Institutional ownership monitoring and corporate political activity: Governance implications

Journal of Business Research

Volumn 65, Issue 7, 2012, Pages 944-950

  Hadani, Michael ^a  

^a LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Corporate political activity; Institutional ownership; Lobbying

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861570263     PISSN: 01482963     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.05.003     Document Type: Article

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