The political economy of constitutional choice: A study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-27

  Kimenyi, Mwangi S ^a   Shughart II, William F ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitutions; Direct democracy; Ethnic divisions; Interest groups; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 75549084853     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-008-9062-4     Document Type: Article

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