Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective

Resource and Energy Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 431-441

  Cheng, Chu Chuan ^a   Lai, Yu Bong ^a  

^a NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Compliance; Enforcement policy; Environmental policy; Interest groups; Lobbying; Political economy

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; COMPLIANCE; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; INTEREST GROUPS; LOBBYING; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS; POLLUTION; PUBLIC POLICY;

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; COMPLIANCE; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; LAW ENFORCEMENT; LOBBYING; POLICY MAKING; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLLUTION POLICY; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK;

EID: 84861112451     PISSN: 09287655     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.04.003     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Andreoni J. Reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines: should the penalty fit the crime?. Rand Journal of Economics 1991, 22:385-395.
2. Becker G.S. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 1968, 76:169-217.
3. Bernheim B.D., Whinston M.D. Menu auction, resource allocation, and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1986, 101:1-31.
4. Bommer R., Schulze G.G. Environmental improvement with trade liberalization. European Journal of Political Economy 1999, 15:639-661.
5. Bontems P., Bourgeon J-M. Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy. European Economic Review 2005, 49:409-435.
6. Cremer H., Gahvari F. Imperfect observability of emissions and second-best emission and output taxes. Journal of Public Economics 2002, 85:385-407.
7. Damania R., Fredriksson P.G., List J. Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2003, 46:490-512.
8. Deily M.E., Gray W.B. Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining industry. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1991, 21:260-274.
9. Fredriksson P.G. The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1997, 33:44-58.
10. Fredriksson P.G. The political economy of trade liberalization and environmental policy. Southern Economic Journal 1999, 65:513-525.
11. Greenberg J. Avoiding tax-avoidance. Journal of Economic Theory 1984, 32:1-13.
12. Grossman G.M., Helpman E. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 1994, 84:833-850.
13. Harford J.D. Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1978, 5:26-43.
14. Harford J.D. Self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1987, 14:293-303.
15. Harrington W. Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal of Public Economics 1988, 37:29-53.
16. Heyes A.G. Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment. Journal of Public Economics 1996, 60:251-265.
17. Heyes A.G. Implementing environmental regulation: enforcement and compliance. Journal of Regulatory Economics 2000, 17:107-129.
18. Heyes A.G. A theory of filtered enforcement. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2002, 43:34-46.
19. Heyes A.G., Maxwell J. Private vs. public regulation: political economy of the international environment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2004, 48:978-996.
20. Innes R., Sam A.G. Voluntary pollution reductions and the enforcement of environmental law: an empirical study of the 33/50 program. Journal of Law and Economics 2008, 51:271-296.
21. Kambhu J. Regulatory standards, non-compliance and enforcement. Journal of Regulatory Economics 1989, 1:103-114.
22. Lyon T., Maxwell J. Self-regulation, taxation, and public voluntary environmental agreements. Journal of Public Economics 2003, 87:1453-1486.
23. Macho-Stadler I. Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance. Spanish Economic Review 2008, 10:1-21.
24. Macho-Stadler I., Pérez-Castrillo D. Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2006, 51:110-131.
25. Michaelis P. Regulate us, please! On strategic lobbying in Cournot-Nash oligopoly. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 1994, 150:693-709.
26. Nowell C., Shogren J. Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics 1994, 6:265-284.
27. Raymond M. Regulatory compliance with costly and uncertain litigation. Journal of Regulatory Economics 2004, 26:165-176.
28. Russell C.S. Monitoring and enforcement. Public Policies for Environmental Protection 1990, Resources for the Future, DC.
29. Sandmo A. Efficient environmental policy with imperfect compliance. Environmental and Resource Economics 2002, 23:85-103.
30. Shiota N. Tax compliance and workability of the pricing and standards approach. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 2008, 9:193-211.
31. Weck-Hannemann H. Environmental politics. Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy 2008, Springer, New York.