Nonlinear pricing with random participation

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 277-311

  Rochet, Jean Charles ^a   Stole, Lars A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MONOPOLY; PRICE DYNAMICS; PRICING POLICY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036181349     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00206     Document Type: Article

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