Decentralized governance, constitution formation, and redistribution

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 161-188

  Wibbels, Erik ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitutions; Decentralization; Federalism; Political economy; Redistributive politics

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444556923     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-2234-6     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (77)

1. Ades, A., and Glaesser, E. (1995) "Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants." Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 195-227.
2. Banerjee, A., and Lakshmi Iyer (2002) "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." Ms. Department of Economics, MIT.
3. Bates, R. (1981) Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.
4. Botana, N. (1998) El Orden Conservador: La Política Argentina Entre 1880 y 1916. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.
5. Brass, P. R. (1982) Pluralism, Regionalism and Decentralizing Tendencies in Contemporary Indian Politics In: Wilson, and Wilson, (ed.) The States of South Asia. London: C. Hurst & Co.
6. Brass, P. R. (1990) The Politics of India since Independence. New York: Cambridge University Press.
7. Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J. (1980) The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Cain, M. and Dougherty, K. (1999) "Suppressing Shays' Rebellion: Collective Action and Constitutional Design Under the Articles of Confederation." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 233-60.
9. Clark, G. and Wolcott, S. (2002) One Polity, Many Countries: Economic Growth in India, 1873-2000, Working Paper, University of California-Davis.
10. Dahl, R. (2002) How Democratic is the American Constitution? New Haven: Yale University Press.
11. Das, H. H., and Choudhury, B. C. (1990) Federal and State Politics in India. New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House.
12. Engerman, S., and Kenneth, L. S. (2001) "The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World". NBER Working Paper 8512.
13. Ferns, H. S. (1973) The Argentine Republic, 1516-1971. New York: Barnes and Noble.
14. Fillipov, M., Ordeshook, P. and Shvetsova, O. (2004) Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
15. Gibson, E. and Falleti, T. (2004) Unity by the Stick: Regional Conflict and the Origins of Argentine Federalism In: Gibson, (ed.) Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
16. Gibson, E., Ernesto, C., and Tulia, F. (2004) "Reallocative Federalism: Overrepresentation and Public Spending in the Western Hemisphere." In Federalism: Latin America in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
17. Government of India. Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Programme Implementation. Various Years. Statistical Abstract of India. New Delhi: Government of India.
18. Hall, K. L. (1992) Major Problems in American Constitutional History. Volume I: The Colonial Era Through Reconstruction. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company.
19. Elster, J. (1995) "The Impact of Constitutions on Economic Performance." Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1994, pp. 209-239. Washington: World Bank.
20. Griffiths, S. P. (1952) Modern India, London: E. Benn.
21. Hall, K. (ed.) (1992) Major Problems in American Constitutional History: Volume 1 - The Colonial Era Through Construction. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company.
22. Hardin, R. (1988) "Constitutional Political Economy - Agreement on Rules." British Journal of Political Science 18: 513-30.
23. Hardin, R. (1989) "Why a Constitution?" In: Groman, and Wittman, (ed.) The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. New York: Agathon Press.
24. Iarzczower M., Sebastian S., and Mariano T. (2002) "Coming Together: The Industrial Organization of Federalism", Manuscript, Universidad de San Andres, Argentina.
25. Jones, A. H. (1977) American Colonial Wealth: Documents and Methods. New York: Arno Press.
26. Krugman, P. (1991) Geography and Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press.
27. Lacoste, P. 1990. Hegemonia Y Poder En El Oeste De Argentina. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina.
28. Landes, D. S. (1999) The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co.
29. Larson, J. L. (2001) Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
30. Lee, F. and Oppenheimer, B. (1999) Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
31. Levi, M. (1988) Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.
32. Mahalanobis, P. C. (1956) "Draft Recommendation for the Formulation of the Second Five Year Plan." In India Planning Commission, Second Five Year Plan. New Delhi.
33. Meltzer, A. and Richard, S. (1981) "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." Journal of Political Economy 89: 914-27.
34. Moore, R. (1982) "India in 1947: The Limits of Unity" In: Wilson, and Wilson (ed.) The States of South Asia. London: C. Hurst & Co.
35. Narain, I. (1988) "Federal Reality in India: Empirical Referents and Hypotheses" In: Lloyd Brown-John, C. (ed.) Centralizing and Decentralizing Trends in Federal States. New York: University Press of America.
36. Natarajan, B. (1949) An Essay on National Income and Expenditure in India, Madras: Government Press.
37. Nayar, B. R. (1972) The Modernization Imperative and India Planning. Delhi: Vikas.
38. North, D. (1961) The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
39. North, D. and Weingast, B. (1989) "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England." Journal of Economic History 49(4): 803-32.
40. Oates, W. E. (1972) Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
41. Olson, M. (1993) "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." American Political Science Review 87: 567-76.
42. Onuf, P. (1987) Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.
43. Ostrom, V. (1987) The Political Theory of a Compound Republic. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
44. Panizza, U. (1999) "On the Determinants of Fiscal Centralization: Theory and Evidence." Journal of Public Economics 74: 97-139.
45. Przeworski, A. (1991) Democracy and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
46. Przeworski, A. (2003) "Institutions Matter?" Working Paper, NYU.
47. Remmer, K. L., and Wibbels, E. (2000) "The Subnational Politics of Economic Adjustment: Provincial Politics and Fiscal Performance in Argentina." Comparative Political Studies 33: 419-451.
48. Riker, W. H. (1964) Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
49. Riker, W. H. (1980) "Implications of the Disequlibria of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." American Political Science Review 74: 432-46.
50. Rock, D. (1985) Argentina, 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War. Berkeley: University of California Press.
51. Rock, D. (1987) Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsin. Berkeley: University of California Press.
52. Rock, D. (2002) State Building and Political Movements in Argentina, 1860-1916. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
53. Rodden, J. (2002) "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance Around the World." American Journal of Political Science 46: 670-687.
54. Rodden, J. and Wibbels, E. (2002) "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multi-Tiered Systems." World Politics 54: 494-531.
55. Rodden, J. Eskeland, G. Litvack, J. (eds.) (2003) Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Soft Budget Constraints. Cambridge: MIT University Press.
56. Rogowski, R. (1988) Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
57. Sawers, L. (1996) The Other Argentina: The Interior and National Development. Boulder: Westview Press.
58. Sbragia, A. M. (1996) Debt Wish: Entrepreneurial Cities, U.S. Federalism, and Economic Development. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
59. Schofield, N. (2000) "Constitutional Quandaries and Critical Elections." Politics, Philosophy, and Economics Sept: 5-36.
60. Schofield, N. (2000b) "Constitutional Political Economy: On the Possibility of Combining Rational Choice Theory and Comparative Politics." Annual Review of Political Science 3: 277-303.
61. Scobie, J. (1971) Argentina: A City and a Nation. New York: Oxford University Press.
62. Sinha, A. (2004) "The Changing Political Economy of Federalism in India: A Historical Institutionalist Approach." India Review 3: 24-46.
63. Sokoloff, K., and Engerman, S. (2000) "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World." Journal of Economic Perspectives XIV: 217-32.
64. Stepan, A. (1999) "Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model. "Journal of Democracy 10: 19-34.
65. Terry, J. A. (1912) Finanzas. Librería Juridica: Buenos Aires.
66. Tiebout, C. (1956) "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64: 416-24.
67. Tilly, C. (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1990. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
68. Treisman, D. (2000) "Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity?" American Political Science Review 94: 837-858.
69. Wallis, J. J. (2002) "Constitutions, Corporations, and Internal Improvements: American States, 1842-1852". Unpublished manuscript, University of Maryland Department of Economics.
70. Wallis, J., and Barry, W. (2004) "Equilibrium Impotence: Why the States and Not the American National Government Financed Infrastructure Investment in the Antebellum Era." Unpublished manuscript, University of Maryland Department of Economics.
71. Weiner, M. (1963) Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
72. Weiner, M. (1967) Party Building in a New Nation: The India National Congress. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
73. Weingast, B. R. (1995) "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Growth." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11: 1-31.
74. Weingast, B. (2003) "Self-Enforcing Constitutions." Manuscript, Stanford University.
75. Wibbels, E. (2000) "Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance." American Journal of Political Science 44: 687-702.
76. Wibbels, E. (2003) "Bailouts, Budget Constraints, and Leviathans: Comparative Federalism and Lessons from the Early U.S." Comparative Political Studies. 36: 475-508.
77. Wood, G. (1969) The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. New York: Norton and Company.