Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: The case of US states

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 134-165

  Crowley, George R ^a  

^a TROY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Diffusion; Spatial dependence; State constitutions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861763985     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-012-9117-4     Document Type: Article

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