Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification

Nous

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 201-222

  Siegel, Susanna ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861636960     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00786.x     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. "Color sensitivity and mood disorders: biology or metaphor?". Barrick et al., Journal of Affective Disorders 68 (2002) 67-71.
2. "Memory Modulates Color Experience". Gegenfurtner et al, Nature Neuroscience, vol 9, no. 11. 2006. See also R Goldstone, "Effects of Categorization on Color Perception." Psychological Science 5, 298-304.
3. For instance, according to this view, a rash person will not perceive the danger in a situation where a courageous person would. I. Murdoch (1970) "The Idea of Perfection" in The Sovereignty of Good Schocken Books; and J. McDowell (1979) "Virtue and Reason" The Monist lxii.
4. For instance, Eberhardt el al (2004) presents evidence using a dot-probe paradigm that when primed with crime-related words or objects, the attention of white subjects is more readily captured by black faces than by white faces ("Seeing Black: Race, Crime and Visual Processing", in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 87, No. 6, 876-893.)
5. In addition to the studies cited in earlier notes, other suggestive studies include Levin, D. T. & Banaji, M. R. (2006), which includes evidence that categorization of a racially ambiguous face as black or white influences how light subjects see it to be ("Distortions in the perceived lightness of faces: The role of race categories." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 501-512.).
6. In a study by Payne (2001), people exposed to black faces were more likely to misidentify a tool as a gun under time pressure ("Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1-12.)
7. Eberhardt et al (op cit) found that white subjects primed with images of black male faces more readily detect guns in fuzzy images in a perceptual threshold task, compared with subjects primed with faces of white male faces. J. Broackes (2010) discusses a case in which expectations about what color a thing should be influences the color experience of color-blind subjects ("What Do the Color-Blind See?", in
8. J. Cohen & M. Matthen, eds. (2010), Color Ontology and Color Science MIT Press).
9. Huemer, a proponent of dogmatism, writes: "Phenomenal conservatism. . .says that when it seems as if P and there is no evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to believe P. . . Phenomenal conservatism is a necessary truth, not a contingent one. There is no possible world in which phenomenal conservatism is false." Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Ch. 5.3.
10. For discussion of this amusing episode in the history of embryology see C. Pinto-Correia (1998), The Ovary of Eve. University of Chicago Press.
11. Pryor (2000), "The Skeptic and The Dogmatist". Nous 34.
12. For an argument that justification should not be assimilated to blamelessness, see Pryor (2001), "Highlights of Recent Epistemology", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol 52.
13. E. Conee and R. Feldman (2001) "Internalism Defended". Reprinted in E. Conee and R. Feldman, Eds. Evidentialism. Oxford University Press, 2004.
14. A minimal evidential boost in the form of immediate justification may offer a reply to the skeptical position that experiences are deprived of justificatory force altogether. But it does not illuminate the full epistemic role of perception, and does not by itself vindicate what we're supposing is an ordinary classification of certain perceptual beliefs to degree N+. 14 This version of the distinction between undercutting and rebutting defeaters is crude but will do for our purposes. For recent discussion of the distinction see M. Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness, Oxford University Press, 2006, and for classic discussion
15. see J. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. (Towota, NJ: Rowman And Littlefield Publishers). 1st edition, 1986.
16. For discussion of whether experiences have contents, see Travis (2004), "The Silence of the Senses" Mind;
17. Siegel (2010), "Do Experiences Have Contents?" in B. Nanay, ed. Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press
18. and A. Byrne 2009, "Experience and Content", Philosophical Quarterly 59.
19. "The Perils of Dogmatism", in G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Eds. S. Nucatelli and G. Seay. Oxford University Press, 2007, and "Skepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon," Mind 100 (1991), 87-115.