On the delegation of powers: With special emphasis on central and eastern Europe

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 25-52

  Salzberger, Eli M ^a   Voigt, Stefan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b RUHR UNIVERSITY BOCHUM   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142670314     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013635123722     Document Type: Article

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