Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-24

  Foros, Øystein ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

Broadband; Strategic investment; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

BROADBAND NETWORKS; COSTS; INTERNET; INVESTMENTS; STRATEGIC PLANNING; THEOREM PROVING; VALUE ENGINEERING;

PRICE REGULATION; VALUE-ADDED SERVICES;

COMPETITION;

EID: 0348223621     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00079-1     Document Type: Article

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