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Volumn 11, Issue 1, 2012, Pages

Market asymmetries and investments in next generation access networks

Author keywords

access price regulation; investment incentives; NGN; one way access; telecommunication

Indexed keywords


EID: 84861591142     PISSN: None     EISSN: 14469022     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/1446-9022.1323     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (31)

References (30)
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  • 2
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    • Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers (1998), The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note, Journal of Industrial Economics 46, 115-121.
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  • 4
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    • Economic welfare and the allocation of resources inventions
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  • 9
    • 77950689676 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Can two-part tariffs promote efficient investment on next generation networks?
    • Brito, D., Pereira, P. and J. Vareda (2010), Can Two-Part Tariffs Promote Efficient Investment on Next Generation Networks?, International Journal of Industrial Organization 28(3), 323-333.
    • (2010) International Journal of Industrial Organization , vol.28 , Issue.3 , pp. 323-333
    • Brito, D.1    Pereira, P.2    Vareda, J.3
  • 10
    • 70350568154 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Broadband investment and regulation. A literature review
    • Cambini, C. and Y. Jiang (2009), Broadband Investment and Regulation. A Literature Review, Telecommunications Policy 33, 559-574.
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    • Cambini, C.1    Jiang, Y.2
  • 12
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    • Local loop unbundling: One-way access and imperfect competition
    • in: R. Dewenter and J. Haucap (eds.), Elsevier Science
    • De Bijl, P. and M. Peitz (2006), Local Loop Unbundling: One-Way Access and Imperfect Competition, in: R. Dewenter and J. Haucap (eds.), Access Pricing: Theory and Practice, Elsevier Science, 91-117.
    • (2006) Access Pricing: Theory and Practice , pp. 91-117
    • De Bijl, P.1    Peitz, M.2
  • 13
    • 0348223621 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market
    • Foros, O. (2004), Strategic Investments with Spillovers, Vertical Integration and Foreclosure in the Broadband Access Market, International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, 1-24.
    • (2004) International Journal of Industrial Organization , vol.22 , pp. 1-24
    • Foros, O.1
  • 14
    • 0042785568 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Regulating private infrastructure investment: Optimal pricing for access to essential facilities
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  • 15
    • 1842738747 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Access holidays and the timing of infrastructure investment
    • Gans, J., and S. King (2004), Access Holidays and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment, Economic Record 80, 89-100.
    • (2004) Economic Record , vol.80 , pp. 89-100
    • Gans, J.1    King, S.2
  • 16
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    • Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly
    • Gilbert, R. and D. Newbery (1982), Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, American Economic Review 72, 514-526.
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  • 18
  • 22
    • 33746657224 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Access price regulation, investment and entry in telecommunications
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  • 26
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    • Nonlinear pricing with random participation
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  • 27
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    • Access regulation and the incumbent investment in quality upgrades and in cost reduction
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  • 28
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    • Quality upgrades and bypass under mandatory access
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    • Vareda, J.1
  • 30
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    • Price regulation of access to telecommunications networks
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.