Commentary on Jack Lyons's Perception and Basic Beliefs

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 153, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 457-466

  Goldman, Alvin I ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952656171     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9602-4     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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2. Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227-287.
3. BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
4. Comesana, J. (forthcoming). Evidentialist reliabilism. Nous.
5. Feldman, R. (2003). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
6. Goldman, A. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge. Dordrecht: Kluwer (Reprinted in Liaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
7. Goldman, A. (1986). Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
8. Goldman, A. (2008). Immediate justification and process reliabilism. In Q. Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: New essays. New York: Oxford University Press.
9. Goldman, A. (2009). Internalism, externalism, and the architecture of justification. Journal of Philosophy, 106(6), 309-338.
10. Goldman, A. (forthcoming). Toward a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism; or, evidentialism's problems, reliabilism's rescue package. In T. Dougherty (Ed.), Evidentialism and its discontents. New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Lehrer, K. (1990). Theory of knowledge. Boulder: Westview Press.
12. Lewis, D. (1999). New work for a theory of universals, papers in metaphysics and epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Lyons, J. (2009). Perception and basic beliefs: Zombies, modules, and the problem of the external world. New York: Oxford University Press.
14. Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. New York: Oxford University Press.