Regulation and entry into telecommunications markets

Regulation and Entry into Telecommunications Markets

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-272

  de Bijl, Paul ^a   Peitz, Martin ^b  

^a Ministry of Finance Netherlands   (Netherlands)

^b GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84928372050     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511493218     Document Type: Book

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