Saving government failure theory from itself: Recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 127-143

  Boettke, Peter J ^a   Coyne, Christopher J ^b   Leeson, Peter T ^c  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HAMPDEN SYDNEY COLLEGE   (United States)

^c WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Entrepreneurship; Government failure; Market failure; Market process; Public choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248212846     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-007-9017-1     Document Type: Article

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