Response to critics

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 153, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 477-488

  Lyons, Jack ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952653267     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9605-1     Document Type: Article

References (15)

1. Alston, W. P. (1988). An internalist externalism. Synthese, 74, 265-283.
2. Audi, R. (1998). Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge. New York: Routledge.
3. BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
4. Comesaña, J. (forthcoming). Evidentialist reliabilism. Nous.
5. Cummins, R. (1975). Functional analysis. Journal of Philosophy, 72, 741-765.
6. Goldman, A. I. (1992). Epistemic folkways and scientific epistemology. In A. I. Goldman (Ed.), Liaisons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
7. Horgan, T. (forthcoming). From agentive phenomenology to cognitive phenomenology: A guide for the perplexed. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
9. Lyons, J. C. (2001). Carving the mind at its (not necessarily modular) joints. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52, 277-302.
10. Lyons, J. C. (2005). Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 237-256.
11. Marr, D. (1982). Vision. London: Allen and Unwin.
12. Pollock, J. (1986). Contemporary theories of knowledge. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
13. Pollock, J., & Cruz, J. (1999). Contemporary theories of knowledge, 2nd ed. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
14. Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Nous, 34, 517-549.
15. Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82, 139-168.