Beyond DOMA: Choice of state law in federal statutes

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 64, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 1371-1430

  Baude, William ^a  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84863636803     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (470)

1. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter DOMA Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The letter was required by 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) ("The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice... determines... to refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal statute....").
2. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter DOMA Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The letter was required by 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) ("The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice... determines... to refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal statute....").
3. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Same-Sex Married Couples (Sept. 27, 2011), available at http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/ operations/cb11-cn181.html.
4. See Annual Geographical Mobility Rates, by Type of Movement: 1947-2009, U.S. Census Bureau 2-4 (May 2010), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migration/tab-a-1.pdf.
5. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 498 (1954).
6. Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 806 (1957).
7. see also Note, Applicability of State Conflicts Rules When Issues of State Law Arise in Federal Question Cases, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1228 (1955) (noting the problem and discussing "four relevant considerations" in crafting a solution in any given substantive area).
8. See Robert B. Chapman, Profoundly Unwise and Even Irresponsible Uncertainty: Some Preliminary Questions as to the Effect of the Defense of Marriage Act on Marital Status in Bankruptcy for Same-Sex Couples Validly Married Under State Law, 14 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 (2005).
9. John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 Okla. L. Rev. 531 (1989).
10. Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 881 (2006).
11. See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 537 (2010).
12. See Mark Strasser, The Legal Landscape Post-DOMA, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 153, 176-77 (2009).
13. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 498 (1954).
14. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 498 (1954).
15. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
16. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 498 (1954).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
18. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
19. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1090-1091.
20. Tara Siegel Bernard, For Children of Same-Sex Couples, a Student Aid Maze, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2011, at B1.
21. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8905(a), 8956(a).
22. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-04-353R, Defense of Marriage Act: Update to Prior Report (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf (updating U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/OGC-97-16, Defense of Marriage Act (1997). For explication of these and other examples, see Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379-83 (D. Mass. 2010).
23. and Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239-44 (D. Mass. 2010).
24. See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 Tax L. Rev. 1, 1 (2000).
25. Tara Siegel Bernard, For Children of Same-Sex Couples, a Student Aid Maze, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2011, at B1.
26. To the extent that officers of the District of Columbia and the territories are federal officers, see Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 336 (1806), they are of course an exception. E.g., D.C. Code § 46-410 (2011).
27. 1 U.S.C. § 7.
28. 1 U.S.C. § 1.
29. cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1924 n.82 (2011) (noting that § 1 "covers only the simplest interpretive conventions").
30. Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 97 n.91 (2000) (calling these definitions "largely insignificant").
31. DOMA's definition is also more emphatic than some of these other statutory definitions, which apply only "unless the context indicates otherwise. " 1 U.S.C. § 1.
32. accord Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199-201 (1993).
33. First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924). DOMA contains no such caveat. See 1 U.S.C. § 7.
34. Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 10-01564, 2012 WL 1909603 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2012).
35. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974, 1002-03 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
36. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010) (Tauro, J.). Technically DOMA has been held to violate the "equal protection component" of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1002, because the Equal Protection Clause itself is inapplicable to the federal government.
37. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-2207, slip op. at 11 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012).
38. In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011).
39. cf. Susan E. Hauser, More than Abstract Justice: The Defense of Marriage Act and the Equal Treatment of Same-Sex Married Couples Under Section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 85 Am. Bankr. L.J. 195, 197-98 (2011) (defending Balas).
40. In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009).
41. In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2009). The enforceability of such orders was at issue in Golinski v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 781 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2011), though that issue might ultimately be rendered academic by the same judge's conclusion that DOMA is indeed unconstitutional, see Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1002-03.
42. For simplicity's sake, I will frequently use "DOMA" when I mean to refer specifically to section 3.
43. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter DOMA Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The letter was required by 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) ("The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice... determines... to refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal statute....").
44. see also Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss at 18, Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (No. 10-257) [hereinafter U.S. Golinski Brief].
45. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter DOMA Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The letter was required by 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) ("The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice... determines... to refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal statute....").
46. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974, 1002-03 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
47. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter DOMA Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The letter was required by 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) ("The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice... determines... to refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal statute....").
48. E.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010).
49. see also In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 574 n.5 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that the justifications actually offered for DOMA would "fail[] even the lowest standard of constitutional scrutiny (rational basis)").
50. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (footnote omitted) (quoting Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2005).
51. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (footnote omitted) (quoting Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2005).
52. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 309 (2011).
53. For a defense of DOMA against arguments based on tradition and federalism, see Lynn D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, Democracy, and the Constitution, 58 Drake L. Rev. 951, 973-85 (2010).
54. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-2207, slip op. at 13-15 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012).
55. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-2207, slip op. at 13-15 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012).
56. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-2207, slip op. at 13-15 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012).
57. See David B. Cruz, The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical Federalism, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 805, 824 (2011) ("Section 3 leaves in place state marriage definitions for federal purposes regardless of how young or old a putative spouse is. It leaves in place state marriage definitions regardless of what diseases or genetic conditions a person might have. It leaves in place state marriage definitions regardless of how closely related the two spouses might be. But if a state marriage definition embraces a same-sex couple, section 3 means that the federal government will suddenly and across-the-board refuse to use the state definition. ").
58. it has no effect, however, on bigamy (one person with multiple two-person marriages).
59. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
60. See David B. Cruz, The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical Federalism, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 805, 824 (2011) ("Section 3 leaves in place state marriage definitions for federal purposes regardless of how young or old a putative spouse is. It leaves in place state marriage definitions regardless of what diseases or genetic conditions a person might have. It leaves in place state marriage definitions regardless of how closely related the two spouses might be. But if a state marriage definition embraces a same-sex couple, section 3 means that the federal government will suddenly and across-the-board refuse to use the state definition. ").
61. Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Defects in the "Defense of Marriage" Act, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 221, 231-39 (1996).
62. see also Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 249 (D. Mass. 2010) (Tauro, J.) (invalidating DOMA under the Tenth Amendment).
63. 142 Cong. Rec. H7481 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mink).
64. Mark Strasser, DOMA's Bankruptcy 30 (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/mark_strasser/22 (noting arguments against DOMA that "would leave state same-sex marriage bans unscathed, " as well as other arguments against DOMA that "would seem equally applicable to state same-sex marriage bans").
65. cf. The West Wing: The Supremes (NBC television broadcast Mar. 24, 2004) (showing fictional conservative jurist criticizing DOMA on federalism grounds).
66. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Nancy Gill, et al. and Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Dean Hara at 2, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Gill Brief].
67. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Nancy Gill, et al. and Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Dean Hara at 2, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Gill Brief].
68. See Bob Barr, Wedding Blues, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 2009, at A13.
69. See Don't Ask Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
70. See William D. Araiza & Dan Woods, Understanding the Repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell: An Immediate Look at Policy Changes Allowing Gays and Lesbians to Openly Serve in the Military 6-7, 15 (2011) (attributing momentum to Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
71. See William D. Araiza & Dan Woods, Understanding the Repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell: An Immediate Look at Policy Changes Allowing Gays and Lesbians to Openly Serve in the Military 6-7, 15 (2011) (attributing momentum to Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
72. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter DOMA Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The letter was required by 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) ("The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice... determines... to refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal statute....").
73. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974, 1002-03 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
74. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 974, 1002-03 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
75. See Interview by Robin Roberts with Barack Obama (May 9, 2012) (transcript available at abcnews. go. com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interview-presidentobama/ story?id=16316043).
76. This Article is thus in the tradition of Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 921, 933 (1998). See also Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, at xi-xii (2006) [hereinafter Koppelman, Different States].
77. See, e.g., Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, 879-80 (C.D. Cal. 2005), vacated for lack of standing, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006).
78. Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
79. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
80. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd on narrower grounds, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012).
81. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Race, Religion, Gender, and Interstate Federalism: Some Notes from History, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 19, 26 n.20 (1996).
82. Pamela S. Karlan, Introduction: Same-Sex Marriage as a Moving Story, 16 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 9 (2005).
83. See Smelt, 447 F.3d at 683-84.
84. See Mark Strasser, The Legal Landscape Post-DOMA, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 153, 176-77 (2009).
85. Brief for Intervenor-Appellant the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 46-47, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214 (1st Cir. Sept. 22, 2011) [hereinafter House Brief].
86. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Nancy Gill, et al. and Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Dean Hara at 2, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Gill Brief].
87. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Nancy Gill, et al. and Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Dean Hara at 2, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Gill Brief].
88. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter DOMA Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. The letter was required by 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006) ("The Attorney General shall submit to the Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of Justice... determines... to refrain (on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional) from defending or asserting, in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of any Federal statute....").
89. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 538 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. This Article does not delve into how states determine who is a man and who is a woman, or when they recognize gender determinations made by other states. Those complicated issues deserve thorough treatments of their own. See, e.g., Julie A. Greenberg, When is a Same-Sex Marriage Legal? Full Faith and Credit and Sex Determination, 38 Creighton L. Rev. 289, 295-307 (2004).
91. Shana Brown, Note, Sex Changes and "Opposite-Sex" Marriage: Applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause to Compel Interstate Recognition of Transgendered Persons' Amended Legal Sex for Marital Purposes, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 1113, 1128-55 (2001).
92. see also David B. Cruz, Sexual Judgments: Full Faith and Credit and the Relational Character of Legal Sex, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 51 (2011). It suffices for this Article to observe that the disarray over recognizing same-sex marriage is even worse for individuals whose sex is in dispute.
93. Thanks to Lea Brilmayer for this point.
94. See Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 495 (Cal. 2004) (declaring same-sex marriages licensed by San Francisco "void and of no legal effect from their inception").
95. see also Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745, 1748, 1764-65 (2005).
96. Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution? The Case of Mayors and Marriage Equality, 3 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 5-14 (2007).
97. Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 361 (App. Div. 2005), superseded by Marriage Equality Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 95 (McKinney).
98. Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 2008).
99. see also Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 337 (N.Y. 2009) (avoiding the question).
100. In re Estate of Ranftle, 917 N.Y.S.2d 195, 195 (App. Div. 2011) (following Martinez).
101. Lewis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578, 584 (App. Div. 2009) (same).
102. In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6-7 (N.Y. 1953).
103. see also Gary J. Simson, Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 313, 326-55 (2006) (discussing May's Estate).
104. Marriage-Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That Is Valid in the State of Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland, 95 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 3 (2010), available at http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2010/95oag3.pdf.
105. See Letter from Patrick Lynch, R.I. Attorney Gen., to Jack R. Warner, Comm'r, R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ. (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.glad.org/ uploads/docs/cases/cote-whitacre-et-al-v-dept-public-health/ri-ag-statem ent.pdf.
106. Are Same-Sex Marriages Performed in Other Jurisdictions Valid in New Mexico?, Op. N.M. Att'y Gen. No. 11-01 (2011), available at http://97.65.186.35/pdf/4%20Jan%2011-Rep.%20Al%20Park-Opinion%2011-01%5B 1%5D.pdf.
107. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 972-73 (R.I. 2007) (Suttell, J., dissenting).
108. See also Christiansen v. Christiansen, 253 P.3d 153, 154 n.1 (Wyo. 2011) (leaving foreign-recognition question undecided).
109. Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, the Public Policy Exception, and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect, 41 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 105, 136, 141 (2010) (noting that Wyoming law lacks a "a clear statement against the validity of a same-sex marriage celebrated outside the enacting jurisdiction").
110. Ala. Code § 30-1-19(e) (2011).
111. A recent article counted thirty-eight such states. Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 Or. L. Rev. 433, 447 (2005).
112. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 11 (2006) (repealed 2008).
113. see also Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 632 (Mass. 2006) (Spina, J., concurring) (quoting section 11).
114. Act of July 31, 2008, §1, 2008 Mass. Acts 1014.
115. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:44 (2011).
116. see also Jeffrey A. Redding, Slicing the American Pie: Federalism and Personal Law, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 941, 995 (2008) (noting that Vermont, New Hampshire, Illinois, and Wisconsin have similar antievasion statutes).
117. An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage, § 12, 2009 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 3 (LexisNexis) (effective Sept. 1, 2009) (repealing Vermont's anti-evasion statute).
118. An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage, § 12, 2009 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 3 (LexisNexis) (effective Sept. 1, 2009) (repealing Vermont's anti-evasion statute).
119. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010).
120. In re Marriage of J.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. App. 2010).
121. Perhaps in Louisiana too, according to dicta in Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d 731 (La. Ct. App. 2008), which noted that "the Louisiana Legislature has not expressly outlawed marriages between first cousins regardless of where they are contracted, as it has em phatically done in the case of purported same-sex marriages. "
122. Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1683 (2011).
123. Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1683 (2011).
124. Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1683 (2011).
125. Judith M. Stinson, The Right to (Same-Sex) Divorce, 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1926660.
126. This Article is thus in the tradition of Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 921, 933 (1998). See also Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, at xi-xii (2006) [hereinafter Koppelman, Different States].
127. Linda Silberman, Same-Sex Marriage: Refining the Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2195, 2205 (2005) (arguing that the applicable law in such circumstances should be the law of the state in which the couple was domiciled when they were married).
128. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage: Why the Due Process Clause Protects Marriages That Cross State Lines, Even If Conflict of Laws Cannot, 110 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1903386.
129. accord Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Unions Across the United States 193-94 (2011).
130. This Article is thus in the tradition of Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 921, 933 (1998). See also Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, at xi-xii (2006) [hereinafter Koppelman, Different States].
131. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (1934).
132. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (1934).
133. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (1934).
134. See generally Perry Dane, Whereof One Cannot Speak: Legal Diversity and the Limits of a Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 75 Ind. L.J. 511, 512-14 (2000).
135. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 132.
136. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 132.
137. see also Joseph H. Beale et al., Marriage and the Domicil, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 529 (1931) ("[T]he decisions... show one underlying principle: control over the marital status rests with the domicil. "). The Restatement is arguably ambiguous about which domiciles have such veto power. Some scholars have suggested that only the domicile "at the time of the marriage" has the power to veto marriages that it views as abhorrent.
138. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles' Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 339, 344 (1998). Others have understood the First Restatement more broadly.
139. See, e.g., Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 969, 994-95 & n.90 (1956).
140. accord State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872).
141. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(1) (1971).
142. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(1) (1971).
143. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(1) (1971).
144. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(1) (1971).
145. See Mark Strasser, The Legal Landscape Post-DOMA, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 153, 176-77 (2009).
146. Compare Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(1).
147. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 227, 231-32 (2010).
148. Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1232, 1233 (1997).
149. Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1232, 1233 (1997).
150. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 253 (1992) ("Trying to be all things to all people, [the Second Restatement] produced mush. ").
151. A recent article counted thirty-eight such states. Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 Or. L. Rev. 433, 447 (2005).
152. see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2215, 2243-44 (2005) (suggesting that courts demand a clear legislative statement before assuming that a state intended to extinguish marriage of a couple that migrates to the state).
153. See Mark Strasser, The Legal Landscape Post-DOMA, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 153, 176-77 (2009).
154. This Article is thus in the tradition of Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 921, 933 (1998). See also Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, at xi-xii (2006) [hereinafter Koppelman, Different States].
155. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 Yale L.J. 1965, 1971 (1997).
156. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 Yale L.J. 1965, 1971 (1997).
157. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 561, 591, 599.
158. See, e.g., Danielle Johnson, Comment, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction: A Critical Analysis of Chambers v. Ormiston and Why Divorce Is an Incident of Marriage That Should Be Uniformly Recognized Throughout the States, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 225, 252-53 (2010).
159. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 284 cmt. c (1971).
160. See, e.g., Danielle Johnson, Comment, Same-Sex Divorce Jurisdiction: A Critical Analysis of Chambers v. Ormiston and Why Divorce Is an Incident of Marriage That Should Be Uniformly Recognized Throughout the States, 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 225, 252-53 (2010).
161. Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 952, 956-57, 965-66 (1977) (written by the reporter of the Second Restatement).
162. This Article is thus in the tradition of Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 921, 933 (1998). See also Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, at xi-xii (2006) [hereinafter Koppelman, Different States].
163. Larry E. Ribstein & Erin A. O'Hara, The Law Market 164-66 (2009).
164. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 561, 591, 599.
165. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 561, 591, 599.
166. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
167. See, e.g., Robert L. Cordell II, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage and an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 247, 271 (1994).
168. Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 551, 584-91 (1994).
169. Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 279, 281-83 (1997).
170. Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Defects in the "Defense of Marriage" Act, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 221, 231-39 (1996).
171. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) ("Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and common law) and to judgments. ").
172. see also David P. Currie, Full Faith & Credit to Marriages, 1 Green Bag 2d 7, 8-9 (1997).
173. cf. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (applying full faith and credit to a custody judgment related to a same-sex marriage).
174. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
175. Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1201, 1206 (2009) ("[T]he only self-executing portion of the Clause was evidentiary in nature: it obliged states to admit sister-state records into evidence but did not mandate the substantive effect those records should have. The real significance of the Clause was the power it granted to Congress to specify that effect later. " (footnote omitted).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
177. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
179. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 Yale L.J. 1965, 1971 (1997).
180. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 147, 167-72 (1998).
181. Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage" and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 45, 56-59 (1998).
182. Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1201, 1206 (2009) ("[T]he only self-executing portion of the Clause was evidentiary in nature: it obliged states to admit sister-state records into evidence but did not mandate the substantive effect those records should have. The real significance of the Clause was the power it granted to Congress to specify that effect later. " (footnote omitted).
183. Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 255, 261 (1998).
184. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage: Why the Due Process Clause Protects Marriages That Cross State Lines, Even If Conflict of Laws Cannot, 110 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1903386.
185. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage: Why the Due Process Clause Protects Marriages That Cross State Lines, Even If Conflict of Laws Cannot, 110 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1903386.
186. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage: Why the Due Process Clause Protects Marriages That Cross State Lines, Even If Conflict of Laws Cannot, 110 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1903386.
187. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage: Why the Due Process Clause Protects Marriages That Cross State Lines, Even If Conflict of Laws Cannot, 110 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1903386.
188. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage: Why the Due Process Clause Protects Marriages That Cross State Lines, Even If Conflict of Laws Cannot, 110 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1903386.
189. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage: Why the Due Process Clause Protects Marriages That Cross State Lines, Even If Conflict of Laws Cannot, 110 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1903386.
190. Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage: Why the Due Process Clause Protects Marriages That Cross State Lines, Even If Conflict of Laws Cannot, 110 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1903386.
191. See, e.g., Powell v. Rogers, 496 F.2d 1248, 1249-51 (9th Cir. 1974) (declining to decide between California and Nevada).
192. Albina Engine & Mach. Works v. O'Leary, 328 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1964) (declining to decide between Idaho and Oregon). But see Huff v. Dir., Office of Pers. Mgmt., 40 F.3d 35, 39 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding it unnecessary to decide between Pennsylvania and Texas, but concluding that Pennsylvania law would apply).
193. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
194. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
195. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
196. The (ultimately victorious) respondent had argued that California law controlled because it was the domicile. Brief for Respondent at 41, De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (No. 529), 1956 WL 89071. The Court did not mention this analysis.
197. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
198. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
199. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
200. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
201. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
202. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
203. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
204. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) ("[W]e need not pause to consider the question whether the conflict-of-laws rule applied in suits where federal jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship shall be extended to a case such as this, in which jurisdiction is based upon a federal statute. ").
205. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942) ("Whether the rule of the Klaxon case applies where federal jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship, we need not decide. ").
206. see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26 n.3 (1988).
207. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 705 n.8 (1966).
208. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 371 n.2 (1945).
209. In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2001).
210. In re Merritt Dredging Co., 839 F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1988).
211. see also A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int'l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (federal jurisdiction under the Edge Act).
212. John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 Okla. L. Rev. 531 (1989).
213. See Brinson v. Brinson, 334 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1964).
214. See Brinson v. Brinson, 334 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1964).
215. See Brinson v. Brinson, 334 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1964).
216. See Brinson v. Brinson, 334 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1964).
217. The Fourth Circuit did not discuss what would have happened under Virginia law. Cf. Gloth v. Gloth, 153 S.E. 879, 886 (Va. 1930) ("[W]hen a divorce a mensa et thoro is decreed there is no severance of the marriage bond. The marital status is not affected thereby.
218. and the parties remain husband and wife, though authorized by the decree to live in separation. ").
219. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2006).
220. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2006).
221. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2006).
222. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2006).
223. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2006).
224. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2006).
225. See Berger v. AXA Network LLC, 459 F.3d 804, 809-10 (7th Cir. 2006).
226. Med. Mut. of Ohio v. DeSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2001).
227. Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1179 n.8 (3d Cir. 1992).
228. Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291, 1294 & n.14 (1st Cir. 1988).
229. see also In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering federal common law to be specially appropriate in bankruptcy).
230. See Robert B. Chapman, Profoundly Unwise and Even Irresponsible Uncertainty: Some Preliminary Questions as to the Effect of the Defense of Marriage Act on Marital Status in Bankruptcy for Same-Sex Couples Validly Married Under State Law, 14 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 (2005).
231. Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 881 (2006).
232. Tatum v. Tatum, 241 F.2d 401, 405 (9th Cir. 1957) (citing Lembcke v. United States, 181 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1950).
233. United States v. Snyder, 177 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
234. Muir v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
235. Hendrich v. Anderson, 191 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1951).
236. see also Yarbrough v. United States, 341 F.2d 621, 623-24 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (noting that the law of the place of celebration applies under the Civil Service Retirement Act).
237. see also Yarbrough v. United States, 341 F.2d 621, 623-24 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (noting that the law of the place of celebration applies under the Civil Service Retirement Act).
238. see also Yarbrough v. United States, 341 F.2d 621, 623-24 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (noting that the law of the place of celebration applies under the Civil Service Retirement Act).
239. see also Yarbrough v. United States, 341 F.2d 621, 623-24 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (noting that the law of the place of celebration applies under the Civil Service Retirement Act).
240. see also Yarbrough v. United States, 341 F.2d 621, 623-24 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (noting that the law of the place of celebration applies under the Civil Service Retirement Act).
241. see also Yarbrough v. United States, 341 F.2d 621, 623-24 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (noting that the law of the place of celebration applies under the Civil Service Retirement Act).
242. see also Yarbrough v. United States, 341 F.2d 621, 623-24 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (noting that the law of the place of celebration applies under the Civil Service Retirement Act).
243. see also Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625, 1672-73 (2007).
244. See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 537 (2010).
245. Estate of Borax v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 666, 668 (2d Cir. 1965).
246. Borax v. Borax, 119 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
247. Estate of Borax, 349 F.2d at 668-69.
248. Estate of Borax, 349 F.2d at 668-69.
249. Estate of Borax, 349 F.2d at 668-69.
250. Estate of Borax, 349 F.2d at 668-69.
251. Borax, 119 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
252. Estate of Borax, 349 F.2d at 672.
253. Estate of Borax, 349 F.2d at 672.
254. David P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 26, 74 (1966) ("Borax rejected the Tax Court's position that only those legally married may file joint returns. Judge Marshall thought legality irrelevant to tax policy.... ").
255. David P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 26, 74 (1966) ("Borax rejected the Tax Court's position that only those legally married may file joint returns. Judge Marshall thought legality irrelevant to tax policy.... ").
256. David P. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 26, 74 (1966) ("Borax rejected the Tax Court's position that only those legally married may file joint returns. Judge Marshall thought legality irrelevant to tax policy.... ").
257. Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 952, 956-57, 965-66 (1977) (written by the reporter of the Second Restatement).
258. Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 952, 956-57, 965-66 (1977) (written by the reporter of the Second Restatement).
259. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 249, 253 (1995) ("RFRA operates as a sweeping 'superstatute,' cutting across all other federal statutes (now and future, unless specifically exempted) and modifying their reach. ").
260. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 249, 253 (1995) ("RFRA operates as a sweeping 'superstatute,' cutting across all other federal statutes (now and future, unless specifically exempted) and modifying their reach. ").
261. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1501, 1553-54 (2006).
262. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2108 (2002).
263. cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1924 n.82 (2011) (noting that § 1 "covers only the simplest interpretive conventions").
264. Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 881 (2006).
265. Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807-09 (1986).
266. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2108 (2002).
267. 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2006). The statute does not say what to do when those two states conflict.
268. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i).
269. Cf. Lars Noah, The Executive Line Item Veto and the Judicial Power to Sever: What's the Difference?, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 235, 243 n.42 (1999).
270. Respect for Marriage Act of 2009, H.R. 3567, 111th Cong. (2009) (emphases added). Later, similar bills include: Respect for Marriage Act of 2011, H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. (2011).
271. Respect for Marriage Act of 2011, S. 598, 112th Cong. (2011).
272. For my argument that Congress should provide a single, cross-cutting rule, see notes 241-43 below and accompanying text.
273. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage: Valuing All Families Under the Law 123-45 (2008).
274. Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 773, 852 (1989) (advocating that tax law be "purged of distinctions based on marital status").
275. See Stephen T. Black, Same-Sex Marriage and Taxes, 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 327, 351-52 (2008) (predicting optimistically that Congress would feel obligated to "restore rationality" to the tax code if DOMA were gone).
276. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 Geo. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1991).
277. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 Geo. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1991).
278. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 Geo. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1991).
279. Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 2134, 2144 n.23 (1991) ("[G]etting choice of law onto the national agenda in Congress is unrealistic. ").
280. Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to Products-Liability Reform, 37 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci., no. 1, 1988, at 90 (1988).
281. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 Geo. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1991).
282. Of course it is true that Congress is a collective body that may not have a single view on same-sex marriage. I refer to Congress's "views" as shorthand for the various forms of collective intent, desire, or policy that can coherently be attributed to Congress.
283. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 Geo. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1991).
284. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1154, 1172 (2006) ("A plausible division of labor is that the reformer should deliberately ignore political feasibility.
285. she should simply propose first-best plans and programs and then let politics itself filter the feasible from the infeasible. ").
286. 38 C.F.R. § 3.49(a) (1949), quoted in United States v. Snyder, 177 F.2d 44, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
287. See, e.g., Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92, 94 (9th Cir. 1951).
288. Snyder, 177 F.2d at 47.
289. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1982).
290. See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 537 (2010).
291. Von Tersch v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 415, 419 (1967) (citing Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60, for proposition that the law of the domicile controls).
292. cf. Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 481, 513-14 & n.170 (2009) ("Although the rule is not clearly and completely stated in the Internal Revenue Code, or in the regulations, it is generally assumed that for tax purposes, a couple will be considered as married if they are legally married in the state of domicile. ").
293. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Trainer, 601 F.2d 1306, 1315 (5th Cir. 1979) (overturning "new guidelines" established by the Benefits Review Board).
294. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Trainer, 601 F.2d 1306, 1315 (5th Cir. 1979) (overturning "new guidelines" established by the Benefits Review Board).
295. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Trainer, 601 F.2d 1306, 1315 (5th Cir. 1979) (overturning "new guidelines" established by the Benefits Review Board).
296. Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
297. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 516-17 (1988).
298. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131 (2012).
299. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1995).
300. see also Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075 (1986).
301. Paul R. Verkuil, Welcome to the Constantly Evolving Field of Administrative Law, 42 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1990) ("This shift to central political control under OMB is the administrative law story of the decade. ").
302. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131 (2012).
303. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 94 (2006).
304. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 846 (2003).
305. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 846 (2003).
306. See Peter Hay et al., Conflict of Laws § 13.20, at 657 (5th ed. 2010) (predicting that state disagreement about same-sex marriage "will give rise to many conflicts problems").
307. See Peter Hay et al., Conflict of Laws § 13.20, at 657 (5th ed. 2010) (predicting that state disagreement about same-sex marriage "will give rise to many conflicts problems").
308. The exception is common law marriage, an institution in general disfavor today. See Jennifer Thomas, Comment, Common Law Marriage, 22 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 151, 151 (2009).
309. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) ("[T]here is no federal law of domestic relations. ").
310. Donlann v. Macgurn, 55 P.3d 74, 77-78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
311. McPeek v. McCardle, 888 N.E.2d 171, 175-76 (Ind. 2008).
312. In re Estate of Murnion, 686 P.2d 893, 899 (Mont. 1984).
313. In re Farraj, 900 N.Y.S.2d 340 (App. Div. 2010).
314. In re Estate of Shippy, 678 P.2d 848, 850-51 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). See generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283 cmt. i (1971).
315. John C. Williams, Annotation, Recognition by Forum State of Marriage Which, Although Invalid Where Contracted, Would Have Been Valid If Contracted Within Forum State, 82 A.L.R.3d 1240 (West 2012) (collecting cases).
316. Cf. Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving Interstate Conflicts over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 47, 91-92 (2011) (predicting, tentatively, a system of federally-celebrated civil unions).
317. Cf. Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 931 (2011) (arguing that common law marriages provide unique advantages to same-sex couples).
318. For a discussion of whether Congress should adopt a federal marriage policy even if the courts cannot do so on their own, see Part VI. A below.
319. 351 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added).
320. Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1419 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
321. See Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Trainer, 601 F.2d 1306, 1313-14 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1979) (collecting cases).
322. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 912 n.141 (1986).
323. accord Camacho v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 445 F.3d 407, 409 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2006).
324. First S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Mobile, Ala. v. First S. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Jackson Cnty., Miss., 614 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1980).
325. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956).
326. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 408 n.122 (1964).
327. Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 245, 311 (2008).
328. Cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 164 n.2 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[N]either [Erie] nor the Rules of Decision Act scholarship underlying it... remotely established that that statute applies only in diversity cases. "). But see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 465-73 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that Erie is limited to diversity cases).
329. See In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 607 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Klaxon in reliance on the Second Circuit's ruling in Maternally Yours).
330. Cf. Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 208 n.2 (1938) (treating the Klaxon rule as an open question after Erie was decided).
331. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
332. see also Lembcke v. United States, 181 F.2d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1950) ("[W]here [diversity] is the basis of jurisdiction it is inadmissible that there should be one rule of state law for litigants in the state courts and another for litigants who bring the same question before the federal courts sitting within the state. ").
333. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
334. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
335. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
336. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
337. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
338. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
339. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam).
340. Some modern scholars have criticized Klaxon, suggesting that it is a bad decision even in its original context of diversity cases. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 79, 117-23 (1993).
341. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 253 (1992) ("Trying to be all things to all people, [the Second Restatement] produced mush. ").
342. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
343. In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2001).
344. A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int'l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
345. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
346. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
347. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 51-54 (2011) (surveying the possible meaning of this caveat).
348. Cf. James Y. Stern, Note, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1509, 1509 (2008) ("[C]hoice of law is the starting point in any legal analysis.... ").
349. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 980 (1991).
350. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 980 (1991).
351. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 980 (1991).
352. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 980 (1991).
353. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 980 (1991).
354. See Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 980 (1991).
355. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 758-59 (2010) (canvassing disagreement).
356. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
357. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
358. For more on institutional role and interpretive method, see Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 63-85 (2006).
359. I do not further discuss the separate hypothesis of agency creation of a federal choice-of-law rule, which I suspect would follow along similar lines.
360. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
361. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 716 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
362. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275, 1306, 1308-09 (2010).
363. Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1758, 1766 (2005).
364. Marsha Garrison, Marriage: The Status of Contract, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1039, 1041 (1983) (reviewing Lenore J. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law (1981).
365. see also Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 Ind. L.J. 453, 454-90 (1998) (marriage cannot be replicated through simple contract). In contrasting status and contract I do not mean to invoke the issue of when and how the parties should be able to terminate the marriage.
366. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 498 (1954).
367. The Federalist No. 45, at 241 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
368. Letter from Michael W. McConnell to Senator Orrin Hatch (July 10, 1996), reprinted in The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 57 (1996).
369. Compare Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991-1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that laws forbidding same-sex marriage violate fundamental rights and equal protection), with Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming on narrower grounds).
370. Compare Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991-1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that laws forbidding same-sex marriage violate fundamental rights and equal protection), with Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming on narrower grounds).
371. Respect for Marriage Act of 2011, H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. (2011).
372. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275, 1306, 1308-09 (2010).
373. Scholars and advocates are fond of citing Justice Jackson's dissent in Estin v. Estin for this point. 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether they are married and, if so, to whom. ").
374. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745, 780-97 (1995).
375. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745, 780-97 (1995).
376. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745, 780-97 (1995).
377. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745, 780-97 (1995).
378. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
379. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
380. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
381. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 922-23 (6th Cir. 2006).
382. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
383. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
384. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
385. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 567 (2006). I am agnostic about that question, and my argument for limiting Klaxon can assume that it was correct in its original context.
386. This Article is thus in the tradition of Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 921, 933 (1998). See also Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, at xi-xii (2006) [hereinafter Koppelman, Different States].
387. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Interstate Pluralism: The Role of Federalism in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 1703, 1801.
388. Cf. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it-discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be. ").
389. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 n.8 (2004) ("The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded against. " (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale L.J. 333, 337 (1933).
390. DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 928 (6th Cir. 2006), discussed in more detail above at notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
391. Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for Dupont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 300 (2009).
392. See McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1990) (cited in Dupont, 555 U.S. at 304).
393. DaimlerChrysler, 448 F.3d at 928-29 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
394. See Buce v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 1133, 1148 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting some disagreement with Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Doe, 140 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.1998).
395. Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867 (7th Cir.1996).
396. Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867 (7th Cir.1996).
397. Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867 (7th Cir.1996).
398. Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867 (7th Cir.1996).
399. In contrast, I am more skeptical of those who have treated bankruptcy jurisdiction as a separate category for purposes of the Klaxon/choice-of-law problem. Some say that Klaxon should be especially applicable to bankruptcy. See In re Merritt Dredging Co., 839 F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1988).
400. Morton v. Smith, 91 F.3d 867 (7th Cir.1996).
401. See Robert B. Chapman, Profoundly Unwise and Even Irresponsible Uncertainty: Some Preliminary Questions as to the Effect of the Defense of Marriage Act on Marital Status in Bankruptcy for Same-Sex Couples Validly Married Under State Law, 14 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 (2005).
402. Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 881 (2006).
403. For some of the reasons for using a state's whole law, see Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1962).
404. This Article is thus in the tradition of Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 921, 933 (1998). See also Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, at xi-xii (2006) [hereinafter Koppelman, Different States].
405. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 253 (1992) ("Trying to be all things to all people, [the Second Restatement] produced mush. ").
406. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 253 (1992) ("Trying to be all things to all people, [the Second Restatement] produced mush. ").
407. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
408. 38 U.S.C. § 103(c). The veterans' benefits statute looks to where the parties resided "when the right to benefits accrued" (or, alternatively, when they were married), id., so it does not fit perfectly into this scheme. It is a separate, and interesting, question how courts should deal with this federal conflicts problem when it intersects with a right that vests over time or at a particular time. Cf. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1277, 1286 (1989). For example, immigration proceedings related to marriage can take several years, and one might question whether federal courts should have to reinquire into a couple's marital status if their domicile changes during that period.
409. See Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Implications for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 537 (2010).
410. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1459, 1495-517, 1535-44 (1997) (comparing different theories of deference).
411. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1459, 1495-517, 1535-44 (1997) (comparing different theories of deference).
412. This Article is thus in the tradition of Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 921, 933 (1998). See also Andrew Koppelman, Same Sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross State Lines, at xi-xii (2006) [hereinafter Koppelman, Different States].
413. see also Scott Titshaw, Sorry Ma'am, Your Baby Is an Alien: Outdated Immigration Rules and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 12 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 47, 95 n.221 (2010) (collecting Board of Immigration Appeals decisions).
414. I am assuming, tentatively again, that Congress has not done so already. Congress has historically passed several laws disfavoring polygamy, and while many have been repealed, see, e.g., Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 683, 864 (repealing territorial antipolygamy offenses previously codified at 18 U.S.C. § 513 (1946), some have not, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A) ("Any immigrant who is coming to the United States to practice polygamy is inadmissible. "). Thanks to Kent Olsen for research on this point.
415. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 498 (1954).
416. Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992).
417. See Paul L. Caron, The Role of State Court Decisions in Federal Tax Litigation: Bosch, Erie, and Beyond, 71 Or. L. Rev. 781, 782-83 (1992).
418. Covey T. Oliver, The Nature of the Compulsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 638, 639 (1953).
419. Covey T. Oliver, The Nature of the Compulsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 638, 639 (1953).
420. Covey T. Oliver, The Nature of the Compulsive Effect of State Law in Federal Tax Proceedings, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 638, 639 (1953).
421. see also Astrue v. Capato, No. 11-159, 2012 WL 1810219 (U.S. May 21, 2012) (discussing § 416(h)(2)(A).
422. Michael Carter, Comment, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: It's Time to Fully Embrace State Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 767 (2008).
423. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 120-21 (2009).
424. E.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
425. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009).
426. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009).
427. 18 U.S.C. § 13(a). The enclaves are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7, and the scheme was upheld in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294-97 (1958).
428. Statement About Policy on Abortions at Military Base Hospitals in the United States, 3 Pub. Papers 500 (Apr. 3, 1971).
429. see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 Yale L.J. 2028, 2053-54 (2011).
430. For more, see Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 294-96.
431. For more, see Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 294-96.
432. For more, see Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 294-96.
433. For more, see Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 294-96.
434. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 320-23 (1974).
435. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 161 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1988) (1835).
436. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819).
437. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 Yale L.J. 619, 643-56 (2001).
438. See, e.g., F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 561, 591, 599.
439. Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 83, 84-96 (1998).
440. E.g., Jonathan Rauch, Saying No to "I Do, " Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at A8.
441. David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Conservatives: Keep Gay Marriage out of the Courts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2006, at A31 ("[T]he question of who may marry and under what conWisconditions has been the province of the state legislatures. And it should have remained that way. ").
442. Steve Chapman, A Federalist Case for Gay Marriage, Reason (Apr. 27, 2009), http://reason.com/archives/2009/04/27/a-federalist-case-for-gay-marr.
443. see also Franklin Foer, The Joy of Federalism, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 2005, § 7 (Book Review), at 12 (canvassing other such arguments).
444. See Bob Barr, Wedding Blues, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 2009, at A13.
445. Compare Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 207 (1836) (holding a slave is made free if travelling with master "staying some time, but not acquiring a domicil here"), with Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 477 (1820) (finding the Northwest Ordinance frees the slaves of residents alone, not to those "of the traveler or sojourner"), and Lewis v. Fullerton, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 15, 15 (1821) (holding that a slave passing through a free state "for a mere transitory purpose... does not thereby acquire a right to freedom"). For further discussion, see also Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 87-99 (1975) (discussing these and other cases).
446. Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, Comity 89, 103-125, 187-200 (1981).
447. Bruce E. Boyden, Constitutional Safety Valve: The Privileges or Immunities Clause and Status Regimes in a Federalist System, 62 Ala. L. Rev. 111, 148-50 (2010). See generally Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851) (leaving this dispute to state law).
448. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
449. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
450. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
451. See, e.g., Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 229-30 (1847).
452. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617-18 (1842). For criticism, see Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 262-63 (2005).
453. See In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854) (attempting to nullify the Fugitive Slave Act), rev'd Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859).
454. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 617-18 (1842). For criticism, see Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 262-63 (2005).
455. Carl B. Swisher, The Taney Period 1836-64, in 5 History of the Supreme Court of the United States 653-75 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1974) (same).
456. Jeffrey Schmitt, Note, Rethinking Ableman v. Booth and States' Rights in Wisconsin, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1315, 1323-42 (2007) (same).
457. Culminating, of course, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857).
458. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 498 (1954).
459. See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 133-38 (2008).
460. Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of "Uniform Laws, " 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 62-64), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1967905.
461. Brief in Opposition at 14, Astrue v. Capato, No. 11-159 (U.S. May 21, 2012), 2011 WL 5014750 (cert. granted).
462. See generally Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008).
463. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
464. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).
465. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1501(a) (2008). That proviso was eliminated after the Tenth Circuit's decision. See Firearm Ownership-Domestic Violence Offenses, 2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws 154.
466. Crank, 539 F.3d at 1244-49.
467. Brief of United States at 19, Crank, 539 F.3d 1236 (No. 07-8046), 2007 WL 4732294.
468. Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1201, 1206 (2009) ("[T]he only self-executing portion of the Clause was evidentiary in nature: it obliged states to admit sister-state records into evidence but did not mandate the substantive effect those records should have. The real significance of the Clause was the power it granted to Congress to specify that effect later. " (footnote omitted).
469. Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1201, 1206 (2009) ("[T]he only self-executing portion of the Clause was evidentiary in nature: it obliged states to admit sister-state records into evidence but did not mandate the substantive effect those records should have. The real significance of the Clause was the power it granted to Congress to specify that effect later. " (footnote omitted).
470. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Nancy Gill, et al. and Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Dean Hara at 2, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-2204 (1st Cir. Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Gill Brief].