Contracting with diversely naive agents

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 689-714

  Eliaz, Kfir ^a   Spiegler, Ran ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL MODEL;

EID: 33745813486     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00392.x     Document Type: Article

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