Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition

Information Economics and Policy

Volumn 11, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 73-100

  Lewis, Tracy R ^a   Sappington, David E M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Access pricing; D82; L51; Managing competition

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; COSTS; OPTIMIZATION; VALUE ENGINEERING;

ACCESS PRICING; UNREGULATED DOWNSTREAM COMPETITIONS;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 0032646218     PISSN: 01676245     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6245(99)00004-9     Document Type: Article

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