Facts and the first amendment

UCLA Law Review

Volumn 57, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 897-919

  Schauer, Frederick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

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EID: 77953320298     PISSN: 00415650     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (241)

1. See Jeff Zeleny, Persistent 'Bathers' Fringe Disorients Strategists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/us/politics/05zeleny.html.
2. See Mark Jacobson, The Ground Zero Grassy Knoll: A New Generation of Conspiracy Theorists Is at Work on a Secret History of New York's Most Terrible Day, N.Y. MAO., Mar. 27, 2006, at 28.
3. See Ta-Nehisi Paul Coates, Suspicious Minds, TIME MAG., July 4, 2005, at 36;.
4. David France, The HIV Disbelievers, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 28, 2000, at 46.
5. See Peter Glick, Deborah Gottesman & Jeffrey Jolton, The Fault Is Not in the Stars: Susceptibility of Skeptics and Believers in Astrology to the Bamum Effect, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 572, 572(1989).
6. See generally DEBORAH E LlPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993) (discussing numerous examples of attempts to deny that the Holocaust occurred).
7. To provide "supporting authority" for the proposition in the text would be inconsistent with the point of this Article.
8. See sources cited supra notes 2-6.
9. See generally CONSPIRACY THEORIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Peter Knight ed., 2003) (listing numerous examples of conspiracy theories in American history which persisted despite a lack of evidence);.
10. CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, MADE TO STICK: WHY SOME IDEAS SURVIVE AND OTHERS DIE (2007) (discussing the reasons behind why some stories or messages persist in people's memories).
11. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Deception in Weight Loss Advertising: A Workshop 8 (2002), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/weightloss/transcripts/transcript- full.pdf.
12. The phenomenon plagues not only lay people, see supra rote 8, but also experts.
13. See Rachel C. Vreeman & Aaron E Carroll, Medical Myths, 335 BRIT. MED. J. 1288 (2007).
14. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENC'D PRINTING 35 (London, W. Johnston 1644).
15. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 128-29 (2005);.
16. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970);.
17. ROBERT F. LADENSON, A PHILOSOPHY OF FREE EXPRESSION AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATIONS 32-34 (1983);.
18. RICHARD MOON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 9-14 (2000);.
19. Tom Campbell, Rationales for Freedom of Communication, in FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION 17, 23-33 (Tom Campbell & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 1994).
20. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 133;.
21. HEATH &. HEATH, supra note 8, passim;.
22. Campbell, supra note 12, at 23-29.
23. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE ACT 2, sc. 2.
24. See, e.g., Rickert v. State, 168 P.3d 826, 832 (Wash. 2007) (concluding that the best remedy for false speech is more speech);.
25. NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE- HOW THE AMERICAN LEFT and RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER 306 (1992) (asserting that counterspeech is effective against lies and distortions);.
26. Franklyn S. Haiman, The Remedy Is More Speech, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1991, at 35 (same);.
27. Adam Liptak, A False Claim of Valor and a Cry of Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at A14 (quoting assertions about the effectiveness of true speech to counter falsity).
28. For a sampling of the extensive literature supporting or challenging the underlying empirical assumptions of the claim that a free marketplace of ideas will have truth-identifying tendencies, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 155-58 (1987);.
29. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 10-33 (1982);.
30. Derek E Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649 (2006);.
31. Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REv. 1;.
32. Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951 (1997);.
33. R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977);.
34. R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 384 (1974);.
35. Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L & ECON. 1 (1964);.
36. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1;.
37. William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995);.
38. Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Problem That Won't Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181 (2007);.
39. Cedric Merlin Powell, The Mythological Marketplace of Ideas: R.A.v., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (1995).
40. Perhaps unconventionally, I refrain from describing a belief in the distinction between fact and value as "objective." For many people, that term connotes the existence of something plainly identified or a distinction with a crisp demarcation, but such clarity or precision is not necessary to recognize a distinction. That there is no clear line between tadpoles and frogs, fix example, says nothing about the viability of the tadpole/frog distinction. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REV. 361 (1985).
41. See, e.g., MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 133 (Joan Stambaugh trans., 1996) (questioning the fact/value distinction by looking at the phenomenon of when fear becomes alarm, horror, or terror);.
42. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 9 (1993) (questioning the fact/value distinction);.
43. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 364 (1979) (same);.
44. R.W. SLEEPER, THE NECESSITY OF PRAGMATISM 141 (1986) (same);.
45. Susan H. Williams, Feminist Theory and Freedom of Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 999, 1007 (2009) (same).
46. THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 947 (1971).
47. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 460 (1984).
48. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 416 (10th ed. 1997).
49. See generally NORWOOD RUSSEL HANSON, PATTERNS OF DISCOVERY (1958) (discussing theory-laden observation);.
50. HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3 (2002) (discussing the dependency of observation selection on questions of value).
51. See John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (1995).
52. See Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 699 (1991).
53. Surprisingly little has been written about just what it is for a society (or any other collection of individuals) to know something, as opposed to what it is for an individual to know something. (A noteworthy exception is ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD (1999)). The basic problem can best be explained with a simplified hypothetical example. Suppose that in one society of one hundred people, twenty have a true belief in x, ten have a false belief in not-x, and seventy have no beliefs at all about x. And then suppose that in another society (or in the same society at some later time) forty people have a true belief in x, fifty people have a false belief in not-x, and ten have no beliefs at all about x. We can then ask two interrelated questions: First, does the second society have more knowledge about x because more people have true beliefs in x, or does the second society have less knowledge about x because more people have false beliefs about x; and, second, apart from the question of how we define collective knowledge, which between the first or second societies is epistemically better off? And even if we could sort out what it was for a population to know something, is a society that believes n true propositions and p false ones more or less epistemically well off than one that believes n+1 true propositions but also p+i false ones? Much of the free speech tradition, and especially that part of the tradition influenced by Chapter Two ("Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion") of john stuart mill, on liberty (David Spitz ed., Norton &. Co. 1975) (1859), appears to have assumed that any society with more beliefs in the truth, or with beliefs in more truths, is better than a society with less, but has done so without considering the tradeoffs between true and false beliefs and the possibility that a process for producing more true beliefs might produce more false beliefs as well.
54. See Vincent Blasi, Milton's Areopagtica and the Modem First Amendment (Yale Law Sch. Occasional Papers, Paper No. 6, 1995), availableathttp:// digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsop-papers/6;.
55. see also VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 34-145 (2006).
56. J. MILTON, THE DOCTRINE AND DISCIPLINE OF DIVORCE (London, T.P. and M.S. 1643).
57. See Stanley Fish, Driving From the Letter: Truth and Indeterminacy m Milton's Areopagitica, in RE-MEMBERING MILTON 234 (Mary Nyquist & Margaret W. Ferguson eds., 1988) (arguing that Milton was far less of an advocate for freedom of speech in modern terms than many commentators have assumed);.
58. see also John Illo, Areopagmcas Mythic and Real, 11 PROSE STUD. 3 (1988) (arguing that the current understanding of Areopagdca is largely a myth which fails to appreciate the narrowness and tactical goals of what Milton actually wrote).
59. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 182-87 (2001) (tracing the legal remedies for fraud at common law to the beginning of the eighteenth century).
60. See R.C. Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 99 (recounting the English and American development of defamation law);.
61. Colin Rhys Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1962) (same);.
62. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904) (same).
63. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 89-172 (1985).
64. See FREDRICK SEATON SEIBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776, at 269-75, 380-92 (1952);.
65. JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1988);.
66. Richard D. Brown, The Shifting Freedoms of the Press in the Eighteenth Century, in 1 A HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN AMERICA: THE COLONIAL BOOK IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 368 (Hugh Amory &. David D. Hall eds., 2000);.
67. William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984).
68. See 8 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 343 (1925);.
69. levy, supra note 31, at 121, 129, 132;.
70. Thomas A. Green, The Jury, Seditious Libel, and the Criminal Law, in JURIES, LIBEL, & JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF ENGLISH JURIES IN SEVENTEENTH-AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY TRIALS FOR LIBEL AND SLANDER 37, 41 (R.H. Helmholz & Thomas A. Green eds., 1984).
71. Green, supra note 33, at 60-61.
72. See generally ROBERT W.T. MARTIN, THE FREE AND OPEN PRESS: THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC PRESS LIBERTY, 1640-1800 (2001) (discussing the dynamic of open press as an avenue for criticism of the government);.
73. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983) (exploring the origins of the freedom of the press clause and reexamining Leonard Levy's conclusion that freedom of the press only meant freedom from prior restraint in light of this history).
74. For an example, see 2 WALTER BAGEHOT, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration, in LITERARY STUDIES 422 (Richard Holt Hutton ed., 1891).
75. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 238-69 (10th ed. 1959).
76. Frederick Pollock, The Theory of Persecution, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 144 (1882).
77. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997);.
78. GEOFFREY r. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME, FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 79-134 (2004).
79. An important exchange about Mill's analysis of the relationship between open discussion and the advancement of knowledge is H.J. McCloskey, Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits, 13 INQUIRY 219 (1970);.
80. D.H. Monro, Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits, 13 INQUIRY 238 (1970).
81. See also Alan Ryan, Mr. McCloskey on Mill's Liberalism, 14 PHIL. Q. 253 (1964);.
82. C.L. Ten, Mill and Liberty, 30 J. HIST. IDEAS 47 (1969).
83. MILL, supra note 25, at 17 n.2.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id. at 28.
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 34.
91. Mill did, after all, argue that confronting even that which is false is valuable in helping produce a better understanding and deeper appreciation of the truth. Id. at 50-51.
92. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1950);.
93. United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1918);.
94. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917);.
95. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994);.
96. Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1990);.
97. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modem First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 726, 728-29, 741, 744 (1975);.
98. Learned Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1930);.
99. Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335 (2003).
100. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting);.
101. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);.
102. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919);.
103. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919);.
104. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919);.
105. HARRY KALVEN JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 130-36 (Jamie Kalven ed., Harper and Rowe 1988);.
106. Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CR. REv. 1;.
107. Sheldon M. Novick, The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of Expression, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 303;.
108. Yosal Rogat & James M. O'Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion-The Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349 (1984);.
109. Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CR. REv. 209;.
110. G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REV. 391 (1992).
111. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.s. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);.
112. Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California: The Power of Ideas, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 407 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004);.
113. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion m Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
114. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1946);.
115. MORRIS L ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1946);.
116. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
117. For general discussions of the free speech issues of the era, see chafee, supra note 53, at 36-108;.
118. Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech (1987);.
119. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205(1983).
120. See Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and die First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL L. REV. 1159(1982).
121. To a significant extent, the increased focus on facts, rather than advocacy or criticism of government, is a consequence of mid to late twentieth century doctrinal and political developments. Starting with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the constitutionalization of defamation law made factual accuracy a First Amendment concern in the context of what was said or printed about identifiable individuals, .
122. and starting with New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), the First Amendment value of factual reporting became more salient.
123. Most importantly, however, the commercial speech revolution that started with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), highlighted the First Amendment importance of information for information's sake, and consequently made the world of fact more important in free speech debates.
124. A related development, starting in the latter years of the twentieth century (perhaps with United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), mandamus denied sub nom.
125. Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979)) and substantially heightened by the events of September 11, 2001, was the increasing recognition of the way in which the disclosure of hard facts was often a far more effective way of causing unlawful action than was mere advocacy alone. To be sure, one way of getting someone else to commit a crime is to urge him to do it, but often a far better way is by providing the facts and instructions that will make it possible or easier for someone to do what they might in any event have been inclined to do.
126. Intriguingly, the standard advocacy/incitement formula from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), has nothing to say about the question.
127. (see United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979);.
128. United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978)), and thus courts have been left to wrestle with the difficult question of fact-based advocacy and fact-based instructions for crime with virtually no authoritative guidance.
129. See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 260-80 (1989);.
130. Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The Brandenburg Test and Speech That Encourages or Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2002);.
131. Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1128 (2005);.
132. Leslie Kendrick, Note, A Test for Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L. REV. 1973 (2005). Especially in the age of the Internet, die applicability of the First Amendment in general and the Brandenburg standard in particular to facts and instructions is an increasingly important topic of First Amendment doctrine and theory, but because this topic is largely about the potential dangers of accurate information rather than about public falsity, it is a topic that is somewhat peripheral to my primary concerns in this Article.
133. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
134. MILL, supra note 25, at 48.
135. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136. See Schauer, supra note 17, at 20-22.
137. See Goldman, supra note 25;.
138. Campbell, supra note 12, at 24-28.
139. See CHARLES COLBERT, A MEASURE OF PERFECTION: PHRENOLOGY AND THE FINE ARTS IN AMERICA (1997);.
140. Martin Gardner, Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science, ch. 7 (Dover Publications 1957) (1952);.
141. David L Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other Abject Lessons From the History of Science, 59 hastings L.J. 979 (2008);.
142. Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 harv. L. REV. 877 (1997). (Pubitemid 127467196)
143. See, e.g., Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 legal theory 1 (1996) (exposing and challenging the view that a free market in ideas is systematically truth conducive).
144. To give just one example, numerous experiments have shown that presenting some proposition with images of various kinds will lead people to attribute more to the proposition than when the proposition is expressed in words alone. See David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW &. HUM. BEHAv. 183 (2006);.
145. Jessica R. Gurley & David K. Marcus, The Effects of Neuroimaging and Brain Injury on Insanity Defenses, 26 BEHAv. SCI. & L 85 (2008);.
146. Aura Hanna & Roger Remington, The Representation of Color and Form in Long-Term Memory, 24 Memory & Cognition 322 (1996);.
147. David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing: The Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343 (2008);.
148. Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470 (2008).
149. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (Jaime Kalven ed., 1988);.
150. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995);.
151. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993);.
152. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978);.
153. Hairy Kalven Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 191;.
154. Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J.L & POL 451 (1988);.
155. William Marshall, Free Speech and the "Problem" of Democracy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (1994) (reviewing sunstein, supra).
156. See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. &. PUB. AFF. 204 (1972);.
157. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991);.
158. Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979);.
159. Irving Younger, The Idea of Sanctuary, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 761 (1979).
160. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978);.
161. Sheldon Nahmod, The GFP (Green) Bunny: Reflections on the Intersection of Art, Science, and die First Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 473, 475 n.ll (2001);.
162. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982);.
163. David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
164. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986);.
165. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999);.
166. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990);.
167. Daniel A. Farber, Commentary, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REv. 554 (1991).
168. See generally Schauer, supra note 17 (suggesting a relationship between epistemic arguments and arguments from democracy).
169. Id.
170. See sources cited supra note 15.
171. Although they are. See, e.g., Gem v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
172. There are noteworthy exceptions, such as Marshall, supra note 16.
173. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We Have to Choose Between Freedom of Speech and Equality 1, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 449 (1996).
174. See sources cited supra note 65.
175. See sources cited supra note 66.
176. See sources cited supra note 67.
177. See Chester S. Galloway, The First Amendment and FTC Weight-Loss Advertising Regulation, 37 J. CONSUMER AFF. 413 (2003);.
178. Jennifer E Gross, The First Amendment and Diet Industry Advertising: How "Puffery" m Weight-Loss Advertisements Has Gone Too Far, 20 J.L & HEALTH 325 (2007).
179. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1765 (2004) (surveying and explaining the vast area of "speech" that is entirely uncovered by First Amendment doctrine).
180. See, e.g., George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration's Regulation of Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 food & drug L.J. 365 (2003);.
181. Michael E Schoeman, The First Amendment and Restrictions on Advertising of Securities Under die Securities Act of 1933, 41 BUS. LAW. 377 (1986).
182. "Great is Truth, and mighty above all things" is the common translation of magna est Veritas et praevalebit, attributed to THOMAS BROOKS, THE CROWN AND GLORY OF CHRISTIANITY (1662), .
183. and to be found as magna est Veritas et praevckt in 1 Esdras4:41. john bartlett, familiar quotations 36b (Emily Morison Beck ed., 14th ed. 1968).
184. As is so often the case, Mark Twain had the last (and best) word: "Truth is mighty and will prevail. There is nothing wrong with this, except that it ain't so." MARK TWAIN'S NOTEBOOK 345 (Albert Bigelow Paine ed., 2d ed. 1935).
185. See SEC v. Wall St. Publ'g Inst, Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.G Cir. 1988) (reaffirming the inapplicability of the First Amendment to the sale of securities). In fact, restricting the advertising of securities is not and need not be limited to controlling that which is false or misleading. The entire scheme of securities regulation, including as it does elaborate controls on what can be said when, and by whom, goes far beyond the false and the misleading, and remains sufficiently far from even the coverage of the First Amendment that almost.
186. (see Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985)) all dimensions of the control of communication in securities are not subject to any level of First Amendment scrutiny.
187. See Wall St. Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d at 373.
188. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980);.
189. Commodity Trend Serv. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 233 F.3d 981, 993 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that regulation of fraudulent speech is constitutionally constrained when protected speech is also regulated, but not otherwise).
190. 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
191. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §121.055 (West 1982).
192. Justice Rehnquist concurred only in the result, questioning the Court's reliance on the constitutional defamation cases. Id. at 62 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
193. 376U.S. 254 (1964).
194. Sullivan does allow "reckless disregard" for the truth to substitute for actual knowledge of falsity, but the Supreme Court subsequently emphasized that the reckless disregard standard would be satisfied only upon showing disregard by the speaker or publisher of actual suspicion of falsity, see St Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
195. Consequently, the "reckless disregard" alternative is now very close to the intentional falsity alternative that the Court in Sullivan misleadingly labeled "actual malice.".
196. 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (striking down a law prohibiting candidates in judicial elections from announcing their views on disputed legal issues).
197. But cf. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
198. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
200. See Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the "Actual Malice" Standard, 82 TUL. L. REV. 889 (2008);.
201. William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285 (2004);.
202. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 137-41.
203. See Pestiak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991);.
204. see also Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. 111. 1981) (permitting an injunction against a misleading campaign slogan).
205. It is impossible to determine whether these courts would have reached the same conclusion after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
206. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996);.
207. Cent. Hudson Gas &. Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);.
208. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
209. See Schauer, supra note 79.
210. See Lillian R. Be Vier, An Informed Public, An Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482 (1980).
211. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521;.
212. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARv.L. Rev. 84, 111 (1998).
213. But see LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 145 (2005) (questioning whether distrust of government is more of an issue for speech regulation than for regulation generally);.
214. Jan Narveson, Freedom of Speech and Expression: A Libertarian View, in FREE EXPRESSION: ESSAYS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 59 (W.J. Waluchow ed., 1994) (same).
215. See STEVEN LEONARD JACOBS & MARK WEITZMAN, DISMANTLING THE BIG LIE: THE PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZlON (2003);.
216. Michael J. Polelle, Racial and Ethnic Group Defamation: A Speech-Friendly Proposal, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 213, 219 (2003).
217. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
218. See generally Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. &. MARY L. REV. 905 (1984) (examining differences between commentary about public figures and commentary about public officials).
219. The lack of total clarity on the issue is substantially a function of the absence of any case directly on point. We know that false and misleading commercial advertising may be regulated, we know that false and misleading campaign advertising may not be regulated unless the "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is satisfied, and we know that the same applies to defamation actions brought by public officials and public figures. The clear implication is that false and misleading speech not about identifiable individuals may not be regulated at all, or again may be regulated only where the Sullivan standard, however poor a fit in this context, is satisfied, but all of this is still implication and not the consequence of any clear and direct holding by the Supreme Court.
220. See supra note 98.
221. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
222. Id. at 339.
223. See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
224. See supra note 101.
225. 425 US. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
226. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983);.
227. Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1979);.
228. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 983 (2005);.
229. Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980).
230. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring);.
231. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991);.
232. Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000);.
233. Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983) (reviewing YUDOF, supra note 108).
234. See Lee, supra note 108.
235. See Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld's First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 914 (2008).
236. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), .
237. arguably in some tension with Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), seems to disable the government from using viewpoint-based criteria to allocate federal funds, and would thus seem to stand as an impediment to funding groups that would seek to combat Holocaust denial while not funding the Holocaust deniers. If this outcome seems implausible, then it is perhaps better to understand Finley as being largely about the autonomy of artistic institutional decisionmaking and not as about a broad-based ban on viewpoint-based government funding.
238. See Schauer, supra note 98;.
239. see also Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2007);.
240. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005).
241. See Schauer, supra note 111, at 921.