On the CIC's involvement in similar cases, see id. at 90-102; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 238 & n.119.
144. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 253-61.
145. Quoted in Owsley, supra note 39, at 284; see also CARTER, supra note 11, at 244-46 (describing white Alabamian outrage at Leibowitz's remarks in New York City); GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 152 (same).
146. CARTER, supra note 11, at 372.
147. Id. at 348.
148. See id. at 100, 119-20, 389-97.
149. See, e.g., Newman v. State, 84 S.E. 579 (Ga. 1915); Graham v. State, 82 S.E. 282 (Ga. 1914); State v. Weldon, 74 S.E. 43 (S.C. 1912), overruled in part by State v. Thompson, 115 S.E. 326 (S.C. 1922); Browder v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W. 328 (Ky. 1909); Brown v. State, 36 So. 73 (Miss. 1904); Collier v. State, 42 S.E. 226 (Ga. 1902); Thompson v. State, 23 So. 676 (Ala. 1898); Massey v. State, 20 S.W. 758 (Tex Crim. App. 1892); MANGUM, supra note 29, at 278, 282-85. That the Arkansas Supreme Court twice reversed the death sentences of another set of six Phillips County defendants may appear to undermine this interpretation. However, the state judges may have regarded these as compromise verdicts. So long as some of the Phillips County defendants were executed, the State's interest in vindicating white supremacy was satisfied. On the other state supreme court decisions arising from the Phillips County riot, see Ware v. State, 252 S.W. 934 (Ark. 1923) (Ware II); 225 S.W. 626 (Ark. 1920) (Were I); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.5; Walter F. White, The Defeat of Arkansas Mob Law, 25 THE CRISIS 259 (1923); Victory in Arkansas, 26 THE CRISIS 163 (1923); J.S. Waterman & E.E. Overton, The Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey, 6 ARK. L. REV. & B. ASS'N J. 1 (1951-52).
150. See, e.g., Newman v. State, 84 S.E. 579 (Ga. 1915); Graham v. State, 82 S.E. 282 (Ga. 1914); State v. Weldon, 74 S.E. 43 (S.C. 1912), overruled in part by State v. Thompson, 115 S.E. 326 (S.C. 1922); Browder v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W. 328 (Ky. 1909); Brown v. State, 36 So. 73 (Miss. 1904); Collier v. State, 42 S.E. 226 (Ga. 1902); Thompson v. State, 23 So. 676 (Ala. 1898); Massey v. State, 20 S.W. 758 (Tex Crim. App. 1892); MANGUM, supra note 29, at 278, 282-85. That the Arkansas Supreme Court twice reversed the death sentences of another set of six Phillips County defendants may appear to undermine this interpretation. However, the state judges may have regarded these as compromise verdicts. So long as some of the Phillips County defendants were executed, the State's interest in vindicating white supremacy was satisfied. On the other state supreme court decisions arising from the Phillips County riot, see Ware v. State, 252 S.W. 934 (Ark. 1923) (Ware II); 225 S.W. 626 (Ark. 1920) (Were I); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.5; Walter F. White, The Defeat of Arkansas Mob Law, 25 THE CRISIS 259 (1923); Victory in Arkansas, 26 THE CRISIS 163 (1923); J.S. Waterman & E.E. Overton, The Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey, 6 ARK. L. REV. & B. ASS'N J. 1 (1951-52).
151. See, e.g., Newman v. State, 84 S.E. 579 (Ga. 1915); Graham v. State, 82 S.E. 282 (Ga. 1914); State v. Weldon, 74 S.E. 43 (S.C. 1912), overruled in part by State v. Thompson, 115 S.E. 326 (S.C. 1922); Browder v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W. 328 (Ky. 1909); Brown v. State, 36 So. 73 (Miss. 1904); Collier v. State, 42 S.E. 226 (Ga. 1902); Thompson v. State, 23 So. 676 (Ala. 1898); Massey v. State, 20 S.W. 758 (Tex Crim. App. 1892); MANGUM, supra note 29, at 278, 282-85. That the Arkansas Supreme Court twice reversed the death sentences of another set of six Phillips County defendants may appear to undermine this interpretation. However, the state judges may have regarded these as compromise verdicts. So long as some of the Phillips County defendants were executed, the State's interest in vindicating white supremacy was satisfied. On the other state supreme court decisions arising from the Phillips County riot, see Ware v. State, 252 S.W. 934 (Ark. 1923) (Ware II); 225 S.W. 626 (Ark. 1920) (Were I); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.5; Walter F. White, The Defeat of Arkansas Mob Law, 25 THE CRISIS 259 (1923); Victory in Arkansas, 26 THE CRISIS 163 (1923); J.S. Waterman & E.E. Overton, The Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey, 6 ARK. L. REV. & B. ASS'N J. 1 (1951-52).
152. See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 110 So. 361 (Miss. 1926); Whip v. State, 109 So. 697 (Miss. 1926); White v. State, 91 So. 903 (Miss. 1922); Matthews v. State, 59 So. 842 (Miss. 1912); MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 213. For similar decisions from other southern states, see, for example, Bell v. State, 9 S.W.2d 238 (Ark. 1928); Enoch v. Commonwealth, 126 S.E. 222 (Va. 1925).
153. Fisher, 110 So. at 365. For similar willingness by the Mississippi Supreme Court to overlook a procedural default by a black defendant, see Butler v. State, 112 So. 685 (Miss. 1927).
154. See Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 342-43 (Miss. 1935), 161 So. 465, 466-67 (Miss. 1935).
155. See CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 95-96, 103.
156. 135 So. 357 (Miss. 1931).
157. 154 So. 306 (Miss. 1934).
158. For a similar example, see Patterson v. State, 156 So. 567 (Ala. 1934).
159. On northern discrimination against blacks, see, for example, KENNETH L. KUSMER, A GHETTO TAKES SHAPE: BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-1930, at ch.8 (1976); 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 293-96, 304-06; ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO 1890-1920, at ch.11 (1967); Hannibal Gerald Duncan, "The Changing Race Relationship in the Border and Northern States" chs.3-4 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1922). On regional differences in legal treatment of blacks, see 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 526-29, 534.
160. On northern discrimination against blacks, see, for example, KENNETH L. KUSMER, A GHETTO TAKES SHAPE: BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-1930, at ch.8 (1976); 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 293-96, 304-06; ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO 1890-1920, at ch.11 (1967); Hannibal Gerald Duncan, "The Changing Race Relationship in the Border and Northern States" chs.3-4 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1922). On regional differences in legal treatment of blacks, see 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 526-29, 534.
161. On northern discrimination against blacks, see, for example, KENNETH L. KUSMER, A GHETTO TAKES SHAPE: BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-1930, at ch.8 (1976); 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 293-96, 304-06; ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO 1890-1920, at ch.11 (1967); Hannibal Gerald Duncan, "The Changing Race Relationship in the Border and Northern States" chs.3-4 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1922). On regional differences in legal treatment of blacks, see 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 526-29, 534.
162. On Sweet, see NAACP Papers (microfilm edition), pt. 5, reel 3, passim, especially frames 164, 230, 462-63.
163. See, e.g., Henry J. McGuinn, Equal Protection of the Law and Fair Trials in Maryland, 24 J. NEGRO HIST. 143, 145 (1939).
164. 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 60-61; see also SAMUEL N. PINCUS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT, BLACKS AND THE LAW 1870-1902, at 247-48 (1990).
165. See, e.g., CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 64-69; CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 43-44; AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, ALONG THE COLOR LINE: EXPLORATIONS IN THE BLACK EXPERIENCE 134 (1976); 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 555-56; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 234-36.
166. On the willingness to second-guess state court findings of fact, see NELSON, supra note 59, at 103-05; Recent Case, 1 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 116, 117 (1932).
167. I have sketched that extralegal context in some detail in Michael J. Klarman, Neither Hero, Nor Villain: The Supreme Court, Race, and the Constitution in the Twentieth Century ch.3 (1999) (unpublished manuscript).
168. On Moore's aftermath, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.8; Waterman & Overton, supra note 127, at 6-7; The Arkansas Cases Nearly Ended, 27 THE CRISIS 124 (1924); The End of the Arkansas Cases, 29 THE CRISIS 272 (1925).
169. On Moore's aftermath, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.8; Waterman & Overton, supra note 127, at 6-7; The Arkansas Cases Nearly Ended, 27 THE CRISIS 124 (1924); The End of the Arkansas Cases, 29 THE CRISIS 272 (1925).
170. For post-Moore mob-dominated trials, see, for example, State v. Wilson, 158 So. 621 (La. 1935); Downer v. Dunaway, 1 F. Supp. 1001 (M.D. Ga. 1932); Powell v. State, 141 So. 201 (Ala.), rev'd, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Ex parte Hollins, 14 P.2d 243 (Okla. Crim. App. 1932).
171. See, e.g., Bard v. Chilton, 20 F. 2d 906 (6th Cir. 1927); Powell, 141 So. at 208-09.
172. See supra note 27.
173. See, e.g., 1 SITKOFF, supra note 61, at 269; Miller, supra note 21, at 225.
174. CARTER, supra note 11, chs. 10-11.
175. Id. at 181, 189-90, 329.
176. Id. at 379.
177. See id., chs. 11-12.
178. On the Alabama judiciary's willingness to "cheat" to ensure convictions in retrials of the Scottsboro defendants, see id. at 341-46. On post-Brown evasions by state courts, see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 283-89 (1994); Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 (1994); Darryl Paulson & Paul Hawkes, Desegregating the University of Florida Law School: Virgil Hawkins v. The Florida Board of Control, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 59 (1984).
179. On the Alabama judiciary's willingness to "cheat" to ensure convictions in retrials of the Scottsboro defendants, see id. at 341-46. On post-Brown evasions by state courts, see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 283-89 (1994); Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 (1994); Darryl Paulson & Paul Hawkes, Desegregating the University of Florida Law School: Virgil Hawkins v. The Florida Board of Control, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 59 (1984).
180. On the Alabama judiciary's willingness to "cheat" to ensure convictions in retrials of the Scottsboro defendants, see id. at 341-46. On post-Brown evasions by state courts, see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 283-89 (1994); Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 (1994); Darryl Paulson & Paul Hawkes, Desegregating the University of Florida Law School: Virgil Hawkins v. The Florida Board of Control, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 59 (1984).
181. Powell,287 U.S. at 71.
182. See supra note 61.
183. On the difficulty faced by southern black defendants in securing decent legal representation, see infra notes 177-187 and accompanying text.
184. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 326-27.
185. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 326 (discussing the reaction of the Daily News (Jackson, Miss.)). For other contemporary predictions that Norris would be evaded, see MANGUM, supra note 29, at 333; NELSON, supra note 59, at 82 (quoting view of NAACP's William Pickens); J.F. Barbour, Jr., Note, The Exclusion of Negroes from Jury Service, 8 MISS. L.J. 196, 200-01 (1935); Recent Decision, supra note 86.
186. See State v. Grant, 19 S.E.2d 638 (S.C. 1942); NELSON, supra note 59, at 82-83; Barbour, supra note 156, at 201-04; Negroes and Jury Service in the Southern States, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 5, 1935, at 8; CHARLESTON NEWS & COURIER, Apr. 13, 1935, at 4; BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 30, 1935, at 1, reproduced in THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTHERN WHITE PRESS TOWARD NEGRO SUFFRAGE, 1932-1940, at 2 (Rayford W. Logan ed., 1940).
187. For the post-Norris proceedings, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 338-41.
188. On the use of jury challenges to circumvent Norris, see NELSON, supra note 59, at 82-83 & n.100; Eckhardt, supra note 74, at 233-35.
189. On the continued difficulty of proving race discrimination in jury selection, see Jefferson, supra note 75, at 433-34, 447, and Schmidt, supra note 58, at 1482. On Norris's third death sentence, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 369-70.
190. NELSON, supra note 59, at 82 n.96.
191. See, e.g., Walter White, George Crawford - Symbol, 41 THE CRISIS 15 (1934); John Temple Graves, Scottsboro Ruling Disturbs the South, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1935, § 3, at 6.
192. See, e.g., Walter White, George Crawford - Symbol, 41 THE CRISIS 15 (1934); John Temple Graves, Scottsboro Ruling Disturbs the South, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1935, § 3, at 6.
193. See, e.g., Harry H. Jones, The Negro Before the Court During 1932, 40 THE CRISIS 230 (1933); White, supra note 162; Editorial, Negroes as Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1932, at 16.
194. See, e.g., Harry H. Jones, The Negro Before the Court During 1932, 40 THE CRISIS 230 (1933); White, supra note 162; Editorial, Negroes as Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1932, at 16.
195. See, e.g., FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 41, at 63-64; 1 SITKOFF, supra note 61, at 231 (noting U.S. Civil Rights Commission report from 1960s); PITTSBURGH COURIER, Jan. 29, 1943, at 3.
196. Quoted in 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 549-50.
197. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359 (1939).
198. Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20, at 266.
199. CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 153, 159.
200. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Florida's Lilttle Scottsboro: Groveland, 56 THE CRISIS 266, 267 (1949) (describing beating of blacks accused of rape in Groveland, Fla.); Along the N.A.A.C.P. Battlefront, 55 THE CRISIS 123, 123 (1948) (detailing NAACP's efforts in late 1940s on behalf of rape suspect forced to "confess" through "force, vio lence, and fear"); Along the N.A.A.C.P. Battlefront, 50 THE CRISIS 371, 372-73 (1943) (discussing 1941 conviction of Oklahoman black whose confession had been obtained through violence); see also Editorial, Rebuke to Tenure, 47 THE CRISIS 81 (1940) (calling the torturing of black criminal suspects a "routine police procedure" in the South).
201. SEE, E.G., TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 25 (1947).
202. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 24, 30-31, 105-15 (photo. reprint 1959) (1947); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 170, at 114-19.
203. See, e.g., CARR, supra note 171, at 114, 133-42, 161-62; To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 170, at 126.
204. For the points in this paragraph, see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. The Court began challenging less extreme forms of coercion in Chambers, 309 U.S. 227 (repeated interrogation of isolated prisoner).
205. One contemporary commentator attributed the relative dearth of Supreme Court criminal procedure cases to the expense, which he estimated to exceed $3,500. See NELSON, supra note 59, at 45. The NAACP spent roughly $15,000 over three-and-a-half years defending the Phillips County defendants at various levels of the criminal justice system. See Walter White, The Defeat of Arkansas Mob Law, 25 THE CRISIS 259 (1923); NAACP, Press Release 2 (Sept. 12, 1924), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 4, frames 335-36. The Supreme Court appeal alone in Brown v. Mississippi cost $1,261. See AFRO-AMERICAN (Bait., Md.), Feb. 22, 1936, at 1.
206. On the fundraising opportunities created by Scottsboro, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 143-44, 170 n.98; CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 40. On Moore, see KELLOGG, supra note 26, at 242-43.
207. See CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 45-49.
208. See, e.g., Charles H. Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 49 (1935); Letter from William Pickens to NAACP (Apr. 11, 1926) (describing how white attorneys had "double-crossed" blacks), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frame 753; Letter from G.W. Lucas, President, New Orleans Branch of the NAACP, to James Welson Johnson, Secretary, NAACP (Apr. 24, 1926) (describing "apprehension" over southern white attorney in residential segregation case), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frame 755. On the pressure felt by white lawyers not to represent blacks in controversial cases involving interracial crime, see Browder v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W. 328, 330 (Ky. 1909); CARTER, supra note 11, at 179; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 214-17; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 237 n.115.
209. Cilella & Kaplan, supra note 61, at 503 n.17; see also CARTER, supra note 11, at 75.
210. McGuinn, supra note 137, at 156-57. The Maryland case was Lee v. State, 161 A. 284 (Md. 1932).
211. CARTER, supra note 11, at 199-202, 205-10; see also id. at 79-80 (describing threats against two other attorneys who questioned the character of the alleged rape victims).
212. CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 46, 59-60, 105-06, 155-56.
213. CARTER, supra note 11, at 276 & n.7.
214. 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 550; Houston, Negro Lawyers, supra note 177, at 49, 50 tbl. 1.
215. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 139, at 130.
216. On racial bias against black lawyers, see id., and McMILLEN, supra note 20, at 215. On inferior legal training, see KELLOGG, supra note 26, at 293; 1 SITKOFF, supra note 61, at 217-18; and Editorial, 9 CRISIS 133-34 (Jan. 1915).
217. On the NAACP's rule requiring likely innocence, which was not relaxed until World War II, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 52-53; TUSHNET, supra note 151, at 28-29.
218. On the absence of NAACP branches from the rural South, see, for example, JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1900-1920, at 206 (1977); McMILLEN, supra note 20, at 314-16.
219. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Brown initially refused to consider the federal coerced confession claim because of defense counsel's failure to object at the appropriate point of the trial. Only because that court addressed (in passing) the merits of the claim at a rehearing was the United States Supreme Court empowered to consider the issue. See Brown, 161 So. 465, 467-68 (Miss. 1935).
220. Patterson v. State, 156 So. 567 (Ala. 1934), vacated, 294 U.S. 600 (1935); Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 210 (Ala.), rev'd, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Hicks v. State, 220 S.W. 308, 309 (Ark. 1920).
221. 237 U.S. 309, 343 (1915).
222. For the later change in the rules regarding procedural defaults, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955).
223. On Moore and Walter White, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 26, 91-92. For a similar scenario, see Browder v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W. 328, 330 (Ky. 1909).
224. See Emanuel, supra note 13, at 240.
225. On Leibowitz's brutal cross-examination of Victoria Price, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 205-10, 223-24.
226. For the rest of this paragraph, see id. at 214-15, 291.
227. For example, the Supreme Court heard eight coerced confession cases involving southern black defendants between 1936 and 1943. See NELSON, supra note 59, at 135-36. There cannot possibly have been more coercion during these years than previously. The increase in the number of cases must be attributable to more favorable conditions for obtaining appellate review -a more active NAACP, an increase in the number of black lawyers, a more professionalized southern legal system, and less oppressive social conditions.
228. On the importance of maintaining hope, see DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT chs.5-6 (1991); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 105-06 (1982).
229. On the importance of maintaining hope, see DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT chs.5-6 (1991); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 105-06 (1982).
230. Letter from J. Rice Perkins to Walter White (May 7, 1935), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 3, ser. A, reel 4, frame 367.
231. Letter from Jasper E. Gayle, Chairman, New Orleans Branch of the NAACP, to Robert W. Bagnall, Director of Branches, NAACP (Nov. 27, 1924), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frame 645.
232. Letter from Walter White to Edward S. Lewis, Baltimore Urban League 1 (Sept. 8, 1937), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 3, sen A, reel 2, frames 818-19.
233. On these "internal" obstacles to change, see JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH 240-41 (1982); FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 41, at 47-48; KELLOGG, supra note 26, at 131; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN vs. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 157 (1976); 2 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 758-59, 824-25.
234. RALPH J. BUNCHE, THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO IN THE AGE OF FDR 108 (Dewey W. Grantham ed., 1973) (questioning the capacity of litigation to produce racial reform).
235. For this view of the anti-lynching campaign, see SHERMAN, supra note 49, at 198, and ZANGRANDO, supra note 49, at 38-39, 214.
236. On this general view of civil rights litigation, see 1 SITKOFF, supra note 61, at 242-43; McGuinn, supra note 137, at 163-65.
237. An example of an educational letter is Letter From Thurgood Marshall, Assistant Special Counsel, NAACP, to Roy L. Ferguson, Principal (of a black school), Hollow Rock, Ternn. (Aug. 19, 1937), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 3, series A, reel 2, frames 789-90.
238. Letter from J. Rice Perkins to Walter White, supra note 198, at 1.
239. Quoted in JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 59, 212 (1994) (ellipsis in original).
240. Memorandum for the Joint Committee of the NAACP and the American Fund for Public Service from Charles H. Houston (Oct. 26, 1934), microformed on NAACP PAPERS, pt. 3, ser. A, reel 1, frames 859-60.
241. On Sweet, see Press Release, NAACP, The Sweets with Robert W. Bagnall Tour 5 Cities (Jan. 15, 1926), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 3, frame 415; Dr. Sweet, FLA. SENTINEL (Jacksonville), Nov. 14, 1925, microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 4, frame 34; A Hopeful Sign, ST. LOUIS ARGUS, Jan. 1, 1926, microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 4, frame 210; Sweet Case, Unidentified press clipping, May 29, 1926, microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 4, frame 291. On Scottsboro, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 143-44.
242. TUSHNET, supra note 151, at 30.
243. Letter from Charles Hamilton Houston to Thurgood Marshall (Sept. 17, 1936), quoted in GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 145 (1983).
244. See PATRICIA SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE: RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW DEAL ERA 83-84, 91-92 (1996).
245. See Sweet Case, supra note 209.
246. On Meridian, see CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 72-73. Litigation challenging residential segregation ordinances proved especially conducive to building new branches and raising large sums of money. See, e.g., KELLOGG, supra note 26, at 184-86; GEORGE C. WRIGHT, LIFE BEHIND A VEIL: BLACKS IN LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 1865-1940, at 201, 208 (1990); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part I: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 503, 514 (1982); NAACP 1926 Legal Defense Report on Residential Segregation, microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 1, frame 955; Letter from Robert W. Bagnall, Director of Branches, NAACP, to James Weldon Johnson, Secretary, NAACP (Sept. 24, 1924), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frames 629-30; Letter from G. W. Lucas, President, New Orleans Branch of NAACP, to Bagnall (Nov. 19, 1924), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frame 644; Letter from Lucas to Bagnall (Mar. 9, 1925), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frame 716; Letter from A.V. Dunn, Secretary, New Orleans Branch of NAACP, to Bagnall (Nov. 9, 1924), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt.5, reel 4, frames 820-21. On other branches founded in connection with litigation, see KLUGER, supra note 201, at 195, 199.
247. On Meridian, see CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 72-73. Litigation challenging residential segregation ordinances proved especially conducive to building new branches and raising large sums of money. See, e.g., KELLOGG, supra note 26, at 184-86; GEORGE C. WRIGHT, LIFE BEHIND A VEIL: BLACKS IN LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 1865-1940, at 201, 208 (1990); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part I: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 503, 514 (1982); NAACP 1926 Legal Defense Report on Residential Segregation, microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 1, frame 955; Letter from Robert W. Bagnall, Director of Branches, NAACP, to James Weldon Johnson, Secretary, NAACP (Sept. 24, 1924), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frames 629-30; Letter from G. W. Lucas, President, New Orleans Branch of NAACP, to Bagnall (Nov. 19, 1924), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frame 644; Letter from Lucas to Bagnall (Mar. 9, 1925), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frame 716; Letter from A.V. Dunn, Secretary, New Orleans Branch of NAACP, to Bagnall (Nov. 9, 1924), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt.5, reel 4, frames 820-21. On other branches founded in connection with litigation, see KLUGER, supra note 201, at 195, 199.
248. TUSHNET, supra note 151, at 66.
249. Letter from Oscar W. Baker to Walter White (Mar. 8, 1926), microformed on NAACP PAPERS, pt. 5, reel 3, frames 462-63 (in connection with the Sweet case).
250. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 139, at 149-52 (quoting letter from Walter White). For particular examples of black lawyers fulfilling this function, see KLUGER, supra note 201, at 150-53; TUSHNET, supra note 151, at 62-63; Robert Wendell Hainsworth, The Negro and the Texas Primaries, 18 J. NEGRO HIST. 426, 435-36 (1933).
251. Charles H. Houston, Don't Shout Too Soon, 43 THE CRISIS 79, 79 (1936).
252. On northern white ignorance of southern black living conditions, see 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 48.
253. BUNCHE, supra note 202, at 108; see also 1 SITKOFF, supra note 61, at 243.
254. Letter from Walter White to James Weldon Johnson, Secretary, NAACP (Nov. 15, 1925), microformed on NAACP PAPERS, pt. 5, reel 3, frame 92.
255. The NAACP during the interwar period made anti-lynching legislation its principal political priority for similar reasons. See 1 SITKOFF, supra note 61, at 278, 296-97; ZANGRANDO, supra note 49, at 18.
256. See, e.g., Klarman, Brown, supra note 108, at 141-49 (citing numerous studies).
257. Quoted in NELSON, supra note 59, at 106 n.177. On the importance of maintaining hope, see supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 586-616 (1993); Klarman, Civil Rights, supra note 18; Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1881, 1889-90 (1991); see generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson ed., 2d ed. 1994).
259. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 586-616 (1993); Klarman, Civil Rights, supra note 18; Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1881, 1889-90 (1991); see generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson ed., 2d ed. 1994).
260. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 586-616 (1993); Klarman, Civil Rights, supra note 18; Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1881, 1889-90 (1991); see generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson ed., 2d ed. 1994).
261. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 586-616 (1993); Klarman, Civil Rights, supra note 18; Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1881, 1889-90 (1991); see generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson ed., 2d ed. 1994).
262. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 586-616 (1993); Klarman, Civil Rights, supra note 18; Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1881, 1889-90 (1991); see generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson ed., 2d ed. 1994).
263. ZANGRANDO, supra note 49, at 19, 64, 143, 162.
264. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). On the federal anti-poll tax measures, see STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH 1944-1969, ch.3 (1976).
265. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
266. See, e.g., Hazel Gaudet Erskine, The Polls: Race Relations, 26 PUB. OPINION Q. 137, 139 (1962) (reporting 1956 opinion poll); Herbert H. Hyman & Paul B. Sheatsley, Attitudes Toward Desegregation, SCI. AM., Dec. 1956, at 35, 36.
267. See, e.g., Hazel Gaudet Erskine, The Polls: Race Relations, 26 PUB. OPINION Q. 137, 139 (1962) (reporting 1956 opinion poll); Herbert H. Hyman & Paul B. Sheatsley, Attitudes Toward Desegregation, SCI. AM., Dec. 1956, at 35, 36.
268. On the 1957 Civil Rights Act, see J.W. ANDERSON, EISENHOWER, BROWNELL, AND THE CONGRESS: THE TANGLED ORIGINS OF THE CLVIL RIGHTS BILL OF 1956-1957 (1964); ROBERT FREDERICK BURK, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS ch.10 (1984).
269. On the 1957 Civil Rights Act, see J.W. ANDERSON, EISENHOWER, BROWNELL, AND THE CONGRESS: THE TANGLED ORIGINS OF THE CLVIL RIGHTS BILL OF 1956-1957 (1964); ROBERT FREDERICK BURK, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS ch.10 (1984).
270. Cf. Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 788-819 (1991) (arguing that had blacks been fully enfranchised and southern legislatures equitably apportioned, judicial intervention might not have been necessary to achieve desegregation of public schools in the South).
271. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
272. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (poll tax); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 5 (1935) (white primary).
273. See Klarman, supra note 141.
274. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Klarman, Civil Rights, supra note 18.
275. See ROSENBERG, supra note 235, at 50 tbl. 2.1; HARVARD SITKOFF, THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954-1980, at 36 (rev. ed. 1993).
276. Klarman, Brown, supra note 108, at 75-150; Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994).
277. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 425-44, 454-59 (1988); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION ch.24 (1971).
278. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 425-44, 454-59 (1988); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION ch.24 (1971).
279. See DONALD R. MCCOY & RICHARD T. RUETTEN, QUEST AND RESPONSE: MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 42-54 (1973); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 170, at 20-27; Kari Frederickson, "The Slowest State" and "Most Backward Community": Racial Violence in South Carolina and Federal Civil-Rights Legislation, 1946-1948, 98 S.C. HIST. MAG. 177 (1997).
280. See DONALD R. MCCOY & RICHARD T. RUETTEN, QUEST AND RESPONSE: MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 42-54 (1973); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 170, at 20-27; Kari Frederickson, "The Slowest State" and "Most Backward Community": Racial Violence in South Carolina and Federal Civil-Rights Legislation, 1946-1948, 98 S.C. HIST. MAG. 177 (1997).
281. See, e.g., Klarman, Brown, supra note 108, at 141-49 (citing numerous studies).