On optimal single-item auctions

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 119-128

  Papadimitriou, Christos H ^a   Pierrakos, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian optimal mechanism design; correlated valuations

Indexed keywords

GEOMETRY; MACHINE DESIGN;

CORRELATED VALUATIONS; DUALITY THEOREMS; GEOMETRIC CHARACTERIZATION; INAPPROXIMABILITY; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; JOINT DISTRIBUTIONS; OPTIMAL AUCTION; OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGNS;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 79959755774     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993636.1993654     Document Type: Conference Paper

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