Loss Aversion and the law

Vanderbilt Law Review

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 829-894

  Zamir, Eyal ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862099500     PISSN: 00422533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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