Veblen brands

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 96, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 769-832

  Sheff, Jeremy N ^a  

^a ST JOHN'S UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84863957267     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (299)

1. DR. SEUSS, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES 12-15 (1961).
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N. Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A1.
3. Amy Davidson, A Motorcycle, a Playground, and a Justice, NEW YORKER: NEWS DESK, (May 27, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/05/ close-read-a-motorcycle-a-playground-and-a-justice.html.
4. See, e.g., Karen Sloan, As IP Boutique Litigator, Former Partners Say Sotomayor Was a Quick Study, Hard Worker, N. Y. L. J., May 29, 2009, at 2 (citing the Times's description of the motorcycle chase as evidence of Sotomayor's "fearless" nature);
5. Holly Bailey, Sotomayor, Action Star?, NEWSWEEK: DAILY BEAST (May 27, 2009, 2:11 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/the-gaggle/2009/05/ 27/sotomayor-action-star.html (expressing surprise at Sotomayor's participation in a motorcycle chase).
6. See Andrew Cohen, Is Sotomayor Supremely Stylish? VF DAILY (June 5, 2009, 2:27 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2009/06/is-sotomayor- supremely-stylish
7. Remarks to the Democratic Leadership Council, 1 PUB. PAPERS 40 (Jan. 12, 2002)
8. Noel Pangilinan, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood: NYC Immigrants by the Numbers, QUEENS7. COM (Feb. 21, 2011) http://queens7.com/who-are-the- people-in-your-neighborhoods-nyc's-immigrants-by-the-number/.
9. See History, FENDI, http://mobile.fendi.com/en/forever-fendi/history (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) (placing the fashion house's origins in Rome in 1925).
10. MOëT HENNESSY LOUIS VUITTON, LVMH: PASSIONATE ABOUT CREATIVITY, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 25(2010), http://www.lvmh.com/uploads/assets/Com-fi/Documents/en/ LVMH-RA-2010-GB.pdf [hereinafter LVMH] (listing Fendi as one of twelve brands in its parent company's "fashion and leather goods business group").
11. See Cathy Horyn & Eric Wilson, When the Label Says Lagerfeld, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at G1 ("There is no bigger star in fashion today than Karl Lagerfeld.");
12. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, Nineteen Eighty-Four 202-03 (1949)
13. 15 U. S. C. §§ 1114, 1125 (a) (2006) (establishing civil liability for confusing trademark uses);
14. 15 U. S. C. § 1116 (a) (2006) (authorizing injunctive relief against trademark infringers and counterfeiters);
15. 15 U. S. C. § 1117 (a) - (b) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (providing monetary remedies against trademark infringers and heightened remedies against counterfeiters);
16. 18 U. S. C. § 2320 (a) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (establishing criminal liability for trafficking in counterfeit goods).
17. United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that "likelihood of confusion" is an element of the federal counterfeiting offense, and holding that a likelihood of post-sale confusion can satisfy this element);
18. United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1987);
19. 15 U. S. C. § 1125 (a);
20. accord 15 U. S. C. § 1114.
21. See IP Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998);
22. Lois Sportswear, U. S. A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1986);
23. Am. Home Prods. v. Barr Labs., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987);
24. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987);
25. United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1989);
26. Ferrari S. P. A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991);
27. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 1996);
28. *Bit v. Poly-Tech Indus., 95 F.3d 663, 669-72 (8th Cir. 1996);
29. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980);
30. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, 500 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2007);
31. Torkington
32. 812 F.2d at 1352-53;
33. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
34. The most recent opportunity for the Court to address the theories of post-sale and initial-interest confusion in trademark law ended in a denial of certiorari. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, 423 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2005)
35. cert. denied, 547 U. S. 1179 (2006).
36. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 851-59 (2010) [hereinafter Beebe, Sumptuary Code] (considering post-sale confusion among other theories of liability as evidence that trademark law promotes anti-dilution and sumptuary policies);
37. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 367, 404-08 (1999) (analyzing the economics of "prestige[-]good cases" and classifying them as an "example of extending property-based trademark protection under the likelihoodof-confusion standard").
38. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2005) (considering the economic effects on producers of counterfeiting);
39. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling: Tattoos for the Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195 (2007) (examining utilitarian, Rawlsian and Lockean rationales for public subsidization of the luxury economy).
40. See 15 U. S. C. § 1125 (c) (2006).
41. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
42. 15 U. S. C. § 1125 (a) (1) (2006).
43. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1853-63 (2007).
44. See generally Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L. J. 759 (1990) (arguing that the modern expansion of trademark law has imposed significant costs on society).
45. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U. S. C.) (creating a cause of action to enjoin conduct that impairs the distinctiveness or harms the reputation of a famous trademark "regardless of the presence or absence of... likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception").
46. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769, 771, 775.
47. H. R. REP. No. 87-1108, at 4, 8 (1961) ("The purpose of the proposed change is... to omit the word purchasers', since the provision actually relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.");
48. S. REP. NO. 86-1685, at 4-5, 8 (1960) (same).
49. See, e.g., David M. Tichane, The Maturing Doctrine of Post-Sales Confusion, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 399, 403-05 (1995). Numerous commentators have noted the seemingly unbounded expansion of the concept of "confusion" in trademark law, and critiqued the invocation of the 1962 amendment to the Lanham Act as a justification for that expansion.
50. Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 160-61 (2005).
51. 58 U. S. P. Q.2d (BNA) 1048, 1056-57 (S. D. N. Y. 2001)
52. aff'd, 317 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2003).
53. See, e.g., 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23.7 (4th ed. 2007) (characterizing post-sale confusion as a form of liability that arises when "Observers See Infringing Imitations");
54. Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83, 120-23 (2010) (characterizing post-sale confusion as a doctrine designed to protect the information value of brands as signals of social status);
55. For example, in General Motors Corp. v. Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc., the court identified six potential injuries flowing from what it referred to as "downstream confusion", some of which correspond to this Article's definition of downstream confusion and others of which correspond to what this Article refers to as "bystander confusion" or "status confusion. " 453 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006).
56. See, e.g., CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng'g, 267 F.3d 660, 683 (7th Cir. 2001);
57. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
58. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987).
59. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623-24 (2004) [hereinafter Beebe, Semiotic Analysis] (noting that the influence and acceptance of the Chicago School's approach is "nearly total" in American trademark law);
60. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 269-70 (1987
61. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B. U. L. REV. 547 (2006) (describing the historical development of misappropriation-based theories of trademark rights).
62. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L. J. 461, 491 (2005) ("[E]ven though the buyer is not confused, others might be.... This in turn can cause harm-if people see Rolexes that don't tell time well, or break, they may mistakenly attribute the shoddy quality of the counterfeit goods to the trademark owner.");
63. Anne M. McCarthy, Note, The Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine: Why the General Public Should Be Included in the Likelihood of Confusion Inquiry, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3337, 3356-58 (1999).
64. See, e.g., Payless, 998 F.2d at 989
65. Lois Sportswear U. S. A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[P]ost-sale confusion would involve consumers seeing appellant's jeans outside of the retail store, perhaps being worn by a passer-by. The confusion the Act seeks to prevent in this context is that a consumer seeing the familiar stitching pattern will associate the jeans with appellee and that association will influence his buying decisions.");
66. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Wrangler's use of its projecting label is likely to cause confusion among prospective purchasers who carry even an imperfect recollection of Strauss's mark and who observe Wrangler's projecting label after the point of sale.");
67. Cartier v. Aaron Faber Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 356, 361 (S. D. N. Y. 2005) ("Individuals viewing the watches on a purchaser's wrist would be misled as to the true nature of the watch's craftsmanship, and any effect such identification might have on Cartier's goodwill with the public is actionable.");
68. Car-Freshener Corp. v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153 (N. D. N. Y. 2004);
69. Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 162 n. 18 (emphasis added).
70. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 356-58 (6th Cir. 2006)
71. Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 873 ("The Polaroid factors therefore must be applied with an eye toward post-sale confusion...."
72. (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polorad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 493 (2d Cir. 1961))).
73. See, e.g., Acxiom Corp. v. Axiom, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497 (D. Del. 1998) ("The sophisticated purchaser' rationale generally weighs against the likelihood of confusion. Courts, however, may consider pre-sale and post-sale confusion when evaluating [consumer sophistication].");
74. *5 (S. D. N. Y. June 8, 1992).
75. E.g., Gen. Motors Corp., 453 F.3d at 356.
76. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996)
77. see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 128 (4th Cir. 1990)
78. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy's, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2003).
79. 645 F. Supp. 484, 493 n. 3, 495 (S. D. Fla. 1986).
80. 220 U. S. P. Q. (BNA) 836, 837-38 (T. T. A. B. 1983).
81. See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting summary judgment to automobile manufacturers in a suit against a retailer who sold car accessories adorned with manufacturers' logos).
82. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U. S. 111, 117-21 (2004).
83. cf. Hermès Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 226 (S. D. N. Y. 1999) ("While Hermès's potential high-end customers may be confused in the post-sale context, these highly sophisticated purchasers will not be confused at the point of sale.")
84. aff'd in part on other grounds, rev'd in part, 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000).
85. See Jonah Berger & Morgan Ward, Subtle Signals of Inconspicuous Consumption, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 555, 562-63 (2010) (demonstrating that luxury goods often use "subtle signals" to indicate quality to a narrow band of consumers);
86. Young Jee Han et al., First Impressions: Status Signaling Using Brand Prominence 28-32 (USC Marshall Sch. of Bus., Working Paper MKT 15-09, Apr. 2009), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1262479 (proposing a classification system for different levels of consumer brand signaling sophistication). It is also consistent with some cases that declined to impose post-sale confusion liability.
87. See, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, 423 F.3d 539, 552-53 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Gibson argues that... [o]n a
88. See, e.g., Hermès Int'l, 219 F.3d at 109 ("In fact, high-end consumers may be less confused than the general public in the post-sale context because many of them will be aware of the existence of copies.").
89. A. T. Cross Co. v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The last straw was the recent mailing, as bold an attempt at persuading purchasers that their donees would think they were receiving Cross pens as could be imagined.").
90. Cartier v. Aaron Faber Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 356, 361 (S. D. N. Y. 2005);
91. Montblanc-Simplo GMBH v. Staples, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 231, 233
92. vacated, 175 F. Supp. 2d 95, 95 (D. Mass. 2001);
93. cf. Saks & Co. v. Hill, 843 F. Supp. 620, 623-24 (S. D. Cal. 1993) (speculating that defendant, operator of a thrift store called "Sacks Thrift Avenue", might one day resell a garment bearing plaintiff's label, thereby causing post-sale confusion).
94. 456 U. S. 844, 854 (1982).
95. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) ("For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.")
96. remanded, No. 04 Civ. 4607 (RJS), 2010 WL 3733894 (S. D. N. Y. Sept. 13, 2010)
97. cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
98. Inwood Labs., 456 U. S. at 854.
99. 264 U. S. 359 (1924).
100. 331 U. S. 125 (1947).
101. Champion Spark Plug, 331 U. S. at 130 ("The result is, of course, that the second-hand dealer gets some advantage from the trade mark. But under the rule of Prestonettes... that is wholly permissible so long as the manufacturer is not identified with the inferior qualities of the product resulting from wear and tear or the reconditioning by the dealer. Full disclosure gives the manufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled.");
102. Prestonettes, 264 U. S. at 368-69 ("The defendant of course by virtue of its ownership had a right to compound or change what it bought, to divide either the original or the modified product, and to sell it so divided. The plaintiff could not prevent or complain of its stating the nature of the component parts and the source from which they were derived if it did not use the trade mark in doing so.... If the defendant's rebottling the plaintiff's perfume deteriorates it and the public is adequately informed who does the rebottling, the public, with or without the plaintiff's assistance, is likely to find it out.").
103. Champion Spark Plug, 331 U. S. at 129.
104. See, e.g., Zino Davidoff S. A. v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2009);
105. Nitro Leisure Prods. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1361-65 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
106. Davidoff & Cie, S. A. v. P. L. D. Int'l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2001);
107. Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1998);
108. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1996).
109. 603 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2010).
110. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1135.
111. Rolex Watch U. S. A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 707-10 (9th Cir. 1999).
112. Two recent district court opinions arrived at similar conclusions. Cartier, Inc. v. Aaron Faber Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359-61 (S. D. N. Y. 2005) (holding that where genuine steel Cartier watches that had been polished and bejeweled to resemble more expensive gold Cartier watches, retention of the Cartier mark deceived rather than informed consumers as to the source of the product);
113. Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 360-61 (S. D. N. Y. 2005) (same). Two earlier Court of Appeals cases deployed similar reasoning to arrive at similar results, again in cases involving luxury watches.
114. Rolex Watch U. S. A., Inc. v. Meece, 158 F.3d 816, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1998);
115. Bulova Watch Co. v. Allerton Co., 328 F.2d 20, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1964). Each of these cases presents a complex mix of the three varieties of post-sale confusion identified in this Part.
116. 603 F.3d at 1139-40.
117. Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added)
118. cited in Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1136-37.
119. Au-Tomotive Gold, 603 F.3d at 1139
120. (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Circuit Breakers & Elec. Supply Inc., 106 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)).
121. To be fair, there is some precedent that could be extended to support this argument, but it does not come from the Ninth Circuit. In Nitro Leisure Prods. v. Acushnet Co., the Federal Circuit held that the "quality control" or "material differences" tests for determining whether resale of a product originating with plaintiff is likely to cause confusion apply only to new, repackaged goods, not to used, refurbished goods. 341 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
122. 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972).
123. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U. S. 844, 854 (1982).
124. 158 F.3d at 818-20.
125. 603 F.3d at 1138.
126. Champion Spark Plug. Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 359-60 (S. D. N. Y. 2005)
127. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955).
128. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 855.
129. Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 70 U. S. P. Q.2d 1650, 1689 (S. D. N. Y. 2004) ("The use of an almost-identical typeface on the band only adds to the possibility that the consumer may acquire the prestige of smoking a Cuban [cigar] without actually purchasing one.")
130. rev'd in part on other grounds, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005).
131. Cartier, Inc. v. Symbolix, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 175, 182-83 (S. D. N. Y. 2006);
132. see also Rolex Watch U. S. A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the defendant's alterations to genuine Rolex watches "so basic that they result[ed] in different product[s]").
133. See Hermès Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2000).
134. See Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1991).
135. 219 F.3d 104.
136. with Hermès Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 225-26 (S. D. N. Y. 1999)
137. aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 219 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2000).
138. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 269-70 (1987)
139. Renée Ann Richardson Gosline, The Real Value of Fakes: Dynamic Symbolic Boundaries in Socially Embedded Consumption 18 (May 2009) (unpublished D. B. A. dissertation, Harvard Business Sch.), available at http://gradworks. umi.com/3371273.pdf (finding, based on empirical research, that "counterfeits are primarily not seen as substitutes for the authentic product.").
140. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark D. McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010)
141. Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, 120 Stat. 285, 285 (2006).
142. This is, to put it mildly, a dubious claim. U. S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 13-14 (2010) [hereinafter ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT] ("Most experts we spoke with and the literature we reviewed observed that despite significant efforts, it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the net effect of counterfeiting and piracy on the economy as a whole.");
143. see also David S. Wall & Joanna Large, Jailhouse Frocks: Locating the Public Interest in Policing Counterfeit Luxury Fashion Goods, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1094, 1094-98 (2010);
144. Felix Salmon, All Counterfeiting Statistics Are Bullshit, FELIX SALMON (June 9, 2005), http://www.felixsalmon. com/2005/06/all-counterfeiting- statistics-are-bullshit/ (questioning the accuracy of statistics of counterfeit goods).
145. see Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1701 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007).
146. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1973) (1899).
147. see generally ROGER MASON, THE ECONOMICS OF CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION: THEORY AND THOUGHT SINCE 1700 (1998).
148. with Tina Fey, Confessions of a Juggler, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2011, at 64, 64 ("All over Manhattan, large families have become a status symbol. Four beautiful children named after kings and pieces of fruit are a way of saying, I can afford a four-bedroom apartment and a hundred and fifty thousand dollars in elementary-school tuition fees each year. How you livin'?'").
149. See, e.g., H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand, 64 Q. J. ECON. 183, 199-205 (1950) ("The essential economic characteristic with which we are concerned is the fact that the utility derived from a unit of a commodity employed for purposes of conspicuous consumption depends not only on the inherent qualities of that unit, but also on the price paid for it.");
150. see also Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J. L. & ECON. 211, 211-26 (1986) (applying Leibenstein's model to the counterfeiting phenomenon);
151. Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1996) (examining factors that cause luxury brands to sell at higher prices than budget brands, even when the brands are functionally equivalent). For an overview of economists' efforts to understand conspicuous consumption
152. See generally, e.g., B. Curtis Eaton & Mukesh Eswaran, Well-Being and Affluence in the Presence of a Veblen Good, 119 ECON. J. 1088 (2009).
153. See generally Shahar Dillbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting "Irrational Beliefs", 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007).
154. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 816-30.
155. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 821, 883-84.
156. See, e.g., David Card et al., Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction, 102 AM. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~moretti/ucpay.pdf (reporting an study finding that knowledge that one's income is less than average inflicts psychological harm, while knowledge that one's income is above average does not provide a psychological benefit).
157. EMILY POST, ETIQUETTE: IN SOCIETY, IN BUSINESS, IN POLITICS AND AT HOME 506 (9th ed. 1923) ("A very well-bred man intensely dislikes the mention of money, and never speaks of it (out of business hours) if he can avoid it.");
158. Daniel Gross, Skip the Yacht Race, SLATE (June 22, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2257823/ (proposing the first of three rules governing
159. See Alex Williams, Not-So-Personal Finance, N. Y. TIMES (SUNDAY STYLES) Apr. 27, 2008, at 1.
160. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 826-28 (noting the "congestion externalities" that frustrate the cultivation of consumption-based social distinction).
161. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons:" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489-92 (1970).
162. E.g., Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 884 ("This is most apparent in the global trademark system, populated as it is by globally famous hypermarks' that are not so much designations of source as commodified simulations of such designations, simulations that are themselves the focus of consumption rather than the underlying product, if any, to which they are affixed.").
163. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N. C. L. REV. 603 (1984) (analyzing policy justifications for merchandising protections);
164. Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1282 (2011).
165. On the notion of money-burning signaling in general, see Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 629-33 (1981);
166. Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 731-34 (1974).
167. See generally Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael H. Riordan, Advertising as a Signal, 92 J. POL. ECON. 427 (1984) (developing a mathematical model to describe the quality-signaling function of advertising);
168. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986) (same, for both prices and advertising levels).
169. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 882-84.
170. Hermès Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2000).
171. (quoting United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1987)).
172. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 503 (1969).
173. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 5748, 748 (1976).
174. Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008)
175. and Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L. J. 147, 185-86, 216-24 (1998)
176. Cf. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 392 (1992) ("[The government] has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.");
177. infra Part III. B. 152. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 513 (1976)
178. 376 U. S. 254, 265 (1964) ("Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action.... The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.").
179. Reddy Commc'ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., 199 U. S. P. Q. 630, 633-34 (D. D. C. 1977);
180. Interbank Card Ass'n v. Simms, 431 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (M. D. N. C. 1977);
181. *8 (E. D. Mich. 2007 April 23, 2007).
182. 491 U. S. 397, 404 (1989)
183. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 18 U. S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
184. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 883
185. (quoting Colin Campbell, When the Meaning Is Not a Message: A Critique of the Consumption as Communication Thesis, in BUY THIS BOOK: STUDIES IN ADVERTISING AND CONSUMPTION 340, 341 (Mica Nava et al. eds., 1997)).
186. But see Beebe, Semiotic Analysis, supra note 46, at 703 ("It has long been a cliché, of social theory as much as of advertising practice, that consumers communicate with each other by the objects they consume. Of late, however, commodity culture has begun to unburden itself of the object language of material commodities. The trademark
187. See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) "[S]ome customers would buy plaintiff's cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers' homes would regard as a prestigious article.");
188. Jennifer Edson Escalas & James R. Bettman, You Are What They Eat: The Influence of Reference Groups on Consumers' Connections to Brands, 13 J. CONSUMER PSYCH. 339, 339(2003), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/ S15327663JCP1303-14
189. (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980)).
190. Cf., e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding that requiring the Boy Scouts to admit a gay scoutmaster under a state antidiscrimination law violated the organization's First Amendment right of expressive association);
191. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 572-73 (1995) (holding St. Patrick's Day Parade organizers have a First Amendment right to exclude a gay, lesbian, and bisexual Irish-American organization from their event).
192. Possible, but in my view, unlikely. See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Brand Renegades, 1 N. Y. U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://www.ssrn. com/abstract=1919328 (arguing that extant trademark doctrine supports the proposition that the consumption of socially charged brands is protected expression more than it supports an associationbased right of brand owners to suppress such consumption).
193. See generally Beebe, Semiotic Analysis, supra note 46.
194. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975) ("[T]he plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties."). It is notable that at least one important jurisdiction is considering legislation to criminalize the purchase of counterfeit trademarked goods, rather than their sale. New York City Council File No. Int. 0544-2011 (Apr. 28, 2011), available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov (click "Legislation;" then search "2011" for "Int 0544-2011;" then follow "Int 0544-2011" hyperlink). Presumably the standing analysis regarding such a statute would be more straightforward.
195. See 15 U. S. C. § 1125 (a) (1) (2006) (giving a private right of action to "any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged" by acts that are likely to cause confusion of consumers or that misrepresent the qualities of goods).
196. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1 (1992) (criticizing the recognition of competitor standing in false advertising cases).
197. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-58 (1953) ("There is such a close relationship between the restrictive covenant here and the sanction of a state court which would punish respondent for not going forward with her covenant... that relaxation of the rule is called for here.").
198. Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 289 n. 71 (1984) ("The Court appears quite willing to permit such [third-party constitutional] challenges simply upon a showing of the existence of certain relationships between the litigant and the third party right holder, such as those between vendor and customer, or physician and patient.").
199. See Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N. Y. U. L. REV. 60, 89-90 (2008).
200. DAVENPORT LYONS, COUNTERFEITING LUXURY: EXPOSING THE MYTHS (June 2007)
201. Cf. Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc. 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000)
202. See Rebecca Tushnet, WIPIP at BU Session 3, REBECCA TUSHNET'S 43 (B) LOG (Feb. 12, 2011, 10:07 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2011/02/wipip-at-bu- session-3.html.
203. See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. Pa. L. REV. 1305, 1352-73 (2011).
204. See generally Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020 (2005) (analyzing "trademark law['s] lack [of] a well-developed theory of the consumer");
205. Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Model of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
206. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J., dissenting)
207. (collecting cases), cert. granted, 0 U. S. L. W. 3098 (Oct. 17, 2011).
208. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (2008);
209. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 912-19 (2010);
210. Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1107-10 (2006);
211. Mark Tushnet, "Telling Me Lies:" The Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements of Fact 7-16, 24-25 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11-02, 2011), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1737930 [hereinafter Tushnet, False Statements of Fact].
212. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U. S. 557, 563-64 (1980) ("[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity.");
213. N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 76 U. S. 254, 301-02 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The imposition of liability for private defamation does not abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the First Amendment.");
214. see also Tushnet, False Statements of Fact, supra note 176, at 2 n. 5, 14.
215. See Tushnet, False Statements of Fact, supra note 176, at 7-10
216. (citing Sullivan, 76 U. S. at 279).
217. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.").
218. Compare id. with Eugene Volokh, Amicus Curiae Brief: Boundaries of the First Amendment's "False Statements of Fact" Exception, STAN. J. C. R. & C. L. 343 (2010) (finding that, although the exception to First Amendment protection of false statements can be ambiguous, it can still be constitutionally permissible).
219. The Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, 20 Stat. 3266
220. (codified at 18 U. S. C. § 704 (b) (2006)), makes it a federal crime to falsely claim to have been awarded certain military decorations. As of this writing, the statute has been ruled unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit (over strenuous dissents) and by the District of Colorado, but upheld by the Western District of Virginia; the Supreme Court will hear a challenge to the statute's constitutionality this term.
221. See United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010)
222. reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 638 F.3d 666
223. cert. granted, 80 U. S. L. W. 3098 (Oct. 17, 2011);
224. United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W. D. Va. 2011);
225. United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Colo. 2010).
226. See Tushnet, False Statements of Fact, supra note 176, at 17-22.
227. Recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that we should be extremely hesitant to analogize from the fraud and defamation exclusions from First Amendment protection. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584-86 (2010).
228. See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (modeling the negative social welfare effects of theft).
229. 638 F.3d 666, 675 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
230. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968) ("[A] government regulation [that incidentally restricts expressive conduct] is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.").
231. see also Laura A. Heymann, The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 688-715 (2009) (analyzing the First Amendment autonomy interests of consumers as listeners entitled to diverse sources of meaning with respect to brands).
232. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 397-99 (1990);
233. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N. Y. U. L. REV. 960, 960-63, 972-77 (1993);
234. cf. Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601 (2010).
235. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 824.
236. See Hermès Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212 (S. D. N. Y. 1999) (Scheindlin, J.)
237. rev'd, 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (Telesca, J., joined by Meskill & Cabranes, JJ.). And of course, the counterfeiting debate reveals the uneasy interconnectedness of the developed and the developing world, with all the racial and ethnic baggage inherent in that dynamic.
238. See ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT, supra note 106, at 8 ("According to CBP data, seized counterfeit goods are dominated by products from China. During fiscal years 2004-2009, China accounted for about 77 percent of the aggregate value of goods seized in the United States. Hong Kong, India, and Taiwan followed China, accounting for 7, 2, and 1 percent of the seized value, respectively.").
239. 424 U. S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
240. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B. C. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) [hereinafter Tushnet, Copyright as a Model] ("If the justification were anything other than copyright, these sweeping powers would be seen as a gaping hole at the heart of free speech rights.").
241. See 15 U. S. C. § 1116 (d) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (authorizing ex parte awards of injunctive relief against trademark counterfeiters);
242. See 15 U. S. C. § 1116 (d) (authorizing ex parte seizure orders against counterfeit goods);
243. 15 U. S. C. § 1118 (2006) (providing for destruction of infringing articles).
244. See 15 U. S. C. § 1117 (b) - (c) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (providing for treble damages and statutory damages for counterfeiting);
245. 18 U. S. C. § 2320 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (establishing criminal liability for trafficking in counterfeit goods).
246. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 375-79 (1969).
247. This unique feature of Veblen brands also distinguishes statusconfusion cases from Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241(1974), insofar as it is the government grant of a property right in the medium of expression, rather than the capital cost of finding alternative access to that medium, that causes the restriction on expression. One might argue that dis
248. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1413 (1986)
249. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 830-40.
250. See Au-Tomotive Gold v. Volkswagen of Am., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2010).
251. See 15 U. S. C. § 1125 (c) (1) (2006) ("Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark... shall be entitled to an injunction... regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.").
252. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (J. W. Gough ed., Blackwell 3d ed. 1976) (1690);
253. cf. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533, 1583-91, 1605 (1993) (arguing that analogous assertions of trademark rights against expressive users in the absence of confusion are inconsistent with a properly reasoned Lockean account of intellectual property); Harrison, supra, at 225 (finding the exclusivity of intellectual property inconsistent with Lockean ideals);
254. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138, 138 (Steven R. Munzer ed., 2001) (finding intellectual property a poor fit with Lockean theory, though not on grounds of the proviso).
255. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) ("The current legal argument runs: One who by the ingenuity of his advertising or the quality of his product has induced consumer responsiveness to a particular name, symbol, form of packaging, etc., has thereby created a thing of value; a thing of value is property; the creator of property is entitled to protection against third parties who seek to deprive him of his property.").
256. see also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 178-80 (1992) (identifying numerous critiques of the "if value then right" argument).
257. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark (et) s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 181-84 (2010).
258. See, e.g., Ferrari S. P. A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1238 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Production of [Ferrari's] cars is... intentionally limited to preserve exclusivity.");
259. (quoting Ferrari S. P. A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili v. McBurnie, 11 U. S. P. Q.2d 1843, 1848 (S. D. Cal. 1989))).
260. see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
261. (quoting U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"))).
262. 100 U. S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
263. See 15 U. S. C. § 1127 (2006) ("The word commerce' means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.").
264. There are similar formal objections to viewing the government support for Veblen brands as part of copyright policy-the useful articles doctrine chief among them. 17 U. S. C. § 101 (2006);
265. Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (1987).
266. Of course, fashion designers-perhaps the primary producers of Veblen brands-have long but as yet unsuccessfully sought to circumvent these formal barriers with sui generis protection. Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010);
267. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 1. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007).
268. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States.").
269. See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller's Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 1121 (2007);
270. Blake Fry, Why Typefaces Proliferate Without Copyright Protection, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 425 (2010);
271. Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Any More): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008);
272. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006);
273. see also Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 521 (2009) ("Creativity, as lived, is more than a response to incentives, working from fixed and random preferences.");
274. cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/ display/images/dynamic/events-media/Expressive-Incentives-in-Intellectual- Property.pdf.
275. See generally Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21;
276. see also Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L. J. 1-18 (1992) (providing an overview of the current economic analysis of relative preferences).
277. (citing BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR, PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK BENEFITS (1714)).
278. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 882 ("[A]s the production and consumption of immaterial status goods in the non-virtual world intensifies under the auspices of intellectual property law, the costs to society of this zero-sum struggle are becoming very real. Resources better spent elsewhere, perhaps in the pursuit of absolute utility or Progress', are instead spent in pursuit of intangible and otherwise typically quite meaningless and useless forms of relative utility.");
279. (citing Ben Cooper et al., Status Effects and Negative Utility Growth, 111 ECON. J. 642, 643 (2001));
280. Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 137 (2005).
281. Brian C. H. Steele & Angelika Heinzel, Materials for Fuel-Cell Technologies, 414 NATURE 345, 347 (2001) ("The second important problem is associated with the electrocatalyst. For operation with pure hydrogen and air, platinum is the most active material.").
282. See Nelly et al., Grillz (2005), available at http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=8fijggq5R6w&ob=av2e ("I got like platinum and white gold, traditional gold/I'm changin' grillz every day, like Jay change clothes.").
283. Rory Sutherland, Please Can You Refute This Argument, CAMPAIGN BLOG (Nov. 14, 2007, 9:18 PM), http://campaignblog.campaignlive.co.uk/2007/11/14/please- can-you-refute-this-argument/ ("Brands are, after all, gloriously intangible. You can build a brand without killing trees and few precious raw materials are needed in their creation. The exploitation of child labour in making brands is rare. And yet brand value creates pleasure and confers status as surely as any more wasteful (i.e., tangible) value. It may seem bizarre to say it, but brands actually succeed in making us happy with less. That is precisely why they make money for the people who own them.");
284. Rory Sutherland, Life Lessons from an Ad Man, http://www.ted.com/talks/ rory-sutherland-life-lessons-from-an-ad-man. html ("If you think about it, if you want to live in a world in the future where there are fewer material goods, you basically have two choices. You can either live in a world which is poorer, which people in general don't like. Or you can live in a world where actually intangible value constitutes a greater part of overall value, that actually intangible value, in many ways is a very, very fine substitute for using up labor or limited resources in the creation of things.").
285. See Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 21, at 884-87.
286. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, J., dissenting);
287. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 906 (1963) ("The Court's obligation to bow to the will of the legislature and the executive is at a minimum where a serious claim to infringement of freedom of expression on the part of those institutions is presented. In this sense, from the judicial point of view, freedom of expression should be regarded as a preferred freedom.'").
288. See generally Robert B. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1182 (1959).
289. (noting the First Amendment value of self-fulfillment), with ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948) ("Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information... which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.").
290. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) ("The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.
291. Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.... Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.").
292. See 15 U. S. C. § 1125 (c) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
293. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1962) (proposing a system of taxes and bounties to force private parties to internalize externalities).
294. See generally William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1972)
295. 15 U. S. C. § 1124 (2006) (providing for customs interdiction of infringing articles);
296. 18 U. S. C. § 2320 (2006) (establishing criminal liability for trafficking in counterfeit goods).
297. 15 U. S. C. § 1117 (2006) (imposing or increasing monetary penalties for trademark infringement and counterfeiting).
298. IP Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 44 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted).
299. See generally William McGeveran, Life in the Fast Lane: Of Presumptions, Defenses, and Burdens, 1 I. P. THEORY 25 (2011) (arguing that not just the substance but the mechanics of trademark law analysis can have a strong influence on both administrative costs and substantive outcomes).