Equilibrium welfare and government policy with quasi-geometric discounting

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 105, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 42-72

  Krusell, Per ^a,b   Kuruşçu, Burhanettin ^a   Smith Jr , Anthony A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b CEPR   (Sweden)

^c CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Markov equilibrium; Quasi geometric discounting; Taxation; Time consistent policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036074214     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2888     Document Type: Article

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