Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception

Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 289-311

  Lyons, Jack ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861758113     PISSN: 15336077     EISSN: 17582237     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00205.x     Document Type: Article

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